FORMALISING JAVA SAFETY – AN OVERVIEW

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Abstract We review the existing literature on Java safety, emphasizing formal approaches, and the impact of Java safety on small footprint devices such as smart cards. The conclusion is that while a lot of good work has been done, a more concerted effort is needed to build a coherent set of machine readable formal models of the whole of Java and its implementation. This is a formidable task but we believe it is essential to building trust in Java safety, and thence to achieve ITSEC level 6 or Common Criteria level 7 certification for Java programs.

We have tried to avoid technical detail, and focus on the bigger issues. The interested reader may wish to consult some of the many papers that we refer to fill in the details.

Keywords: Java, semantics, formal methods, smart cards

1. INTRODUCTION

Java offers interesting possibilities for building flexible and portable smart card systems. However, many design and implementation problems have been, and are being reported in the literature with respect to Java's safety [32]. Safety is particularly important for Java Card applications, as witnessed by the increasing demand for smart card ITSEC [25] or Common Criteria [44] certifications [51].

An excellent introduction to the relevant terminology and concepts of safety and security in programming languages may be found in Volpano and Smith [60]. In this paper we focus on safety based on the correctness of implementations of Java, and correctness of programs written in Java.

Java is a safe programming language in the sense that Java programs are type safe and memory safe. The two main features that bring type and memory safety are firstly that Java does not offer pointer arithmetic;

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instead Java offers references to objects which cannot be manufactured by the user but only by the system. Unused objects are automatically garbage collected. The second feature is that Java is a strongly typed language, like Pascal and Ada, and unlike C and C++, Java even performs runtime checks to avoid array index errors.

Java is implemented by compiling Java programs into Java Virtual Machine (JVM) byte codes. The byte codes are stored in class files. An interpreter, the JVM, loads the class files and executes byte codes. The JVM controls access to all machine resources. Safety in Java is therefore considered language based, as opposed to operating system based.

A simple (and inefficient) implementation of safety would carry out all sorts of runtime checks. This is the "defensive" approach to safety [9]. Examples include making sure that the operands of an integer add instruction are indeed integers, to check that an object is initialised before it is used, and to check that an index is within the bounds of an array. It is more efficient for the compiler to perform the type checks. However, other checks, such as the array index check cannot normally be performed by the compiler, and must be delegated to the run time system. We will discuss some proposals also to avoid even this kind of runtime check in Section 4.

Java's write once, run anywhere philosophy adds an interesting complication by allowing compiled Java programs (in the form of class files) from any source to be loaded into the runtime environment. This means that the checks performed by the compiler lose their validity because it is easy to tamper with class files while they are stored, or in transit. Therefore Java implementations normally include a class loader and a byte code verifier [30]. The former takes care of accepting and loading JVM programs into the Java runtime environment. The latter is essentially another type checker operating on the JVM byte codes. We will not say more about the class loader here as it mainly deals with controlling name spaces and providing the hooks for a third component, the security manager to implement a form of security in Java. Instead we will concentrate on safety.

Both the class loader and the byte code verifier do their work before execution of the code from a newly loaded class starts. We would argue that even if all the relevant checks were performed during the execution of the code, which are now performed at load and verification time, Java applets would offer more safety than they do now. The reason is that many implementation errors [11] have been, and are being uncovered in class loaders, byte code verifiers, and in particular in the complex interplay between the class loader, the byte code verifier and the run time system. Each single error is a safety loophole. Worse yet, each

error may give rise to a bug fix, and system administrators will soon grow tired of installing yet another bug fix [17]. Operational procedures are often the weakest element in security [2].

2. METHODOLOGY

If Java is to be a language used to build applications that offer safety, it needs to be well defined, so that programmers understand exactly how to use the language, and that implementors know how to realise the implementation, always maintaining the safety. This requires formal specifications of the following components:

- The semantics of Java.
- The semantics of the JVM language.
- The Java to JVM compiler.
- The runtime support, that is parts of the Java API, including all Java.* classes. A specification of the API is needed because for example starting and stopping threads is effectuated via the Java API and not via JVM instructions.

