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International Investment Law and the Law of Armed Conflict pp 229–257Cite as

Armed Conflicts and Customary International Law on Investment: Codification and Fragmentation of “Protection and Security”

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Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((Spec. Issue))

Abstract

The proliferation of investment treaties in international investment law has largely displaced the role of customary international law on investment protection. This paper considers the utility of customary international law during armed conflict and the compatibility in the interaction between treaty and customary obligations, through the classical norm of the host State to provide protection and security on foreign investment. Applying existing scholarship on the consequences flowing from the codification of customary law, this paper argues that the inclusion of protection and security clause in its codified form in treaties have diverged and fragmented from the original bare custom. Despite the fragmentation of protection and security in treaty rules, the corresponding customary law remains effective and would continue to govern the relationship between States in all circumstances, including armed conflict. This paper calls for a return to the bare custom on protection and security to facilitate parallel application of treaty and customary protection to achieve a universal scope and standard of foreign investment protection.

I am indebted to the participants at the colloquium on “International Investment Law & the Law of Armed Conflict” for their insights and helpful comments.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The phrase “customary international law”, “customary law” and “custom” are used interchangeably in this paper to refer to solely to customary international law as a source of law on investment protection, unless stated otherwise.

  2. 2.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), pp. 5–6.

  3. 3.

    OECD (2004) Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate in International Investment Law. OECD Working Papers on International Investment https://doi.org/10.1787/780155872321, p. 2.

  4. 4.

    Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 5.

  5. 5.

    If international investment between all States are to be governed merely by BITs, the present total number of BITs would only cover around 16% of the potential bilateral relationship on investment between States. For instance, if there are n States, the total number of possible BITs between all States is equivalent to n (n-1)/2. This does not include any potential multilateral treaty between States. See Gazzini (2007), p. 691.

  6. 6.

    Dumberry (2016), p. 353.

  7. 7.

    International Law Commission (2013), pp. 15–16.

  8. 8.

    Schreuer (2013), p. 5.

  9. 9.

    List of literature examining this area include Dumberry (2016), Gazzini (2007), Cai (2008) and Kishoiyian (1994).

  10. 10.

    The term “codification” in this paper focuses on binding legal instruments (i.e. treaties and conventions), simply referred to as treaty making, although the creation of other non-binding instruments (i.e. declarations, model agreements and draft instruments) do have the persuasive effect of soft law.

  11. 11.

    Whilst the parallel application and co-existence of both treaty law and customary law is valid, where treaty law is clear and unambiguous, customary law is often deprived from further discussion.

  12. 12.

    D’Amato (1971), pp. 92–93. For instance, the bare custom on protection and security may undergo “conflict-of-custom situations”. It may change and adapt with significant departure in practice and opinion juris, giving effect to a new norm.

  13. 13.

    Meyer (2012), p. 1001. Meyer suggests the Capture Thesis as a rationale for codification, the “desire to define the content of customary rules for a [S]tate’s individual benefit”. Meyer argues that as States seek to push forward their agendas, “codification can replicate, magnify, or alter power dynamics present in the formation of bare customary international law (emphasis added).”

  14. 14.

    Geneva Convention (I) on Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 1949, signed 12 Aug 1949, entered force 21 Oct 1950, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 1949, signed 12 Aug 1949, entered force 21 Oct 1950, 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention (III) on Prisoners of War 1949, signed 12 Aug 1949, entered force 21 Oct 1950, 75 UNTS 135 and Article 2 of the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War 1949, signed 12 Aug 1949, entered force 21 Oct 1950, 75 UNTS 287 (hereafter referred to as the “Geneva Conventions 1949”).

  15. 15.

    Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 1949.

  16. 16.

    Article 1, para. 1 of the Second Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609, signed 8 June 1977, entered force 7 Dec 1978.

  17. 17.

    ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 Oct 1995), para. 70.

  18. 18.

    The near universal acceptance of the Geneva Conventions has allowed the Conventions to be considered as accepted into customary international law. See, e.g., Dusko Tadić, para. 70; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DR Congo v Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168, para. 218; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, para. 92 and Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission, Partial Awards on the Claims Relating to Prisoners of War: Ethiopia’s Claim 4 (2003) 42 ILM 1056, para. 27.

