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The US "Culture Wars" and the Anglo-American Special Relationship pp 3–23Cite as

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Identity, Culture Wars, and the Origins of the Anglo-American Special Relationship: A Huntingtonian Prelude

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Abstract

Taking as its point of departure the contemporary American debate over “culture wars,” this chapter introduces a core concept underlying the theoretical and empirical arguments made in this book: the notion, associated with the late Samuel Huntington, of “kin-country rallying.” Advanced in this introductory chapter is the assertion that “identity” is today considered by many as an indispensable element of political analysis. But while such an argument would hardly come as a surprise to any attentive observer of contemporary American and global political realities, what is much more of a surprise is the chapter’s claim that today’s culture wars actually pale in strategic significance when contrasted with the ethnic political disputations of the neutrality years a century or so ago. And yet, those earlier culture wars remain, today, practically expunged from collective memory. Few recall that they occurred, and fewer still understand what they implied for the future of American grand strategy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For that tradition and its abandonment, see Jay Sexton, A Nation Forged by Crisis (New York: Basic Books, 2018).

  2. 2.

    See David G. Haglund, “Is There a ‘Strategic Culture’ of the Special Relationship? Contingency, Identity, and the Transformation of Anglo-American Relations,” in Contemporary Anglo-American Relations: A “Special Relationship”? ed. Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 26–51.

  3. 3.

    The strategic significance of this deeply rooted oppositional stance toward Britain is examined in Stephen Tuffnell, “‘Uncle Sam Is to Be Sacrificed’: Anglophobia in Late Nineteenth-Century Politics and Culture,” American Nineteenth Century History 12 (March 2011): 77–99; and Edward P. Crapol, America for Americans: Economic Nationalism and Anglophobia in the late Nineteenth Century (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1973). In equating alliance with union, I am here following the steps outlined in Charles Kupchan’s “stable peace theory”—that is, first rapprochement, then security community, finally alliance (“union”). See Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

  4. 4.

    One particularly exhortative statement on the necessity of Anglo-American alliance, prior to the First World War, was British author H. Perry Robinson’s The Twentieth Century American: Being a Comparative Study of the Peoples of the Two Great Anglo-Saxon Nations (Chautauqua, NY: Chautauqua Press, 1911). Even years before, during the late Victorian age, Albert Venn Dicey could report favorably on what he deemed to be a budding British mood of “Americomania,” championed by enthusiasts for a strategic re-stitching together of the First British Empire; see Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 235; Frank K. Prochaska, Eminent Victorians on American Democracy: The View from Albion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Hugh Tulloch, “Changing British Attitudes Towards the United States in the 1880s,” Historical Journal 20 (December 1977): 825–40.

  5. 5.

    William Clark, Less than Kin: A Study of Anglo-American Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), pp. 80–81.

  6. 6.

    For critical assessments of the chip, on the part of two analysts who very much wished it could be dislodged, see Goldwin Smith, “The Hatred of England,” North American Review 150 (May 1890): 547–62; and George Herbert Adams, Why Americans Dislike England (Philadelphia: Henry Altemus, 1896), especially pp. 5–6: “[I]t must be regarded as proved beyond all doubt that there is in the minds of a large proportion of our people, very probably of a majority of them, a peculiar feeling of dislike towards England, which they cherish towards no other country, and a peculiar quickness to flame up into open opposition to her whenever she seems to be threatening the slightest encroachment upon our interests.”

  7. 7.

    Horace M. Kallen, Culture and Democracy in the United States: Studies in the Group Psychology of the American Peoples (New York: Arno Press, 1970; orig. pub., 1924).

  8. 8.

    See Michael Lipson, Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney, “Divided discipline? Comparing Views of US and Canadian IR Scholars,” International Journal 62 (Spring 2007): 327–343. Also see Jeffrey Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50 (January 1998): 324–48; Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic, “Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension,” in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997), pp. 85–104; Morris Dickstein, “After the Cold War: Culture as Politics, Politics as Culture,” Social Research 60 (Fall 1993): 531–44; and Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23 (Summer 1998): 171–200.

  9. 9.

    Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), pp. 9–10.

  10. 10.

    Whatever else the national interest may be, it is not a self-evident construct. For two useful means of elucidating such an interest, see Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

  11. 11.

    See especially J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, “Constructivist Realism or Realist-Constructivism?” International Studies Review 6 (June 2004): 337–41. One scholar with an interest in how “neoclassical realism” (NCR) can sometimes appear to be an alternative way of saying “realist constructivism” has enthusiastically touted one of the “more exciting growth areas of NCR over the past decade: the explicit use of constructivist-informed ideational variables (such as identity) in the domestic-level analysis.” Nicholas R. Smith, “Can Neoclassical Realism Become a Genuine Theory of International Relations?” Journal of Politics 80 (April 2018): 742–49, quote at p. 746.