The methodology to build these specifications and their implementations should be to:

- Construct clear and concise formal specifications of the relevant components.
- Validate the specifications by animating them, and by stating and proving relevant properties of the components. Examples include type soundness (i.e. a program that is well typed will not go wrong with a typing error at runtime), and compiler correctness (i.e. compiling a Java program to a JVM program should preserve the meaning of the program).
- Refine the specifications into implementations, or alternatively implement the specification by ad-hoc methods with an a-posteriori correctness proof.
- Create all specifications in machine-readable form, so that they can be used as input to theorem provers, model checkers, and other tools [57].

Following the methodology outlined above would enable developers to achieve ITSEC level 6 or Common Criteria level 7 for Java applications [51]. This is particularly important for smart card applications,

where safety and security breaches have devastating economic consequences.

Regardless of Java's claims of being a small and simple language, which by comparison to C++ it is, Java is too complex and too large to make it easy for a complete formal specification to be built. It also contains some novel combinations of language features that have not been studied before. The principal difficulties are:

- Many different features need to be modelled, such as multi-threading, exception handling, object orientation and garbage collection;
- Careful consideration has to be given to the interaction of these features. The official Sun references [19, 31] are sometimes ambiguous, inconsistent and incomplete. See for example Bertelsen [5], who provides a long list of ambiguities in the JVM specification. Curiously, other authors do find the official Sun references complete and unambiguous [14].
- The reference implementation is complex (the Sun JDK), and not always consistent with the documentation.

Attracted by the potential benefits, and challenged by the difficulties, many authors have formalised aspects of Java, and/or its implementation. At the time of writing we counted more than 40 teams of researchers from all over the world. Many of those have specified the semantics of subsets of Java. Others have worked on the semantics of subsets of the JVM language. Some authors have worked on both, often in an attempt at relating the two, with the ultimate goal of proving the specification of a Java compiler correct. To our knowledge, no single attempt has been made at specifying full Java, the full JVM, or the full compiler. Only two authors have worked on small parts of the Java API: Coscia and Reggio [10] and Poll et al [48].

The vast majority of the studies that we have found discuss abstractions, to make the specifications more manageable. Popular assumptions include:

- There is unlimited memory.
- Individual storage locations can hold all primitive data types (i.e. byte as well as double).
- Individual JVM program locations can hold all byte code instructions.

While such abstractions help to reduce clutter in the specifications, they also make it impossible to model certain safety problems, such as

jumping in the middle of an instruction. It is an art to model systems precisely at the right level of abstraction, with just enough detail to be able to discuss the features of interest.

2.1. LANGUAGE FEATURES

The Java and JVM languages have a number of interesting features. Some apply only to Java, some to the JVM and some to both.

Most researchers in the field model parts of Java's imperative core, and many also deal with object orientation. We will say no more about this core, as it is well understood. Instead, we will concentrate on the remaining issues. Some authors model objects and classes but not the type system. Type soundness has been studied by quite a few. The JVM implementation of exception handling uses a difficult optimisation, which is the reason why several authors have studied this in detail. Multi-threading has found favour only with few. We have not been able to find any work on modelling garbage collection in the context of studying either Java or the JVM. This is a problem because garbage collection is not transparent since deallocating an object triggers its finalizer method. This connection is actually ignored by some authors [6].

3. JAVA SEMANTICS

In this paper we concentrate on the various reports found in the literature on specifying the semantics of Java. The most interesting aspect of studying the JVM (the byte code verifier) is perhaps less relevant to Java implementations on smart cards, mainly because it is so difficult to implement a byte code verifier within the limited resources of a smart card. However, we will revisit this issue in Section 5.

Our focus is on identifying the methodological approaches and on the Java subsets being studied. The reason is that some specification methods, and in particular the accompanying support tools, are perhaps more appropriate for the task in hand than others. We are also keen to identify methods and tools that are able to cope with the largest amount of complexity in the Java language, with the most features taken into account.

3.1. PROGRAMMING ENVIRONMENT

Attali et al [4] discuss a reasonably complete executable, operational semantics of Java built using the Centaur system. The specification includes concurrency, but it omits exceptions, arrays, and packages. A static semantics is not given. One of the strengths of this work lies in

the capability of the Centaur system to generate an appropriate programming environment from syntactic and semantic specifications.

