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Abstract

Although slightly more that one-half of the fifty American states require automobile insurers to offer no-fault personal injury coverages (i.e., PIP), many of these states fail to provide any accompanying barrier to tort recovery. In fact, fewer than one-third of all states impose any barrier to recovery, and these barriers invariably take the form of a monetary or verbal threshold’ that must be satisfied before an accident victim can seek recovery for non-economic (pain and suffering) damages. Currently, no state imposes a barrier to third-party recovery for economic damages.

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A “monetary” threshold requires that a victim’s economic damages reach a certain dollar level, whereas a “verbal” threshold requires that a victim’s bodily injuries satisfy a legal standard of “serious” injury

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References

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© 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Lascher, E.L., Powers, M.R. (2001). Choice No-Fault Insurance: Efficiency and Equity. In: Lascher, E.L., Powers, M.R. (eds) The Economics and Politics of Choice No-Fault Insurance. Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security, vol 24. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1541-8_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1541-8_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-7467-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-1541-8

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