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America’s Missing Diaspora: The “Hawthornian Majority” and Anglo-American Relations

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The US "Culture Wars" and the Anglo-American Special Relationship

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Abstract

This chapter picks up the story where the last one left it: with a discussion of the “propaganda school’s” explanation of how and why the United States entered the First World War and became a British ally. Conceding at the outset that there is some logic to this school’s argument about sentimentality (“emotion”) conducing Americans toward a course of action that, in time, became widely considered to have been a regrettable departure from tried-and-true principles of grand strategy, the chapter goes on to demonstrate what is nevertheless wrong with the propaganda school version of events. In doing so, emphasis is placed upon a particular application of “ontological security” that is itself a derivative of “social identity theory,” in a bid to demonstrate why the British had, prior to the war, so misjudged the utility, to them, of America’s “Hawthornian majority,” that is, the English-descended component of its population.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A Gallup poll conducted in January 1937 found that 77 percent of respondents thought that it had been a blunder for the United States to have intervened in the war; see Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 189.

  2. 2.

    See, for interwar attempts to avoid a repetition of the situation(s) thought to have led America to war in 1917, Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Struggle over the Arms Embargo (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968).

  3. 3.

    Gary S. Messinger, British Propaganda and the State in the First World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); J. Lee Thompson, Politicians, the Press and Propaganda: Lord Northcliffe and the Great War, 1914–1919 (London: Associated University Presses, 1999); Idem, “‘To Tell the People of America the Truth’: Lord Northcliffe in the USA, Unofficial British Propaganda, June–November 1917,” Journal of Contemporary History 34 (April 1999): 243–62; Stewart Halsey Ross, Propaganda for War: How the United States Was Conditioned to Fight the Great War of 1914–1918 (London: McFarland & Company, 1996); Michael L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914–1918 (London: Macmillan, 1982); and Erika G. King, “Exposing the ‘Age of Lies’: The Propaganda Menace as Portrayed in American Magazines in the Aftermath of World War I,” Journal of American Culture 12 (Spring 1989): 35–40. While many atrocity stories were indeed fabricated, many others were not. German behavior in wartime Belgium, to put it mildly, was hardly consistent with Berlin’s repeated claims of innocence of war crimes; see Larry Zuckerman, The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I (New York: New York University Press, 2004); and John N. Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

  4. 4.

    Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1938; orig. pub. 1927); and Campbell Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House: The Story of a Famous Campaign (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920). One of the leading interwar revisionists, the historian Charles Beard, lampooned wartime American gullibility, expressed in what he termed the “Sunday-school theory” of the war’s origins, to wit: “three innocent lads [Russia, France, England] get beaten up on the way to Sunday school by two nasty bullies, Germany and Austria”; quoted in Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 207–8.

  5. 5.

    Today, we would use the term, multiculturalism, in place of cultural pluralism, but at the time of the culture wars of the neutrality period, the former term had yet to be concocted. Multiculturalism is believed to have made its inaugural appearance in the print media in July 1941, when Iris Barry employed it while reviewing, for the New York Herald Tribune Books, Edward Haskell’s Lance: A Novel about Multicultural Men. Both Barry and Haskell understood multicultural to refer to a person thought to be free of chauvinistic impulses. Over time, the term has come to mean something different, and to be employed as a synonym for “multi-ethnicity.” See Denis Lacorne, La Crise de l’identité américaine: Du melting-pot au multiculturalisme (Paris: Fayard, 1997), p. 20; and Nathan Glazer, We Are All Multiculturalists Now (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 8.

  6. 6.

    Horace M. Kallen, Culture and Democracy in the United States: Studies in the Group Psychology of the American Peoples (New York: Arno Press, 1970; orig. pub. 1924), p. 118.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., pp. 122–23.

  8. 8.

    Lois Kimball Mathews, The Expansion of New England: The Spread of New England Settlement and Institutions to the Mississippi River, 1620–1865 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), quote at p. 254. Also see Ralph Barton Perry, Puritanism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964; orig. pub. 1944); and Van Wyck Brooks, New England: Indian Summer, 1865–1915 (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1940).