  12. 12.

    Carson Holloway, “Who Are We?: Samuel Huntington and the Problem of American Identity,” Perspectives on Political Science 40 (April 2011):106–14.

  13. 13.

    For recent restatements of this contention, see Amy Chua, Political Tribes: Group Instinct and the Fate of Nations (New York: Penguin Press, 2018); and Francis Fukuyama, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).

  14. 14.

    Just how ambiguous this concept can be, is explicated wonderfully in Philip Gleason, “Identifying Identity: A Semantic History,” Journal of American History 69 (March 1983): 910–31; and Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’,” Theory and Society 29 (February 2000): 1–47. Also see Francis Fukuyama, “Against Identity Politics: The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 97 (September/October 2018): 90–114; Sheldon Stryker and Peter J. Burke, “The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly 63 (December 2000): 284–97; Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, “Identity as a Variable,” Perspectives on Politics 4 (December 2006): 695–711; and Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Lies that Bind: Rethinking Identity (New York: Liveright, 2018).

  15. 15.

    Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Whittlesey House, 1936).

  16. 16.

    As so candidly indicated in the rhetorical question put by a particularly controversial Republican member of congress from Iowa, Steve King, to a reporter from the New York Times in January 2019: “White nationalist, white supremacist, Western civilization,” wondered King in feigned bafflement, “how did that language become offensive?” King’s choice of words, correlating white supremacism with Western civilization, led fellow Republicans to issue a string of denunciations of their congressional colleague. See Jonathan Martin, “Republicans Rebuke Steve King but Face Vexing Question: Why Not Sooner?” New York Times, 15 January 2019; available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/us/politics/steve-king-white-supremacy; accessed 15 January 2019.

  17. 17.

    Kevin Sack, “Two Unspeakable Hate Crimes United Pastor and Rabbi in Grief,” New York Times, 4 November 2018, pp. 1, 26.

  18. 18.

    See Todd Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America Is Wracked by Culture Wars (New York: Henry Holt, 1995); David Rieff, “Therapy or Democracy? The Culture Wars Twenty Years On,” World Policy Journal 15 (Summer 1998): 66–76; and Andrew Hartman, A War for the Soul of America: A History of the Culture Wars (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

  19. 19.

    Henry E. Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Rogers Brubaker, “The Dolezal Affair: Race, Gender, and the Micropolitics of Identity,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 39 (February 2016): 414–48.

  20. 20.

    C. Loring Brace, “Race” Is a Four-Letter Word: The Genesis of the Concept (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Wendy D. Roth, “The Multiple Dimensions of Race,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 39 (June 2016): 1310–38.

  21. 21.

    Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22–49; and Idem, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

  22. 22.

    See David A. Welch, “The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Thesis as an Argument and as a Phenomenon,” Security Studies 6 (Summer 1997): 197–216; J. Paul Barker, ed., The Clash of Civilizations: Twenty Years On (Bristol, UK: e-International Relations, October 2013); available at http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/Clash-of-Civilizations-E-IR.pdf.; and Francis Fukuyama, “The Clash at 25: Sam’s the Man, So Far …,” American Interest 14 (November/December 2018): 4–6.

  23. 23.

    Martin Bulmer and John Solomos, “Introduction: Re-thinking Ethnic and Racial Studies,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 21 (September 1998): 819–37. Also see Stephen Iwan Griffiths, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threats to European Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Jerry Z. Muller, “Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs 87 (March/April 2008): 18–35; and Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

  24. 24.

    A term apparently coined by the principal mullah of the alt-right, Richard Spencer, as a means of encapsulating the group’s “white interests, values, customs, and culture.” Quoted in Michael Wolff, Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House (New York: Henry Holt, 2018), p. 130.

  25. 25.

    See, for instance, Patrick J. Buchanan, State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America (New York: Thomas Dunne/St. Martin’s, 2006); and Robert Mickey, Steven Levitsky, and Lucan Ahmad, “Is America Still Safe for Democracy? Why the United States Is in Danger of Backsliding,” Foreign Affairs 96 (May/June 2017): 20–29.

  26. 26.

    Quoted in Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, That Used to Be Us: How America Fell Behind in the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), p. 13.

  27. 27.

