Abstract
Strategic doctrine is viewed, in this chapter, as a state’s ‘theory’ about how it can best ‘produce’ security for itself.1 Strategic doctrine may be conceptualised as a means-end relationship, in which military means are connected to political objectives.2 Ideally it should include an explanation of why the theory is expected to work in practice. Actual events test the validity of the state’s national security ‘theory’ and serve to show whether the ‘theory’ helps the state achieve its political goals.
The author wishes to thank D. Constas, F. Kikiras and G. Poukamissas for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. All errors and opinions are of course the responsibility of the author. For support during the preparation of this chapter he thanks the SSRC-MacArthur Fellowship Program in International Peace and Security.
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Notes
See Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984) p. 13.
See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976)
Edward M. Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971) p. viii
Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973) pp. 1–29
Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Frederik Praeger, 1967) p. 335.
See Arnold Horelick, ‘Perspectives on the Study of Comparative Military Doctrine’, in Frank B. Horton (ed.), Comparative Defense Policy (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974) p. 155
See Edward N. Luttwack, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
See Van Coufoudakis, ‘Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973–1983: the View from Athens’, International Security (Spring 1985) pp. 201–4.
These data have been presented to parliament by the Greek prime minister. See Journal of Parliamentary Debates [Praktika Voulis] (24 May 1987) p. 6240 (in Greek). See also Robert McDonald, ‘Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean — Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part II’, in Prospects of Security in the Mediterranean, Adelphi Paper No. 229 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988) p. 74.
See, for example, Jed Snyder, Defending the Fringe: NATO, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1987).
See US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951 (Washington, DC, 1974) p. 452, and Yannis Roubatis, ‘The United States and the Operational Responsibilities of the Greek Armed Forces, 1947–1987’, Journal of Greek Diaspora, vol. 6 (Spring 1973) pp. 41–9.
See Petros Garoufalias, Greece and Cyprus: Tragic Mistakes and Lost Opportunities (Athens: Bergadis, 1982) p. 47 (in Greek).
See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979) p. 168.
For the classic formulation of the requirements of deterrence, see William Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence (Princeton, NJ: Center for International Studies, 1954) pp. 6–8.
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986) p. 36.
For a theoretical analysis of this tactic see Edward Rhodes, Power and Madness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) pp. 107–34.
For an analysis of this problem, see Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977) pp. 239–97
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) pp. 58–113.
For an analysis of this problem, see Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988) pp. 11–14
For an analysis of this problem, see Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988)
For a theoretical analysis of the advantages of this strategy, see Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977) pp. 254–80
A. George, D. Hall and W. Simons, The Limits of Coersive Diplomacy (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1971).
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© 1991 Dimitri Constas
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Platias, A. (1991). Greece’s Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence. In: Constas, D. (eds) The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12014-7_7
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