  9. 9.

    Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). The irony here, as noted earlier in this book, is that Huntington, because of his insistence that America’s English-descended were settlers not immigrants, refused to recognize that they too might engage in this kind of “ethnic politicking.”

  10. 10.

    Kevin P. Phillips, The Cousins’ Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America (New York: Basic Books, 1999), pp. xv–xvi.

  11. 11.

    For a fascinating account that lays the emphasis upon an “Anglo-Saxon” racial identity as the key to Anglo-American relations, see Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

  12. 12.

    Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States: A.D. 990–1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1992).

  13. 13.

    Phillips, Cousins’ Wars, pp. xiii–xiv.

  14. 14.

    This was certainly the view of Huntington, who argued that America’s core culture remained that of its seventeenth and eighteenth century “settlers”—to wit an amalgam of Christian religion, Protestant work ethic, English language, and British law and governance practices, all of which together constituted the “American creed.” Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), pp. 40–41. In this claim, he was hardly alone, or even original, borrowing some of his core ideas from David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

  15. 15.

    See Erik Larson, Dead Wake: The Last Crossing of the Lusitania (New York: Crown, 2015); Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster: An Episode of Modern Warfare and Diplomacy (New York: Free Press, 1975); and Adolph A. Hoehling and Mary Hoehling, The Last Voyage of the Lusitania (New York: Henry Holt, 1956).

  16. 16.

    Nicholas John Cull, Selling War: The British Campaign against American Neutrality in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

  17. 17.

    Roosevelt’s post-Lusitania militancy on behalf of intervention cannot easily be explicable in terms of ethnocultural rallying, not least because he had often boasted proudly not only of possessing no English blood, but he went out of his way to insist that he considered the collective identity known as “Anglo-Saxonism” to be so much mumbo-jumbo, telling Rudyard Kipling, “I doubt if there is such a thing as an Anglo-Saxon, but at any rate I am not one”; quoted in William Henry Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1961), p. 527. In an earlier letter to John St. Loe Strachey, written during the Boer War, he observed, “I have felt very sadly over the war. I am myself of Dutch descent (though mixed with Scotch, Irish and French Huguenot), and many men in the Boer ranks bear names the same as those of some of my forefathers, and I dare say, are of the same blood.” TR to Strachey, 27 January 1900, in The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 2: The Years of Preparation, 1898–1900, ed. Elting E. Morison (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 1146. Pace what he wrote to Strachey and remarked to Kipling, Roosevelt did have some English forebears, his paternal grandmother having been a Pennsylvanian of Welsh, English, German, and Scotch-Irish extraction. For Anglo-Saxonism, and its impact on Roosevelt’s worldview, see Thomas G. Dyer, Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980).

  18. 18.

    Russell Buchanan, “Theodore Roosevelt and American Neutrality, 1914–1917,” American Historical Review 43 (July 1938): 775–90.

  19. 19.

    Henry A. Turner, “Woodrow Wilson and Public Opinion,” Public Opinion Quarterly 21 (Winter 1957–58): 505–20.

    Like Edmund Burke, Wilson believed that the elected leaders should not blindly follow public sentiment; rather, he was convinced that the prime responsibility of a statesman was to inform and provide leadership for the people so that they would understand and accept his judgment. In a number of minor matters Wilson’s decisions were dictated by public opinion, but when problems of major significance arose, Wilson felt that he must do what was ‘right’ whether it was ‘popular or not.’ (p. 519)

  20. 20.

    Hawthorne , who was born in Salem, Massachusetts, on 4 July 1804, was descended from East Anglian Puritans, one of whom—great-great-great-grandfather William Hathorne—had made a name for himself persecuting witches in the Salem trials. See Marion L. Starkey, The Devil in Massachusetts: A Modern Inquiry into the Salem Witch Trials (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949); and Chadwick Hansen, Witchcraft at Salem (New York: George Braziller, 1969). It was Nathaniel Hawthorne who changed the spelling of the family name. Mark Van Doren, Nathaniel Hawthorne (New York: W. Sloan Associates, 1949), pp. 4–6.