  19. 19.

    Article 73 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

  20. 20.

    Article 2(b) of the Draft Articles on the Effect of Armed Conflicts on Treaties. The Draft Articles defined armed conflict as “situation in which there is resort to armed force between States or protracted resort to armed force between governmental authorities and organised armed groups”.

  21. 21.

    Hague Convention (IV), Regulations Annex to the Convention on Neutral Powers in case of War on Land, signed 18 Oct 1907, entered force 26 Jan 1910 (hereafter referred as “Hague Convention (IV)”), Reg Article 46.

  22. 22.

    Hague Convention (IV), Reg Article 47.

  23. 23.

    Article 53 of the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War 1949, signed 12 Aug 1949, entered force 21 Oct 1950, 75 UNTS 287.

  24. 24.

    Hernández (2013), p. 26.

  25. 25.

    Legality of the Treat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226 (hereafter referred as “Nuclear Weapons”), paras 24–25.

  26. 26.

    Legality of the Treat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, para. 25.

  27. 27.

    Hernández (2013), p. 28.

  28. 28.

    Article 7 of the proposition is consistent with the Draft Articles on the Effect of Armed Conflicts on Treaties.

  29. 29.

    D’Aspremont (2012), p. 23.

  30. 30.

    Pauwelyn (2014), p. 14.

  31. 31.

    Pauwelyn (2014), p. 15.

  32. 32.

    Pauwelyn (2014), p. 15.

  33. 33.

    See e.g. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Malta), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 13, para. 27; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 207 and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226, para. 64.

  34. 34.

    North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, para. 77.

  35. 35.

    D’Aspremont (2012), pp. 23–26.

  36. 36.

    Oil Platforms (Iran v United States) 1996 ICJ 803 (Preliminary Objection), Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, p. 858, para. 39.

  37. 37.

    OECD (2004) Fair and Equitable Treatment Standards in International Investment Law. OECD Working Papers on International Investment https://doi.org/10.1787/675702255435, p. 40.

  38. 38.

    German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (German v Poland) 1926 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 7 (Merits), p. 29, para. 82, The Court observed that, “[a] treaty only creates law as between the States which are parties to it; in case of doubt, no rights can be deduced from it in favour of third States [or other third parties] (emphasis added).”

  39. 39.

    Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, para. 89.

  40. 40.

    Barcelona Traction, para. 93.

  41. 41.

    Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 582. In the Preliminary Objections, the Court declared that Guinea’s application is inadmissible so far as it concerns the protection of Diallo in respect of alleged violations of rights of his companies (i.e. substituting Diallo for the right of his companies). Guinea’s claims on the protection of Diallo’s right as an individual and his direct right as associé in his companies were admissible.

  42. 42.

    Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 82.

  43. 43.

    Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 88.

  44. 44.

    Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 88.

  45. 45.

    Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 90.

  46. 46.

    McLachlan (2016), p. 259.

  47. 47.

    Muchlinkski (2009), p. 341.

  48. 48.

    Amerasinghe (2008), p. 346.

  49. 49.

    See e.g. Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran et al., 14 July 1987, Iran-US C.T., 83 ILR 501, para. 252, The Tribunal noted, “State practice […] cannot be considered as giving birth to customary rules of international law, unless it presents specific features which demonstrate the conviction of the State parties that they were acting in application of what they considered to be settled law.” The Tribunal observed the same principle as applied by the ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, para. 77. See also McLachlan (2016) pp. 258, 260. McLachlan opines that the Court has “paralysed” and “chilled” the potential of customary investment law, despite the increasing recognition of the investment arbitration community on the potential of customs.

  50. 50.

    McLachlan (2008), p. 395.

  51. 51.

    McLachlan (2008), p. 395.

  52. 52.

    McLachlan appears to have adopted a different stance in his subsequent article, published after the merits stage of Diallo, see McLachlan (2016), he suggests an evolving customary international law on investment, departing from his earlier view on the paralysis and chilling of customs.

  53. 53.

