Abstract
The theory of how mutual deterrence through a balance of terror would work, and of strategy in the nuclear age, was developed with remarkable speed in the latter part of the 1950s by a group of brilliant American thinkers which included Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Oskar Morgenstern, Thomas Schelling and Albert Wohlstetter.1 The basic ideas, discussed at greater length in chapter 6, are now familiar. The present chapter begins by summarising them. It then compares the balance of terror with earlier balances of military power and sketches the development of strategic postures in the period since 1945.2
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Notes and References
See especially Albert Wohlstetter, ‘The delicate balance of terror’, Foreign Affairs (January 1959).
Oskar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defence, (New York: Random House, 1959).
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princton University Press, 1959).
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1960).
Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton University Press, 1960).
For an excellent account of the evolution of strategic theory see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Macmillan, 1981).
Also Michael Howard, Studies in Peace and War (London: Temple Smith, 1970) chapter 10. The author recalls with gratitude distinguished lectures on the subject by both men at the Royal College of Defence Studies in 1979.
John Foster Dulles, The Evolution of Foreign Policy (Department of State Bulletin 30, no. 761, 25 January 1954) p. 108.
The unpublished NATO document embodying the ‘massive retaliation’ strategy is known by its serial number MC 14/2.
The term ‘assured destruction’ was first used in 1964.
The unpublished NATO document of December 1967 embodying the ‘flexible response’ strategy is known by its serial number MC 14/3.
Secretary McNamara publicly discussed in 1962 the idea of targeting military installations in a retaliatory response. By 1964 the idea had been dropped.
John Newhouse, Cold Dawn, the Story of SALT (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973) p.18.
See also Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) p.208.
NATO Handbook, March 1978, p.17.
Ibid.
President Nixon’s question is quoted in James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Report for Financial Year 1975 (US Department of Defence, 1974) p. 35.
Ibid. President Nixon’s own answer is quoted in chapter 7, note 17.
Robert S. McNamara, ‘The military role of nuclear weapons, perceptions and misperceptions’ (Foreign Affairs, Fall 1983) pp.65–6.
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© 1986 A.J.C. Edwards
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Edwards, A.J.C. (1986). Basic Theory and the Evolution of Strategic Postures. In: Nuclear Weapons, the Balance of Terror, the Quest for Peace. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08131-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08131-8_2
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