    See John Dumbrell, “America in the 1990s: Searching for Purpose,” in US Foreign Policy, ed. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Chap. 5. Also see, for this search, Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., America’s Strategic Choices (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).

  28. 28.

    Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs 76 (September/October 1997): 28–49.

  29. 29.

    Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

  30. 30.

    For good reviews of the phenomenon of ethnic lobbying, as it developed during the twentieth century, see Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Alexander De Conde, Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992); and Charles McCurdy Mathias, Jr., “Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 59 (Summer 1981): 975–98.

  31. 31.

    See Richard Maher, “Bipolarity and the Future of U.S.-China Relations,” Political Science Quarterly 133 (Fall 2018): 497–525.

  32. 32.

    But for a useful caution against the fallacy of conflating the two terms, cf. David Wilkinson, “Unipolarity Without Hegemony,” International Studies Review 1 (Summer 1999): 141–72.

  33. 33.

    Inter alios, see Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The New European Diasporas: National Minorities and Conflict in Eastern Europe (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2000); Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory,” International Organization 57 (Summer 2003): 449–79; Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, eds. Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2007); Myron Weiner, ed. International Migration and Security (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); and Gabriel Sheffer, “Ethno-National Diasporas and Security,” Survival 36 (Spring 1994): 60–79.

  34. 34.

    See James R. Schlesinger, “Fragmentation and Hubris: A Shaky Basis for American Leadership,” National Interest, no. 94 (Fall 1997), pp. 3–9, quote at pp. 3–4; and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society, new and rev. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998).

  35. 35.

    Huntington, “Erosion of American National Interests,” p. 49.

  36. 36.

    James M. McPherson, Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also known, mainly in the South, as the battle of Sharpsburg, this took place on 17 September, costing some 3600 Americans their lives, as compared with nearly 3000 dead on 9/11, and 2300 in the Pearl Harbor attack of December 1941.

  37. 37.

    For a dissenting view, see Yossi Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the US and Their Homelands (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

  38. 38.

    Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, “Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia,” International Security 24 (Winter 1999–2000): 108–38; Stephen M. Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Will H. Moore, “Ethnic Minorities and Foreign Policy,” SAIS Review 22 (Summer-Fall 2002): 77–91; David M. Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul, Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009).

  39. 39.

    Consider the furor touched off a dozen years ago with the publication of John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), which triggered a number of rejoinders, some at times verging on the apoplectic. For instance, Abraham H. Foxman, The Deadliest Lies: The Israel Lobby and the Myth of Jewish Control (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 55, 65. Also see the more restrained, yet still negative, assessment of the Mearsheimer-Walt thesis in Dore Gold, “Blaming Israel,” International Herald Tribune, 17 October 2007, p. 6. More balanced assessments include Robert C. Lieberman, “The ‘Israel Lobby’ and American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 7 (June 2009): 235–57; and Mackubin Thomas Owens, in “Debating the Israel Lobby,” Foreign Policy, no. 156 (September/October 2006), p. 4.

  40. 40.

    Huntington, “Clash,” p. 35.

  41. 41.

    Kim Richard Nossal, “Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater? Huntington’s ‘Kin-Country’ Thesis and Australian-Canadian Relations,” in Shaping Nations: Constitutionalism and Society in Australia and Canada, ed. Linda Cardinal and David Headon (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2002), pp. 167–81, quote at p. 179. Readers possessing familiarity with German can easily figure out the meaning of that substance, “dreck,” deserving to be pitched (politely, rubbish); but they are likely to be confused by its adjective, “shonky,” which is Australian English for something poorly executed, or shoddily done. I thank Kim Nossal for this contribution to my linguistic edification.

  42. 42.

    Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How the First World War Created Modern America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 233.

  43. 43.

    Quoted in Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 99.

  44. 44.

    See Nell Irvin Painter, The History of White People (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010).

  45. 45.

    For a brilliant conceptual analysis, see Arthur N. Waldron, “Theories of Nationalism and Historical Explanation,” World Politics 37 (April 1985): 416–33.

  46. 46.

    Hans Kohn, The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p. 31. Also see, for a defense of the civic nation, Lowell W. Barrington, “‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism’: The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science,” PS 30 (December 1997): 712–16.

  47. 47.

    See Taras Kuzio, “The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s Framework for Understanding Nationalism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25 (January 2002): 20–39; Bernard Yack, “The Myth of the Civil Nation,” Critical Review 10 (Spring 1996): 193–211; and Nicholas Xenos, “Civic Nationalism: Oxymoron?” ibid., pp. 213–31.

  48. 48.

    Chua, Political Tribes, p. 203 (emphasis in original).

  49. 49.