    Pellet (2013), p. 225.

  54. 54.

    Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for the interpretation of treaty in accordance with the “ordinary meaning to be given to the terms”. Although the Convention only applies on the interpretation of treaties, the International Court of Justice has applied the similar technique by referring to dictionary definitions in construing legal arguments. See e.g. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 63.

  55. 55.

    Oxford Dictionary of English (revised, 2nd edn, OUP 2009).

  56. 56.

    Oxford Dictionary of English (revised, 2nd edn, OUP 2009).

  57. 57.

    Foster (2012), pp. 1106–1107.

  58. 58.

    Vitoria (1532), para. 386. Vitoria writes that, “The Spaniards have a right to travel into the lands in question and to sojourn there, provided they do no harm to the natives, and the natives may not prevent them” (emphasis added).

  59. 59.

    Vitoria (1532), para. 386–387.

  60. 60.

    Wolff (1749) and Vattel (1758).

  61. 61.

    Wolff (1749), pp. 536–537.

  62. 62.

    Wolff (1749), pp. 536–537.

  63. 63.

    Wolff (1749), pp. 536–537.

  64. 64.

    Wolff (1749), pp. 536–537.

  65. 65.

    Wolff (1749), pp. 536–537.

  66. 66.

    Vattel (1758), pp. 313–314.

  67. 67.

    Vattel (1758), p. 315.

  68. 68.

    Vattel (1758), pp. 298–299. “Whoever offends the [S]tate, injures its rights, disturbs its tranquillity, or does it a prejudice in any manner whatsoever, declares himself its enemy, and exposes himself to be justly punished for it (emphasis added).”

  69. 69.

    Vattel (1758), p. 299. “If a sovereign, who might keep his subjects within the rules of justice and peace, suffers them to injure a foreign nation either in its body or its members, he does no less injury to that nation, than if he injured it himself (emphasis added).”

  70. 70.

    Vattel (1758), p. 299.

  71. 71.

    Meyer (2012), p. 1022.

  72. 72.

    Article 18 of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (United States-Prussia), 10 September 1785 “If the citizens or subjects of either party, in danger from tempests, pirates, enemies or other accident, shall take refuge with their vessels or effects, within the harbours or jurisdiction of the other, they shall be received, protected & treated with humanity & kindness […] (emphasis added)” and Article 2 of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (United States-Great Britain), 19 November 1794 “[All Settlers and Traders] shall continue to enjoy, unmolested, all their property of every kind, and shall be protected therein. They shall be at full liberty to remain there, or to remove with all or any part of their Effects” (emphasis added).

  73. 73.

    Article 14 of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (United States-Great Britain).

  74. 74.

    Foster (2012), pp. 1118–1124. The term United States Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties is a generic reference to the United States bilateral commerce and trade treaties between 1778 to 1966. See generally, Vandevelde (2005), pp. 157–162.

  75. 75.

    See generally, Shea (1955), pp. 16–20.

  76. 76.

    Article 12(2)(a)(i) Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation, Final Act and Related Documents, UN Doc. E/Conf. 2/78, 24 Mar 1948.

  77. 77.

    International Chamber of Commerce (1949), “International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments” (1949) ICC Brochure No. 129, reprinted in UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: A Compendium, Vol III, 273.

  78. 78.

    Article 1 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention (1959). For the text and the commentary on the draft convention, see generally, Seidl-Hohenveldern (1960).

  79. 79.

    Article 1(a) of the OECD, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (1967) 7 ILM 117.

  80. 80.

    Meyer (2012), p. 1054.

  81. 81.

    See e.g. Article 1 of the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention (1959) and Article 1(a) of the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (1967) 7 ILM 117.

  82. 82.

    For instance, the OECD Draft Convention failed to gain support of member States including Greece, Portugal and Turkey. See Sinclair (2004), p. 432.

  83. 83.

    For discussion on the failures of multilateralism through attempts between 1945 to 1974 and 1999 to 2004, see Schill (2009), pp. 31–40 and pp. 49–60.

  84. 84.

    The question that needs to be addressed is what standard should be attached to the customary obligation on the host State.