  21. 21.

    Quoted in Amanda Foreman, A World on Fire: Britain’s Crucial Role in the American Civil War (New York: Random House, 2010), p. 13. A British diplomatic counterpart in the United States, Richard Bickerton Pemell (otherwise known as Lord Lyons), corroborated Hawthorne’s basic point later in the same decade when he astutely observed that the “taking and giving of offense had become a reflexive habit in Anglo-American relations since the separation of 1775–83.”

  22. 22.

    Literary critics might object to Hawthorne’s being conscripted to serve as strategic-cultural eponym for a majoritarian perspective, for Hawthorne was, along with his contemporary Edgar Allan Poe, someone who on other cultural matters was as “out of touch with society as few other artists in the world have been before; to their contemporaries they seemed spectral and aloof, scarcely human.” Van Wyck Brooks, America’s Coming of Age (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1915), pp. 45–46.

  23. 23.

    For studies reflecting this interwar fascination with the impact of wartime propaganda, see James Duane Squires, British Propaganda at Home and in the United States from 1914 to 1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935); James Morgan Read, Atrocity Propaganda, 1914–1919 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941); and Harold Lavine and James Wechsler, War Propaganda and the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940; reprint ed., New York: Garland Publishing, 1972).

  24. 24.

    See, for example, Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, “Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War,” Security Studies 24 (October 2015): 662–95.

  25. 25.

    For an intriguing recent discussion, see Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017). Also see William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics 61 (January 2009): 28–57; Reinhard Wolf, “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition,” International Theory 3 (February 2011): 105–42; and T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds., Status in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

  26. 26.

    Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, “Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics,” Review of International Studies 34 (January 2008): 115–35, quote at pp. 116–17.

  27. 27.

    Why it is misleading to posit an antithetical relationship between rationality and emotions, is argued persuasively in Jonathan Mercer, “Emotional Beliefs,” International Organization 64 (Winter 2010): 1–31. Also see Renee Jeffery, “Reason, Emotion, and the Problem of World Poverty: Moral Sentiments Theory and International Ethics,” International Theory 3 (February 2011): 143–78. “Advances in decision neuroscience,” she writes, “have all lent support to Hume’s claim that emotion is central to reason and demonstrated that reason and emotion are engaged in both deontological and consequentialist variants of cosmopolitan moral deliberation…. [E]motions cannot be excised from the deliberative process and, more than that, play an indispensable role in making rational judgements. That is, without emotion, there can be no reason” (p. 163). Along this same line of argumentation, see Rose McDermott, “Cognitive Neuroscience and Politics: Next Steps,” in The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior, ed. W. Russell Neuman, George E. Marcus, Ann N. Crigler, and Michael MacKuen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 375–97; McDermott, “The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics 2 (December 2004): 691–706; and, on a broader philosophical level, Martha C. Nussbaum, The Monarchy of Fear: A Philosopher Looks at Our Political Crisis (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018).

  28. 28.

    For a useful corrective of the fallacy, see Stephen M. Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” International Security 23 (Spring 1999): 5–48.

  29. 29.

    Neta C. Crawford, “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships,” International Security 24 (Spring 2000): 116–56, quote at p. 122.

  30. 30.

    As noted by two analysts otherwise in sympathy with the emotions-in-IR enterprise; see Julien A. Deonna and Fabrice Teroni, “Taking Affective Explanations to Heart,” Social Science Information 48 (September 2009): 359–77.

  31. 31.

    See especially Todd H. Hall, Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016). For one particular emotion, anger, see Hall, “We Will Not Swallow this Bitter Fruit: Theorizing a Diplomacy of Anger,” Security Studies 20 (October 2011): 521–55; and Idem, “On Provocation: Outrage, International Relations, and the Franco-Prussian War,” Security Studies 26 (January 2017): 1–29.

  32. 32.

    Andrew Linklater, “Anger and World Politics: How Collective Emotions Shift over Time,” International Theory 6 (November 2014): 574–78, quote at p. 574.