3.2. THE TYPE SYSTEM

The Java type system is based on simple sub typing, but it has one novel feature: Java offers interfaces by way of creating multiple inheritance. Drossopoulou and Eisenbach were probably the first to model this feature [16]. They give a static semantics (i.e. a specification of the type system) and a dynamic semantics (i.e. an interpreter of Java programs that works with typed data) of a relatively small subset of Java. Drossopoulou and Eisenbach then state the soundness of their type system. In a separate paper, Drossopoulou et al [15] extend their subset to include exception handling. Neither paper gives proofs. Instead Syme [57] encodes some of the models of Drossopoulou et al in his DECLARE system, and gives proofs. The mere activity of encoding hand built specifications in a mechanised system is reported to uncover 40 errors made during the translation. More importantly, Syme has also found two non-trivial errors in the hand written proofs of Drossopoulou and Eisenbach.

Nipkow and von Oheimb [41] prove type soundness of their *Java_{light}* subset, which is similar to the subset used by Drossopoulou et al. However, the former use Isabelle/HOL to machine-check the proofs from the outset, giving a higher degree of confidence in the correctness of the specifications and the proofs. While the semantics are verified using a proof checker, Nipkow and von Oheimb were not able to validate the specifications due to the lack of support for generating executable semantics [62]. One conclusion of their work is that theorem provers are too sensitive to the precise formulation of a specification, and that more support in the provers is needed to make working with semantics more accessible [62, Page 151]. To complement the operational semantics of *Java_{light}* [62], von Oheimb presents an axiomatic semantics [61], and proves the soundness and completeness of the latter with respect to the operational semantics.

4. JAVA EXTENSIONS

Several authors propose to enhance the safety of Java programs by using program verification techniques. This contributes to the safety of Java programs because they may be expected to contain fewer design and implementation problems. While some of the work we report on below has not been done specifically for smart cards, it is relevant for the practical reason that programs or applets for smart cards are generally

intricate but small. This is something that the tools we report on cope well with.

4.1. MODEL CHECKING

Bieber et al [7] use the SMV model checker to verify security properties of Java card applets. Their approach is based on abstract interpretation of Java Card byte codes, where the domain of the interpretation is a partial order based on levels of security. Common to all model checking based approaches, Bieber et al have to work hard to keep the state space small. Using a low level, byte code representation of programs does not make this any easier.

4.2. THEOREM PROVING

Detlefs et al, using Modula 3 [13], and more recently also using Java [53], go beyond what type checking offers by requiring the programmer to annotate programs with pre- and post-conditions. The idea is that programmers do this informally anyway, so it is not a big step to ask them to annotate their programs formally. The compiler is then able to generate and prove the verification conditions (using a form of Dijkstra's weakest pre-condition calculus) that need to be satisfied for the pre- and post-conditions to hold. The system of Detlefs et al does not require the programmer to annotate programs with loop invariants and variants, which most programmers would find harder than to write down than just the pre and post conditions. Instead the system derives loop invariants automatically, which are weaker than those provided by humans. Alternatively the system may be directed to assume that loops are executed at most once, thus giving rise to conservative approximations to the real behaviour of loops. The system is thus a compromise between what is achievable with automated techniques to date and what programmers are able to provide. The system is therefore more powerful than a type checker, but less powerful than programming with full verification.

The aim of the LOOP project of Jacobs et al is full verification of Java programs. They use a denotational semantics based tool to translate Java into the higher order logic of widely used theorem provers (PVS [26], or Isabelle/HOL [59]). The user then expresses properties of the translated Java programs in higher order logic and drives the appropriate theorem prover to develop the proofs. Examples of properties include termination of a method, or in-variants on the fields of a class. While the theorem provers provide a degree of automation, user intervention is required for example to introduce loop variants and in-variants. The LOOP project aspires to achieve full verification of Java programs. While the project

is building tools to assist the Java programmer, it is unclear how much Java programmers will be expected to know about PVS, or Isabelle/Hol and tool assisted theorem proving.