  85. 85.

    Schill (2009), p. 39.

  86. 86.

    The customary law on protection and security was codified in the widely regarded first modern BIT, Germany-Pakistan BIT 1959, 457 UNTS 23, 1961 BGBI II793, Article 3(1).

  87. 87.

    Schill (2009), p. 40.

  88. 88.

    Crawford (2011), pp. 19–20.

  89. 89.

    Schill (2009), p. 23.

  90. 90.

    On the issue of whether BITs represent a new form of customary international law, see Dumberry (2010). In relation to multilateral treaties, it is undisputed that they may form customary international law, see Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Malta), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 13, para. 27.

  91. 91.

    Elkins et al. (2008), p. 277.

  92. 92.

    Meyer (2012), p. 1059.

  93. 93.

    Galbraith (2012), pp. 351 and 353.

  94. 94.

    Galbraith (2012), p. 351.

  95. 95.

    Meyer (2012), pp. 1051–1056.

  96. 96.

    Malik (2011) The Full Protection and Security Standard Comes of Age. IISD Best Practice Series http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/full_protection.pdf, p. 12. See also Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, “Briefing on Investments in Libya” (2011).

  97. 97.

    Elettronica Sicula SPA (ELSI), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 15.

  98. 98.

    Article 1105(1) of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

  99. 99.

    Article 11(1) of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement.

  100. 100.

    Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty.

  101. 101.

    Article 2 of the Organisation of Islamic Conference Investment Agreement.

  102. 102.

    For instance, on a non-exhaustive examination on the BITs ratified by Libya and Syria, legal protection is expressly provided in the following BITs: Article 2(2) of the Libya-Belarus BIT (2000); Article 2(3) of the Libya-Croatia BIT (2002); Article 2(3) of the Libya-Serbia BIT (2004); Article 2(2) of the Syria-Belarus BIT (1998) and Article 2(4) of the Syria-Italy BIT (2002).

  103. 103.

    Schreuer (2010), p. 353 and Moss (2008), pp. 133–134.

  104. 104.

    See e.g. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award (11 September 2007), para. 354.

  105. 105.

    Elettronica Sicula SPA (ELSI), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1989, paras 105–106.

  106. 106.

    Elettronica Sicula SPA (ELSI), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1989, para. 109.

  107. 107.

    See e.g. Saluka Investments B.V. v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 Mar 2006, paras 483–484, “[Protection and security] is not meant to cover just any kind of impairment of an investor’s investment, but to protect more specifically the physical integrity of an investment against interference by use of force (emphasis added)”. See also BG Group Plc. v The Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 24 Dec 2007, para. 324 and Rumeli Telekom A.S. v Republic of Kazakhstan, Award, 29 July 2008, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, para. 668.

  108. 108.

    See e.g. CME Czech Republic B.V. v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 Sept 2001, para. 613, “The host State is obligated to ensure that neither by amendment of its laws nor by actions of its administrative bodies is the agreed and approved security and protection of the foreign investor’s investment withdrawn or devalued (emphasis added)”. See also Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 Award (14 July 2006), para. 406; Siemens A.G. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award (6 February 2007), para. 303; Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v The Argentine Republic, Award, 20 Aug 2007, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, paras 7.4.15–17 and Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award (24 July 2008), para. 729.

  109. 109.

    Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) v Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/87/3, Final Award (27 June 1990), paras 51 and 53.

  110. 110.

    American Manufacturing & Trading Inc v Republic of Zaire, Award (21 February 1997), 36 ILM 1531 (1997), paras 6.06-08.

  111. 111.

    Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) v Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/87/3, Final Award (27 June 1990), para. 51.

  112. 112.

    Foreign Trade Information System of the Organisation of American States (2001) Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions. NAFTA Free Trade Commission http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp.

  113. 113.

    Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty.

  114. 114.

    Article 11(1) of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement.

  115. 115.

    Article 2(2) of the Russian Model BIT (2001). The newly adopted Regulation on Entering into International Treaties on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments, Government Decree No. 992, 30 September 2016, replaces the Russian Model BIT. The Regulation does not affect existing BITs and was intended as guidelines in the drafting of future Russian BITs.