  33. 33.

    Indeed, “positivists” who insist that rational-choice paradigms remain invaluable tools for analysis can sometimes figure among the most enthusiastic students of emotion in foreign-policy decisionmaking, a good and recent case in point being Brian C. Rathbun, Joshua D. Kertzer, and Mark Paradis, “Homo Diplomaticus: Mixed-Method Evidence of Variation in Strategic Rationality,” International Organization 71 (Supplement 2017): S33–60. Also see, for a somewhat different gloss on the same theme, Jonathan Renshon, Julia J. Lee, and Dustin Tingley, “Emotions and the Micro-Foundations of Commitment Problems,” ibid., pp. S189–218. But for a caution against the use of any “evolutionary psychology” (EP) approach that incorporates biological mechanisms in a bid to explicate decisionmaking behavior, see Duncan Bell, “Beware of False Prophets: Biology, Human Nature and the Future of International Relations Theory,” International Affairs 82 (May 2006): 493–510.

  34. 34.

    Andrew A.G. Ross, “Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions,” European Journal of International Relations 12 (June 2006):197–222.

  35. 35.

    Jean-Marc Coicaud, “Emotions and Passions in the Discipline of International Relations,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 15 (September 2014): 485–513.

  36. 36.

    See Neta C. Crawford, “Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking ‘Man’,” International Relations 23 (June 2009): 271–88.

  37. 37.

    Apropos the pessimism of realists, two scholars note that “[a]lthough realists disagree about many things, there is one matter on which they concur: In the absence of a common threat, sustained interstate cooperation is extremely difficult because (a) states are more concerned about relative than absolute gains, (b) states are always tempted to defect (and there is no higher authority to stop them or others from doing so), and (c) the penalties for being too sanguine about the intentions of others are so severe. The institutionalist challenge arose in response to this pessimistic appraisal of the prospects for cooperation in the international system.” James M. Goldgeier and Philip Tetlock, “Psychology and International Relations Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (June 2001): 67–92, quote at p. 78.

  38. 38.

    Alex Danchev, “On Specialness,” International Affairs 72 (October 1996): 737–50, quote at p. 740.

  39. 39.

    Arnold Wolfers and Laurence W. Martin, eds., The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs: Readings from Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956). Also see Max Beloff, “Is There an Anglo-American Political Tradition?” History 36 (February–June 1951): 73–91.

  40. 40.

    See Jasper Godwin Ridley, Lord Palmerston (London: Constable, 1970); and James Chambers, Palmerston: The People’s Darling (London: John Murray, 2004).

  41. 41.

    Heather Devere and Graham M. Smith, “Friendship and Politics,” Political Studies Review 8 (September 2010): 341–56, quote at p. 341.

  42. 42.

    See “TRIP 2014 Faculty Survey Report,” available at https://data.itpir.wm.edu/reports/rp_2014/index3.php. The acronym in the report’s title stands for Teaching, Research, and International Policy.

  43. 43.

    For instance, Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000); or even Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class, and Empire: The Enduring Anglo-American Relationship (New York: Nation Books, 2004); and Srdjan Vucetic, “A Racialized Peace? How Britain and the US Made Their Relationship Special,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (October 2011): 403–21.

  44. 44.

    Felix Berenskoetter, “Friends, There are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 35 (September 2007): 647–76, quote at pp. 674–75.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., quote at pp. 671–72.

  46. 46.

    Peter E. Digeser, “Friendship between States,” British Journal of Political Science 39 (April 2009): 323–44, quote at pp. 324–25.

  47. 47.

    While the intended target of the diaspora’s influence attempts may lie abroad, the activism, according to Huntington, still has an unintended effect of corrupting the formulation and pursuit of the national interest at home; see his “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs 76 (September/October 1997): 28–49.

  48. 48.

    See, for the claim that ontology has emerged as a “common, obvious, or uncontroversial term in IR,” pari passu the changing seasonal colors of the discipline’s theoretical foliage, Scott Hamilton, “A Genealogy of Metatheory in IR: How ‘Ontology’ Emerged from the Inter-paradigm Debate,” International Theory 9 (March 2017): 136–70, quote at p. 156.