    Sometimes the second-mentioned of these, the Dutch, can be overlooked altogether, due to their relatively small impress upon American demography, compared with that of the larger German and Irish ones; but for an intriguing corrective, cf. Russell Shorto, The Island at the Center of the World: The Epic Story of Dutch Manhattan and the Forgotten Colony That Shaped America (New York: Vintage, 2005). For the two larger ethnic groups, see Aaron Spencer Fogleman, Hopeful Journeys: German Immigration, Settlement, and Political Culture in Colonial America, 1717–1775 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989); and Thomas D’Arcy McGee, A History of the Irish Settlers in North America from the Earliest Period to the Census of 1850, 2d ed. (Boston: P. Donahoe, 1852).

  50. 50.

    See Donald M. MacRaild, “Ethnic Conflict and English Associational Culture in America: The Benevolent Order of the Society of St. George,” in English Ethnicity and Culture in North America, ed. David T. Gleeson (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2017), pp. 37–63; and Rowland Tappan Berthoff, British Immigrants in Industrial America, 1790–1950 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953). It is sometimes forgotten that immigrants from Great Britain and Ulster (i.e., these latter being mainly non-Catholic Irish) constituted the third-largest cohort of European arrivals in America (after the Germans and Irish Catholics) in the dozen or so years prior to the Civil War, when some 500,000 migrants entered the US from England, Wales, Scotland, and Ulster. After the Civil War, though, things changed dramatically, with the British (including Ulster) share of new arrivals becoming halved, shrinking to about 12 percent by the 1880s. Kevin P. Phillips, The Cousins’ Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 498.

  51. 51.

    Samuel P. Huntington, “The Hispanic Challenge,” Foreign Policy, no. 141 (March/April 2004), pp. 30–45. Also see James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class, and Empire: The Enduring Anglo-American Relationship (New York: Nation Books, 2004).

  52. 52.

    Laurence Halley, Ancient Affections, Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1985).

  53. 53.

    See Tanja Bueltmann, David T. Gleeson, and Donald M. MacRaild, “Invisible Diaspora? English Ethnicity in the United States before 1920,” Journal of American Ethnic History 33 (Summer 2014): 5–30. Also see De Conde, Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy, pp. 44–46.

  54. 54.

    Walter T. K. Nugent, Crossings: The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870–1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

  55. 55.

    See Thomas N. Brown, Irish-American Nationalism, 1870–1890 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1966); Brian A. Jenkins, Fenians and Anglo-American Relations during Reconstruction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); Leon Ó Broin, Fenian Fever: An Anglo-American Dilemma (New York: New York University Press, 1971); Jonathan Gantt, Irish Terrorism in the Atlantic Community, 1865–1922 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Niall Whelehan, The Dynamiters: Irish Nationalism and Political Violence in the Wider World, 1867–1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), and David Sim, A Union Forever: The Irish Question and U.S. Foreign Relations in the Victorian Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

  56. 56.

    See David G. Haglund and Tyson McNeil-Hay, “The ‘Germany Lobby’ and U.S. Foreign Policy: What, if Anything, Does It Tell Us about the Debate over the ‘Israel Lobby’?” Ethnopolitics 10 (September–November 2011): 321–44.

  57. 57.

    “First generation” refers to those born outside the country (i.e., immigrants); “second generation” applies to native-born Americans who had at least one parent (and often both parents) born abroad. Even today’s America, so focused as it has become on immigration, does not have as great a share of foreign-born to total population as did the America of 1910. Sabrina Tavernise, “U.S. Has Highest Share of Foreign-Born Since 1910, with More Coming from Asia,” New York Times, 13 September 2018; available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/us/census-foreign-population.html?emc=edit_nn_20180913&nl=morning-briefing&nlid=6217183820180913&te

  58. 58.

    Louis L. Gerson, The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1964), pp. 61–62.

  59. 59.

    Quoted in Ernest R. May, ed., The Coming of War, 1917 (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1963), p. 1.

  60. 60.

    Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation, 1914–1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 34.

  61. 61.

    Some would even date those origins to an earlier time. For two such instances, each of which locates the beginning of the AASR in a period preceding the American culture wars of 1914–17, see Duncan Andrew Campbell, Unlikely Allies: Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special Relationship (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007); and Iestyn Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean: British Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” 1900–1905 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005).

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    David G. Haglund

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Haglund, D.G. (2019). Identity, Culture Wars, and the Origins of the Anglo-American Special Relationship: A Huntingtonian Prelude. In: The US "Culture Wars" and the Anglo-American Special Relationship. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18549-7_1

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