  116. 116.

    Article 2(2) of the Russia-China BIT (2006).

  117. 117.

    Article 2(2) of the Russia-United Arab Emirates (2010).

  118. 118.

    Article 2(2) of the Russia-Bahrain BIT (2014).

  119. 119.

    Russia-Cambodia BIT (2015).

  120. 120.

    Article 2(2) of the Russia-Equatorial Guinea BIT (2011).

  121. 121.

    Brown (2013), p. 159, citing Yao (1987) International Investment Law, Wuhan University Press, Wuhan (in Chinese), pp. 334–338.

  122. 122.

    Article 4(2) of the China-Canada BIT (2012).

  123. 123.

    Article 143(1) of the China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (2008).

  124. 124.

    Article 5(2) of the China-Mexico BIT (2008).

  125. 125.

    Meyer (2012), pp. 1021–1022.

  126. 126.

    In situations of inconsistency between State practice and opinio juris, the conduct of the State that is contrary to the recognised custom is regarded as a breach of that custom, not as an indication of a new rule. If the State defends its conduct by relying on the exceptions or justifications derived from the custom itself, the State has effectively confirmed the existence of the custom, rather than weakening it. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 186.

  127. 127.

    Meyer (2012), pp. 1021–1022. D’Amato (1971), pp. 97–98. D’Amato writes that “The number of disconfirmatory acts required to replace the original rule is a function partly of the number of acts that established the original rule in the first place, the remoteness in time of the establishing act, the legal authoritativeness of the participating [S]tates and other possible factors […] (emphasis added)”.

  128. 128.

    Meyer (2012), p. 1022.

  129. 129.

    Meyer (2012), p. 1022.

  130. 130.

    Meyer (2012), p. 1023.

  131. 131.

    For a list of arbitration cases where the persistent objector argument was raised, see Dumberry (2016), pp. 397–401. Despite the prominence of the persistent objector in international law, it is less frequently raised in international investment law arbitral arbitration proceedings. It was first surfaced in BG Group Plc v Argentina, Final Award, 24 December 2007, UNCITRAL, para. 400. See also Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v United States, Award, 12 January 2011, UNCITRAL, para. 210–213 and Daimler Financial Services AG v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1 Award (22 August 2012), para. 168.

  132. 132.

    Dumberry (2016), p. 404.

  133. 133.

    Dumberry (2016), p. 404.

  134. 134.

    Meyer (2012), p. 1023.

  135. 135.

    Meyer (2012), p. 1023.

  136. 136.

    Meyer (2012), p. 1023.

  137. 137.

    International Law Commission (2006), p. 11.

  138. 138.

    International Law Commission (2006), p. 11.

  139. 139.

    See e.g. Asian Agricultural Products Limited v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Final Award, 27 June 1990, 4 ICSID Rep 250, para. 48.

  140. 140.

    Moss (2008), pp. 139–140.

  141. 141.

    See e.g. Asian Agricultural Products Limited v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Final Award, 27 June 1990, 4 ICSID Rep 250, para. 77. The Tribunal held that, “due diligence is nothing more nor less than the reasonable measures of prevention which a well-administered government could be expected to exercise under similar circumstances.” See also Saluka Investments B.V. v The Czech Republic, para. 484 and Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (29 May 2003), para. 177.

  142. 142.

    Glennon (2005), p. 941.

  143. 143.

    Glennon (2005), p. 941. cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 392, paras 47 and 51.

  144. 144.

    Thirlway (2014), p. 56.

  145. 145.

    Thirlway (2014), p. 56.

  146. 146.

    Thirlway (2014), p. 56.

  147. 147.

    Thirlway (2014), p. 56.

  148. 148.

    Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment, 20 Nov 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 266, p. 276.

  149. 149.

    Asian Agricultural Products Limited v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Final Award, 27 June 1990, 4 ICSID Rep 250, para. 40, Rule (b) and para. 47.

  150. 150.

    Asian Agricultural Products Limited v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Final Award, 27 June 1990, 4 ICSID Rep 250, para. 40, Rule (d).