The LOOP project has started to annotate all the methods found in the Java Card API with preconditions, with the purpose of being able to prove that unexpected exceptions cannot happen [48]. The annotations are supported by the Java Modelling Language (JML) [29]. As formal methods go, JML is particularly interesting because it aims to avoid the notational burden that some other formal methods impose on their users. The JML notation achieves this aim by using as much of the syntax of the host language (java) as possible for the specifications, and JML provides a means of encapsulating some of the maths in Java Classes.

Poetzsch-Heftter and Müller [47] give an operational and an axiomatic semantics of a subset set of Java (the imperative core and method calls). They then prove the soundness of the axiomatic semantics with respect to the operational semantics. Their axiomatic semantics can thus be used to as a basis for the verification of Java programs. Both types of semantics are also embedded in HOL, so that mechanical checking of the soundness proof would be feasible. This is proposed as future work.

Verification is not restricted to Java programs. Moore [35] has built a new version of a small subset of Cohen's specification [9] of the JVM. Moore shows how the ACL2 theorem prover is capable not only of animating the semantics of simple byte code programs, but also of proving the correctness of such programs, against a specification in terms of the models underlying programs. Both Cohen and Moore's ACL2 specifications are rather verbose, as the notation used in ACL2 is Lisp.

Motré [36] describes a formal model (using the B-method) of the Java Card Firewall, the component of Java Card that permits controlled sharing of objects between potentially hostile applets. In the model a number of simplifications have been made, such as the omission of looping constructs from the JCVM component. The main results of the work are twofold. Firstly, the constructed model has been entirely verified. Secondly, to reduce the number of proof obligations that need to be discharged during verification, it is argued that it is a good idea to break the specification up in a number of separate B machines. Spending more effort to build a more comprehensive specification, and relating the specification back to the reference implementation of Java Card would be extremely valuable.

4.3. CODE CERTIFICATION

Necula and Lee introduced the idea of proof carrying code (PCC) [37]. This is a partly automatic verification technique for assembly level programs designed to allow a code consumer to have trust in the products of a code producer. One might argue that this would then be not a Java but more a JVM issue. However we report it here as it relies on automatic program verification techniques, like most of the other work reported in this section.

PCC works as follows (ignoring the negotiations between producer and consumer about the safety policy to be used). The producer expresses a safety property in terms of pre and post conditions on the program. In addition, the producer annotates the program, with loop invariants etc. Then the producer generates a proof of the safety property, either by hand, or using a mechanical proof assistant. The consumer receives the code and the proof, and mechanically checks that the proof is consistent with the program, and therefore that the program satisfies the safety property. Since it is more difficult to generate a proof than to check it, separating the two phases has a significant benefit: The consumer does not need to trust the producer, or the means by which the producer creates the code and the proof. Instead, the consumer relies only on a small trusted infrastructure consisting of what is essentially a type checker. This is reported to be no more than 5 pages of C code in size.

One of the problems of the PCC approach is that the size of a proofs may be exponential in the size of the program [39]. A proof may become large because of the amount of redundancy. Necula and Lee [38] show that it is possible to reduce a proof of size n to a proof of size $\sqrt{n}$ by avoiding some redundancy. They also give practical examples of small programs (e.g. quick sort) with acceptable proof sizes. In spite of this improvement, proofs may still be exponentially large.

We conclude this section with a cautionary note. Program verification requires special skills, to formulate properties, to discover appropriate loop invariants, to drive mechanical theorem provers etc. Few programmers have these skills. It is thus essential that tools are automatic, or at least require as little programmer intervention as possible.

5. SMALL FOOTPRINT DEVICES

Java implementations are resource hungry. For example even the smallest JVM implementations require at least 1 MB of store [63]. This makes Java acceptable for use in PCs and capacious embedded controllers but less than ideal for use in small footprint devices, such as mobile phones, and PDAs. Even the K Virtual Machine, which has been

designed specially to fit into small footprint devices requires at least 128KB of RAM [56]. Please note that we are side stepping the fact that Java is not suitable for real time applications [63].