  49. 49.

    Philip Gleason, “Identifying Identity: A Semantic History,” Journal of American History 69 (March 1983): 910–31, quote at pp. 918–19. See also Sheldon Stryker and Peter J. Burke, “The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly 63 (December 2000): 284–97.

  50. 50.

    Ronald David Laing, The Divided Self: A Study of Sanity and Madness (London: Tavistock, 1960).

  51. 51.

    Laing, quoted in Chris Rossdale, “Enclosing Critique: The Limits of Ontological Security,” International Political Sociology 9 (December 2015): 369–86, quote at p. 371.

  52. 52.

    In particular, see Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

  53. 53.

    Rossdale, “Enclosing Critique,” p. 372.

  54. 54.

    Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations 12 (September 2006): 341–70, quote at p. 360.

  55. 55.

    Ibid., pp. 361–62.

  56. 56.

    Catarina Kinnvall and Jennifer Mitzen, “An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics,” Cooperation and Conflict 52 (March 2017): 3–11, quote at p. 3. Also see the special issue on “Ontological (In)Security in the European Union,” guest edited by Kinnvall, Mitzen, and Ian Manners, European Security 27, 3 (2018): 249–413.

  57. 57.

    Amy Chua, “Tribal World: Group Identity Is All,” Foreign Affairs 97 (July/August 2018): 25–33, quote at p. 25. Also see Chua, Political Tribes: Group Instinct and the Fate of Nations (New York: Penguin Random House, 2018).

  58. 58.

    Henri Tajfel, “Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour,” Social Science Information 13 (April 1974): 65–93.

  59. 59.

    For these variations on a theme, see Brent E. Sasley, “Theorizing States’ Emotions,” International Studies Review 13 (September 2011): 452–76; and Rupert Brown, “Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Challenges,” European Journal of Social Psychology 30 (November 2000): 745–78.

  60. 60.

    Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity,” International Organization 49 (Spring 1995): 229–52, quote at pp. 241–42.

  61. 61.

    Tobias Theiler, “Societal Security and Social Psychology,” Review of International Studies 29 (April 2003): 249–68, quote at p. 261.

  62. 62.

    In addition to n54, above, see Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State (London: Routledge, 2008).

  63. 63.

    Lanoszka and Hunzeker, “Rage of Honor,” p. 667.

  64. 64.

    For an elaboration, see Theiler, “Societal Security and Social Psychology,” p. 267: “[S]ocietal security theorists sometimes imply that individuals want to defend their groups because these groups contain their culture. Social identity theory, by contrast, suggests that people value their culture because it helps sustain their groups, with ‘groupness’ serving basic cognitive and emotional needs. All this echoes Fredrik Barth’s well-known conclusion that what is important about groups is their boundaries rather than the cultural stuff they enclose.”

  65. 65.

    On the phenomenon of “othering” in IR, see Iver B. Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2 (June 1996): 139–74.

  66. 66.

    Edward F. McSweeney, Ireland Is an American Question (New York: Friends of Irish Freedom, 1919).

  67. 67.

    Berenskoetter, n45.

  68. 68.

    Jelena Subotić, “Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12 (October 2016): 610–27, quote at p. 611.

  69. 69.

    Iestyn Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean: British Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” 1900–1905 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005), pp. 9–10.

  70. 70.

    To use the formulation developed in Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

  71. 71.

    Galen Jackson, “The Offshore Balancing Thesis Reconsidered: Realism, the Balance of Power in Europe, and America’s Decision for War in 1917,” Security Studies 21 (July 2012): 455–89.

  72. 72.

    By the start of the 1980s, that share had declined to 20 percent. See Fischer, Albion’s Seed, pp. 873–74.

  73. 73.

