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What’s New and What’s Old about the New Sociology of Morality

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Handbook of the Sociology of Morality

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Abstract

In this chapter I ask what’s new and what’s old about the new sociology of morality. What might it learn from earlier sociologies of morality? What wheels needn’t be reinvented? In the second section I discuss three old issues: (a) whether morality can and should be scientifically investigated; (b) the fact of moral variation; and (c) the explanation of moral variation. I spell out these three points using the writings of Martineau, Lévy-Bruhl, and Durkheim. In the third section I discuss two new challenges: (a) the implications of moral realism; and (b) the implications of moral neuroscience. I argue that neither challenge can be easily dismissed. Finally, in the fourth section, I very briefly consider the future of the new sociology of morality: what’s next and what unique contributions it can make.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    I use existing English translations wherever possible; all others are my own. The translations of “la morale” and “science de la morale” aren’t straightforward. In his “Preface to the Translation” of Division of Labor, George Simpson (1933:x) writes: “I have often translated ‘la morale’ as ethics, although sometimes as morality. I do not think Durkheim made any sharp distinction between them.” But Simpson doesn’t say what he means by them, nor in which cases he uses which. Durkheim’s introduction to La Morale is titled “Introduction to Morality” in one collection of essays (translation by Mark Traugott), and “Introduction to Ethics” in another (translation by H.L. Sutcliffe) (Durkheim [1920]1978, [1920]1979). Remarkably, Durkheim begins this piece precisely by discussing two senses of “la morale.” In my translations I leave the word “morale” in French. [Cf. Sutcliffe (1979:viii): “As is the custom amongst translators of Durkheim, certain words for which there is no precise and unambiguous English equivalent have been left in the original” (see also Fields 2005:174–175.]

  2. 2.

    On Martineau’s (arguably neglected) methodological treatise, How to Observe Morals and Manners, see: Hill (1989), Hoecker-Drysdale (1992:50–53), Lengermann and Niebrugge (2001).

  3. 3.

    One can’t really speak of the moral nativism thesis, since there are many dissimilar moral nativism theses. Joyce (2006b:257–258) tries to clarify what the “innateness of morality” means as follows: “I suggest that what people generally mean when they debate the ‘innateness of morality’ is whether morality (under some specification) can be given an adaptive explanation in genetic terms: whether the present-day existence of the trait is to be explained by reference to a genotype having granted ancestors reproductive advantage, rather than by reference to psychological processes of acquisition.”

  4. 4.

    It’s beside the point for the purposes of this chapter whether this argument is sound. But I do think that Lévy-Bruhl is sometimes in trouble, especially when he argues that “experience itself testifies against that objection” (p. 214), and uses the expressions “ethical objective reality” and “objective” in an ambiguous fashion (e.g., pp. 214–215).

  5. 5.

    Behind these claims lies Martineau’s metaphysics, which at the time of her writing How to Observe Morals and Manners still had room for “Providence” and “[man’s] Creator”: “The general influences under which universal ideas and feelings of right and wrong are formed, are dispensed by the Providence under which all are educated. That man should be happy is so evidently the intention of his Creator, the contrivances to that end are so multitudinous and so striking, that the perception of the aim may be called universal” (p. 25; cf. Hoecker-Drysdale 1992:26).

  6. 6.

    For example, she argues that, given the nature of the feudal system, “[t]he clergy will be politic, subservient, studious, or indolent, kind-hearted, effeminate, with a strong tendency to spiritual pride, and love of spiritual dominion. It will be surprising, too, if they are not driven into infidelity by the credulity of their pupils” (p. 33).

  7. 7.

    For example, he writes: “There are then sciences which ought to play an indispensable part in ‘ethical physics,’ analogous (I do not say entirely similar) to that of mathematics in physics properly so called. They are the historical sciences. […] If we understand, as we should, by historical sciences, not only the political, diplomatic and military history of nations, but also the history of languages, arts, technology, religions, law, customs, civilization, and institutions, those are the oldest and most fruitful in results of the sciences studied by ‘social nature’; indeed, failing them, the effort to establish sociological laws would be vain. The comparative method, indispensable to reach such laws, is only applicable thanks to the results of the historical sciences” (p. 100).

  8. 8.

    In order to test theory T one needs many auxiliary theories, including the theories embedded in one’s measurement instruments and methodological techniques. But then one is not testing theory T alone, but T and the auxiliary theories as a whole (cf. Duhem [1906]1991, Quine 1953).

  9. 9.

    For instance, Sturgeon (1988:245–246) proposes this counterfactual: “I do not believe that Hitler would have done all he did if he had not been morally depraved, nor, on the assumption that he was not depraved, can I think of any plausible alternative explanation for his doing those things. Nor is it plausible that we would all have believed he was morally depraved even if he hadn’t been.” See the extensive debate in metaethics about “moral explanations,” kicked off by Harman (1977). The question is analogous to the question of symmetry and impartiality in the sociology of science (Bloor 1991). What’s the difference, if any, between a sociological explanation of purported truths (e.g., some people’s belief that the Earth is an oblate spheroid that revolves around the sun) and a sociological explanation of purported falsehoods (e.g., some people’s belief that the Earth is a flat disk floating in an ocean or supported by a giant tortoise)? For an analogous question in the sociology of religion, see Berger (1967) and Porpora (2006).

  10. 10.

    Admittedly, the skeptic would retort that the Nazis weren’t really wicked. That’s just some people’s opinion. Hitler’s opinion was that they were morally admirable folks. Recall, however, that Jones is assuming that the Nazis weren’t really wicked as far as her scientific endeavor is concerned. Outside the office and the classroom, she does think they were. (This is obviously not an argument against the skeptic, though.)

  11. 11.

    Moral neuroscience’s account about itself relies on another common trope in the history of science: a subject or set of issues traditionally studied by philosophers strikes lucky and starts to be studied by scientists instead, gets promoted to scientific status, we obtain reliable empirical data instead of mere speculation, etc. Here’s another example: “Debates on the moral nature of man have occupied the center of discussions among theologians, philosophers, and layman for millennia. Only recently have we been able to delve empirically into the neural organization of moral behavior” (Moll et al. 2003:299; see also Prehn and Heekeren 2009:129).

  12. 12.

    I’m not interested in evaluating these arguments here, but they are far from unproblematic – see, e.g., Barrett (2006), Barrett et al. (2007), Lindquist et al. (2006), Lindquist and Barrett (2008).

  13. 13.

    In 1995 the center became the Centre de Recherche Sens, Éthique et Société and the new director Patrick Pharo. The next directors were Simone Bateman and currently Edwige Rude-Antoine. Morality has also been a central theme for Luc Boltanski, Laurent Thévenot, and their Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale.

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Correspondence to Gabriel Abend .

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Abend, G. (2010). What’s New and What’s Old about the New Sociology of Morality. In: Hitlin, S., Vaisey, S. (eds) Handbook of the Sociology of Morality. Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6896-8_30

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