The most extreme example of a small device is probably a smart card, which typically offers a few hundred bytes of RAM and a dozen or so KB of EEPROM. The current solution for smart cards as licensed by Sun to the smart card industry is to subset Java and the JVM. Only programs written in the Java-Card subset can be run on the Java-Card VM (JCVM). This has three disadvantages:

- The full potential and flexibility of client server software development cannot be realised because developers need to be aware of the platform on which their code is going to run (i.e. on or off card).
- Java applets running on the smallest embedded controllers cannot be verified appropriately before they are run because the full byte code verifier is too large. Current stopgap measures include digital signing of pre-verified byte codes.
- The freedom of code migration is restricted because not all platforms support full Java.

The implementation of Java for smart cards is based on the Split VM concept, which pushes part of the byte code verification from the loading to the compilation/linking phase. A converter from the JVM byte codes to the JCVM format performs the byte code verification and optimises and prepares the code for loading into the device.

Like Java, and the JVM, Java Card also has some safety and security problems. For example Montgomery and Krishna [34] show how the security of the Java Card object sharing model can be broken. Oestreicher [42, 43] discusses the Java Card memory model. The model is not obviously flawed, but it is rather baroque, and therefore a potential source of security problems when used incorrectly.

5.1. PROGRAMMING ENVIRONMENT

Attali et al [3] use the Centaur system to build a syntax and semantics directed programming environment for Java Card applets. The system includes a Java Card specific editor, and is capable of generating a terminal application to test a Java Card application. The tools are based on a formal, executable semantics of Java [4].

5.2. CLASS FILE CONVERSION

Hartel et al [23] provide a complete specification of an early version of the JCVM, the Java Secure Processor (JSP). The JSP subset excludes multi-threading, garbage collection and exception handling, mainly because the limited resources on a smart card would not be able to support these features. The specifications have been validated using the *letos* tool.

An interesting methodological point to note is that the earlier JSP was designed essentially by starting from the full JVM, and then cutting back unwanted features. The newer KVM on the other hand has been designed from scratch, adding features as required. This latter method is more likely to yield a coherent result and is therefore recommended [58]. The developers of the *picoPERC* version of the JVM take a different and promising looking approach. They offer a core VM (still requiring 64KB) and provide tools to add further functionality to the core VM. Unfortunately, no details are provided in the paper [40].

Lanet and Requet [28] use the B-method (and the associated toolkit ‘Atelier B’) to study one particular aspect of the conversion from JVM to JCVM code. This is the optimisation that replaces JVM instructions with int type arguments by JCVM instructions that take byte, short or int as appropriate. Their results include:

- 1 A specification of the constraints imposed by the byte code verifier for a small subset (the imperative core and method calls) of the JVM.
- 2 A specification of the semantics of this subset of the JVM byte codes.
- 3 A specification of the semantics of the corresponding subset of the JCVM byte codes.
- 4 A proof that the specification of the JCVM subset is a data refinement of the JVM subset.

The subsets are small, and the differences between the JCVM and the JVM are small. However, the work by Lanet and Requet shows how the B-method can be used successfully, and succinctly to make the proof.

Denney and Jensen [12] study an aspect that is complementary to that studied by Lanet and Requet. The former study the conversion of JVM class files to JCVM class files by a ‘tokenisation’ process. This replaces names in the class files by more compact representations, thus reducing the size of the class files as well as speeding up the loading process. Denney and Jensen take essentially the same four steps as Lanet and Requet

above. However, Denney and Jensen use the Coq theorem prover to mechanically check their proofs. They also use an elegant method to parameterise their operational semantics over name resolution. Therefore, only one operational semantics is required, that is abstract with respect to the actual name resolution method, and thus common to both the JVM and JCVm subsets.

5.3. VERIFICATION REVISITED

A small footprint device (a smart card) does not have enough memory to perform byte code verification. The split VM concept stipulates off-line verification, and signing the results digitally. When loading the code all that needs to be checked is the signature, not the code itself. This places considerable trust in digital signatures: once the underlying keys are compromised, verified byte code becomes worthless.

Instead of a verifier based on type checking, Posegga and Vogt [50, 49] propose to use a model checker to perform off-line byte code verification for smart cards. Their argument is that a tried and tested model checker (SMV) is easier to trust than a Java byte code verifier. They give no supporting evidence for this claim. In a separate paper [18], Posegga et al propose to implement a tiny proof checker on a smart card. The proof checker would then be able to reason about trust policies set by the user. The result appear to be somewhat disappointing, as proving theoremhood of some simple first order logic formulae may take of the order of minutes.