    In the words of one writer, Tardieu was “an intellectual colossus [who] strode through a third of a century of history wielding more power over the Republic than its constitution-makers had ever dreamed of.” Rudolph Binion, Defeated Leaders: The Political Fate of Caillaux, Jouvenel, and Tardieu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 12–13. Also see Olivier Bernier, Fireworks at Dusk: Paris in the Thirties (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), p. 61.

  74. 74.

    André Tardieu, France and America: Some Experiences in Coöperation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927), pp. 302–3. Earlier that same year, this book was published in French, titled Devant l’obstacle: L’Amérique et nous (Paris: Paul-Emile Frères, 1927).

  75. 75.

    See Elizabeth Brett White, American Opinion of France: From Lafayette to Poincaré (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927).

  76. 76.

    Quoted in George Herbert Adams, Why Americans Dislike England (Philadelphia: Henry Altemus, 1896), p. 10. Hawley’s career in the senate spanned the years 1881 and 1905.

  77. 77.

    Duncan Andrew Campbell, Unlikely Allies: Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special Relationship (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007).

  78. 78.

    The origins of this policy idea back to the middle of the century; see Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).

  79. 79.

    Philip H. Bagenal, The American Irish and Their Influence on Irish Politics (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1882), respectively pp. 244–45 and 61–62 (emphasis added).

  80. 80.

    See William C. Reuter, “The Anatomy of Political Anglophobia in the United States, 1865–1900,” Mid-America 61 (April–July 1979): 117–32.

  81. 81.

    Especially, The Virginian: A Horseman of the Plains (New York: Macmillan, 1902).

  82. 82.

    Owen Wister, The Pentecost of Calamity (New York: Macmillan, 1915).

  83. 83.

    Owen Wister, A Straight Deal or, The Ancient Grudge (New York: Macmillan, 1920), pp. 95–96.

  84. 84.

    Ibid., pp. 99–100, 205.

  85. 85.

    Mark Sullivan, Our Times: The United States, 1900–1925, vol. 2: America Finding Itself (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932), pp. 49–50. Also see, for a similar argument about the impact of the country’s educational system upon its self-identity, Bessie Louise Pierce, Public Opinion and the Teaching of History in the United States (New York: Da Capo Press, 1970; orig. pub. 1926).

  86. 86.

    Arthur Guy Empey, “Over the Top”: By an American Soldier Who Went (Toronto: Briggs, 1917), p. 150.

  87. 87.

    Duncan Bell, “Before the Democratic Peace: Racial Unionism, Empire, and the Abolition of War,” European Journal of International Relations 20 (September 2014): 647–70.

  88. 88.

    For an interesting examination of the saying’s origins, see the online “Quote Investigator”; available at https://quoteinvestigator.com/2016/07/09/paranoid/

  89. 89.

    Noted one of American anglophobia’s most astute contemporary critics, “it is one of the strangest phenomena in ethnology if, in a single century, the two branches of the same race have become radically different in character from each other, and the strangest fact in history if, when a race was suddenly cut in two, all the good went to one side and all the evil to the other.” Goldwin Smith, “The Hatred of England,” North American Review 150 (May 1890): 547–62, quote at p. 547. Also see Elizabeth Wallace, “Goldwin Smith on England and America,” American Historical Review 59 (July 1954): 884–94. For a good summary of this period in the two countries’ diplomatic relations, see Charles S. Campbell, Jr., From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783–1900 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974).

  90. 90.

    Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams: An Autobiography, 2 vols. (New York: Time Incorporated, 1964; orig. pub. 1918), 1: 127–28.

  91. 91.

    Quoted in Karl Schriftgiesser, The Gentleman from Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge (Boston: Little, Brown, 1944), p. 198.

  92. 92.

    Henry Cabot Lodge, “England, Venezuela and the Monroe Doctrine,” North American Review 160 (June 1895): 651–58, quote at p. 657.

  93. 93.

    Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963; orig. pub. 1935).

  94. 94.

