Abstract
What is the connection between mirror processes and mindreading? The paper begins with definitions of mindreading and of mirroring processes. It then advances four theses: (T1) mirroring processes in themselves do not constitute mindreading; (T2) some types of mindreading (‘low-level’ mindreading) are based on mirroring processes; (T3) not all types of mindreading are based on mirroring (‘high-level’ mindreading); and (T4) simulation-based mindreading includes but is broader than mirroring-based mindreading. Evidence for the causal role of mirroring in mindreading is drawn from intention attribution, emotion attribution, and pain attribution. Arguments for the limits of mirroring-based mindreading are drawn from neuroanatomy, from the lesser liability to error of mirror-based mindreading, from the role of imagination in some types of mindreading, and from the restricted range of mental states involved in mirroring. ‘High-level’ simulational mindreading is based on enactment imagination, perspective shifts or self-projection, which are found in activities like prospection and memory as well as theory of mind. The role of cortical midline structures in executing these activities is examined.
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Notes
- 1.
The functional properties of two mirror tokenings need not be identical, however. First, it is taken for granted that mirror discharges in execution and observation mode are not perfectly identical (for a review, see Csibra, 2007). In observation mode, the frequency or amplitude of firing may not coincide with that of the execution mode. Thus, the ‘strength’ of two tokenings may diverge slightly, with implications of slight differences in functional properties. Second, the Parma group from the beginning has distinguished between ‘strictly’ and ‘broadly’ congruent mirror neurons (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996). In the case of broad congruence, functional properties are not identical. For present purposes, however, we can ignore this issue. Our approach focuses, for simplicity, on strictly congruent mirror neurons (or their analogue in mirror systems or circuits).
- 2.
For example, lesions to the fusiform gyrus of the right occipital lobe produce both prosopagnosia and achromatopsia (Bartels & Zeki, 2000). But these two deficits have no interesting functional relationship to one another. It just so happens that the impaired capacities are at least partially co-localized in the fusiform gyrus.
- 3.
I usually speak of the simulation relation as holding between processes rather than states (including intentions). However, as I use the term, a process is a series of causally related states; so, as a limiting case, we may consider a state to be a process with a single member. Hence, we may also speak of states, such as intentions, as items that figure in simulation relations.
- 4.
De Vignemont and Haggard (in press) make a strong case for the claim that the best candidate for what is shared in a pair of mirroring events is an ‘intention in action.’ If this is right, it argues against the intention-prediction interpretation of the Iacoboni et al. (2005) imaging results per se.
- 5.
It is assumed in all of these studies that the participant not only ‘recognizes’ the emotion in the sense of classifying or categorizing it, but also views the emotion as occurring in the observed target (whose facial expression is shown or depicted). This implies that the participant is not merely categorizing the emotion but also attributing it to the target. If the categorization results from the mirroring process -- which includes the observation of the target – it is hardly open to question that the attribution also results from the mirroring process. Thanks to F. de Vignemont for emphasizing this point.
- 6.
Saxe (2005) uses a somewhat analogous argument from error to criticize the general simulation theory of mindreading. Here an argument from error is being used to resist the claim that all mindreading takes a specific simulationist form, namely mirroring-based mindreading. Many errors associated with non-mirror-based mindreading are readily accommodated by a second form of simulation, discussed below in section 8. More generally, see Goldman (2006, Chap. 7).
- 7.
It might be replied that mirror-based mindreading is susceptible to egocentric error. F. de Vignemont (personal communication) suggests that if I myself have a terrible back pain and I see you carrying a heavy box, I would feel pain and ascribe this feeling to you. This might be an error because you are perfectly fine with a box that heavy; you are not in pain. Is not this an egocentric error? No doubt, it is an egocentric error. The question is whether it is a case of mirroring, at least a pure case of mirroring. It is not a case in which I see you exhibiting a behavioral or expressive manifestation of pain. And it is questionable whether the perceived heaviness of the box is a ‘sign’ of pain comparable to a knife or needle penetrating a body. It might be a case of inference- or imagination-caused pain rather than mirror-produced pain Admittedly, the case puts pressure on our definition of mirroring, but this is not a problem only for me. It is a problem for anyone seeking to be precise about what counts as mirroring. In any case, there are other arguments offered here in favor of thesis T3. It does not rest exclusively on the lesser-liability-to-error argument.
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Acknowledgments
The author thanks Vittorio Gallese, Marco Iacoboni, and Frederique de Vignemont for detailed comments that resulted in many helpful changes in the manuscript. Other helpful comments were due to Holly M. Smith.
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Goldman, A.I. (2008). Mirroring, Mindreading, and Simulation. In: Pineda, J.A. (eds) Mirror Neuron Systems. Contemporary Neuroscience. Humana Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59745-479-7_14
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