  151. 151.

    Article 11 of the United Kingdom Model BIT (2008).

  152. 152.

    Article 7(1) of the German Model BIT (2009) and Article 11(2) of the Austrian Model BIT (2008).

  153. 153.

    Article 16 of the United States Model BIT (2012).

  154. 154.

    Brown (2013), p. 313.

  155. 155.

    See e.g. Article 7 of the Syria-Jordan BIT (2001), the non-derogation clause makes no reference to general international obligations or customary law but refer to “best provisions and advantages prescribed in other agreements in which two countries are members, or those prescribed in local applicable law in the hosting country” and Article 10 of the France Model BIT (2006), where the non-derogation clause refers to “investissements ayant fait l’objet d’un engagement particulier de l’une des Parties contractantes à l’égard des nationaux et sociétés de l’autre Partie contractante” [investments that are subject to a specific commitment by one of the Contracting Parties towards investors of the other Contracting Party].

  156. 156.

    See e.g. Schreuer (2010), p. 364 and Moss (2008), p. 136.

  157. 157.

    Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, paras 178–179. The ICJ allowed Nicaragua to rely on custom instead of a later multilateral treaty of the same content, to discard an objection by the United States on the jurisdiction of the Court predicated by a multilateral treaty reservation.

  158. 158.

    Mann (1982), p. 244.

  159. 159.

    cf. Oppenheim (1905), pp. 38–42, Oppenheim was aware about the codification of customary law but supported codification despite acknowledging the risk of “clumsy” drafting and possibility of “more harm than good”. Oppenheim argues that, “history has given its verdict in favour of codification”.

  160. 160.

    See e.g. Article 5(2) of the United States Model BIT (2002); Article 2(2) of the United States-Argentina BIT (1991), and Article 2(2) of the United States-Romania BIT (1992).

  161. 161.

    Article 2(4) of the United States-Republic of Zaire BIT (1984).

  162. 162.

    American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v Republic of Zaire, 36 ILM 1534, para. 6.06.

  163. 163.

    El Paso Energy International Company v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 Award (31 October 2011), paras 522–523.

  164. 164.

    Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v Iran, 29 June 1989, 21 Iran-US C.T.R 79.

  165. 165.

    Article 2(4) of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights (United States-Iran), signed 15 Aug 1955, states “Nationals of either High Contracting Party shall receive the most constant protection and security within the territories of the other High Contracting Party.”

  166. 166.

    Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v Iran, para. 107.

  167. 167.

    Gazzini (2007), p. 713.

  168. 168.

    Gazzini (2007), p. 713.

  169. 169.

    Article 2(2) of the UK-Sri Lanka BIT (1980) states “Investments of nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party.”

  170. 170.

    Asian Agricultural Products Limited v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Final Award, 27 June 1990, 4 ICSID Rep 250, para. 67.

  171. 171.

    Asian Agricultural Products Limited v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Final Award, 27 June 1990, 4 ICSID Rep 250, para. 67.

  172. 172.

    The term “renvoi” refers to a procedure in reconciling the conflict of laws. Within the context of international investment law, the Tribunal in AAPL v Sri Lanka adopted the renvoi technique by referring to customary law in the application of the treaty-based standard. See Sornarajah (2010), p. 335.

  173. 173.

    Gazzini (2007), p. 710. See e.g. Amco Asia Corporation and others v Republic of Indonesia, Award, 25 Sep 1983, 1 ICSID Rep 413, para. 172.

  174. 174.

    Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

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  1. Izral Partnership, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

    Kong Soon Lim

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  1. Law School, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain

    Katia Fach Gómez

  2. Athens Public International Law Center, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece

    Anastasios Gourgourinis

  3. French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS)-CERSA, University Paris II Panthéon-Assas, Paris, France

    Catharine Titi

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Lim, K.S. (2019). Armed Conflicts and Customary International Law on Investment: Codification and Fragmentation of “Protection and Security”. In: Fach Gómez, K., Gourgourinis, A., Titi, C. (eds) International Investment Law and the Law of Armed Conflict. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10746-8_12

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