Rose and Rose [52] do not wish to rely on digital signatures for the safety of byte code verification on smart cards. Instead they use Necula and Lee's proof carrying code method to 'split' the byte code verifier as follows. The first step (the verification) is to reconstruct the types associated with all local variables and stack locations of JVM code. The second step (the certification) is to check based on the reconstructed types, that each instruction is correctly typed. The advantages are, firstly that the certification process is simple, so that it is feasible to implement it on a smart card; the more complex verification can be carried out on a host. The second advantage is that only the certification needs to be trusted, not the verification. This makes the trusted infrastructure smaller than in a standard Java implementation. Rose and Rose show that for a small subset of the JVM, consisting essentially of parts of the imperative core with method calls, certification is sound and complete. This means that the separated verifier and checker agree exactly with the original byte code verifier. The paper contains some annoying errors, which could have been avoided if Rose and Rose had used tool support.

Furthermore, exception handling has been omitted, which complicates byte code verification considerably [55].

5.4. ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATION

Grimaud et al [20] propose the FACADE intermediate language specifically for use on smartcards. Their objective is use FACADE for Java, Visual Basic (for the benefit of Smart Card for Windows), and MEL (the language of the Multos system). FACADE does not support interfaces or multiple inheritance so it is unclear how the objective might be satisfied.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Java programs offer type and memory safety because of properties of the Java language. However, it has proved difficult to implement the safety features correctly. The main reason is that building a Java system with acceptable performance requires various optimisations, which basically distribute the implementation of safety features throughout the compiler and different parts of the run time system. The various components responsible for safety interact in complex ways, creating scope for design and implementation problems. Yet in spite of all the optimisations, Java programs today are still slower than C or C++ programs.

New implementation techniques are needed to make Java simpler and faster, whilst at the same time making the implementations more amenable to formal modelling. Formal models offer a way of studying the different components responsible for safety, and for studying the interactions between these components.

Many formal methods and semantics tools have been used to study aspects of Java: ACL2 [27], ASM [21], B method [1], Centaur [8], Coq, DECLARE, ESC/Java [53], FDR, Haskell, Isabelle [46], HOL, JML [29], LETOS [22], PVS [45], SMV [33], SpecWare [54], SPIN [24]. Not all of those tools are sufficiently automatic, or adequately equipped with the right mathematical theories to prove safety properties of Java programs.

There is no clear winner amongst the various methods and tools used. The Abstract State Machines has been used to build the most comprehensive set of specifications. Isabelle/HOL is one of the most popular tools, but even its users complain about lacking mathematical theories and validation facilities [62]. This clearly needs improvement.

Almost all efforts that we have discussed, either to formalise parts of Java, or its implementation have uncovered ambiguities and inconsistencies in the official Sun documentation, and/or problems with the various implementations. This should be considered a clear success of applying formal techniques. However, much work remains to be done:

- On modelling garbage collection, and the Java API.
- On building more appropriate theories for programming language semantics modelling.
- On simplifying and modularising the individual components of Java implementations.
- On reducing the size of the trusted computing base, so that flaws are less likely to compromise the security of the system as a whole.
- On considering formal specification, validation and provably correct implementation as a whole, rather than in separation.
- On presenting clear and concise formalisations of systems, which are accessible to the designers and implementors of these systems.
- On using machine-readable specifications.

We believe that work in each of these areas is both interesting and will lead to novel results, as the combination of features offered by Java is rather different from other languages.

We have made an effort to survey a considerable fraction of the relevant literature on Java safety, and in particular the relation with smart cards. We have tried to make the survey as accurate as possible. However, we welcome to hear about errors and inaccuracies in the survey. We do not claim to have written a complete survey. This would clearly be an impossible task considering the huge popularity of Java, and the consequent large number of researchers working in the area. However, having searched for relevant literature over a period of 6 months, new papers are being discovered at a much slower pace than at the beginning. This justifies the conclusion that our survey is at least representative for the current state of the art.

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