    On British disquiet with American territorial expansion, see Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815–1908 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); James E. Lewis, The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood, 1783–1829 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); J. Fred Rippy, Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain over Latin America, 1808–1830 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929); and Wilbur Devereux Jones, The American Problem in British Diplomacy, 1841–1861 (London: Macmillan, 1974). For various expansion-engendered diplomatic incidents during the decades prior to the Civil War, see Bradford Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812–1823 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); Howard Jones, “Anglophobia and the Aroostook War,” New England Quarterly 48 (December 1975): 519–39; Idem, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty: A Study in Anglo-American Relations, 1783–1843 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977); Frederick Merk, “British Government Propaganda and the Oregon Treaty,” American Historical Review 40 (October 1934): 38–62; Idem, The Oregon Question (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967); Sam W. Haynes, “Anglophobia and the Annexation of Texas: The Quest for National Security,” in Manifest Destiny and Empire: American Antebellum Expansion, ed. Haynes and Christopher Morris (Arlington: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), pp. 115–46; Ephraim Douglas Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838–1846 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1910); Idem, “English Interest in the Annexation of California,” American Historical Review 14 (July 1909): 744–63; Robert A. Naylor, “The British Role in Central America Prior to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850,” Hispanic American Historical Review 40 (August 1960): 361–82; Richard W. Van Alstyne, “Anglo-American Relations, 1853–1857: British Statesmen on the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and American Expansion,” American Historical Review 42 (April 1937): 491–500; Martin Crawford, The Anglo-American Crisis of the Mid-Nineteenth Century: The Times and America, 1850–1862 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987); and Kenneth Bourne, “The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the Decline of British Opposition to the Territorial Expansion of the United States, 1857–1860,” Journal of Modern History 33 (September 1961): 287–91.

  95. 95.

    David Paul Crook, The North, the South, and the Powers, 1861–1865 (New York: Wiley, 1974); Lynn Marshall Case and Warren F. Spencer, The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970); Dean Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War (Washington: Brassey’s, 1999).

  96. 96.

    Quoted in William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 22. The scholarship on Britain’s position(s) in respect of the Civil War is voluminous. In addition to Foreman, A World on Fire (n21), see Howard Jones, Union in Peril: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Brian A. Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union, 2 vols. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1974); Norman B. Ferris, The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977); Francis M. Carroll, “The American Civil War and British Intervention: The Threat of Anglo-American Conflict,” Canadian Journal of History 47 (Spring/Summer 2012): 87–115; Kenneth Bourne, “British Preparations for War with the North, 1861–1862,” English Historical Review 76 (October 1961): 600–32; Donald Bellows, “A Study of British Conservative Reaction to the American Civil War,” Journal of Southern History 51 (November 1985): 505–26; Frank J. Merli, The Alabama, British Neutrality and the American Civil War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Idem, Great Britain and the Confederate Navy (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1965); Warren F. Spencer, The Confederate Navy in Europe (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1983); Howard J. Fuller, Clad in Iron: The American Civil War and the Challenge of British Naval Power (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008); Wilbur Devereux Jones, “The British Conservatives and the American Civil War,” American Historical Review 58 (April 1953): 527–43; Richard Little, “British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War: The English School Strikes Back,” Security Studies 16 (April 2007): 68–95; and Peter Thompson, “The Case of the Missing Hegemon: British Nonintervention in the American Civil War,” ibid., pp. 96–132.

  97. 97.

    William Archibald Dunning, The British Empire and the United States: A Review of Their Relations Following the Treaty of Ghent (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1914), p. 323. One biographer relates that British support for the United States in the Spanish War became evident just as Lodge was putting the finishing touches on a two-volume history of the Revolution, for which this dramatic improvement in bilateral relations occasioned some instant editorial revisionism; as one of Lodge’s reviewers wryly noted, “[w]hen he began to write it was all the fashion to curse England, and he cursed her soundly. When he ended everyone was falling on England’s neck, and he fell, blubbering with the rest.” Quoted in Schriftgiesser, Gentleman from Massachusetts, p. 188.

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    David G. Haglund

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Haglund, D.G. (2019). America’s Missing Diaspora: The “Hawthornian Majority” and Anglo-American Relations. In: The US "Culture Wars" and the Anglo-American Special Relationship. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18549-7_4

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