A New Identification Scheme Based on the Perceptrons Problem

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Abstract. Identification is a useful cryptographic tool. Since zero-knowledge theory appeared [3], several interactive identification schemes have been proposed (in particular Fiat-Shamir [2] and its variants [8, 5, 4], Schnorr [9]). These identifications are based on number theoretical problems. More recently, new schemes appeared with the peculiarity that they are more efficient from the computational point of view and that their security is based on $\mathcal{NP}$ -complete problems: PKP (Permuted Kernels Problem) [10], SD (Syndrome Decoding) [12] and CLE (Constrained Linear Equations) [13].

We present a new $\mathcal{NP}$ -complete linear problem which comes from learning machines: the Perceptrons Problem. We have some constraints, m vectors X^i of $\{-1, +1\}^n$, and we want to find a vector V of $\{-1, +1\}^n$ such that $X^i \cdot V \geq 0$ for all i .

Next, we provide some zero-knowledge interactive identification protocols based on this problem, with an evaluation of their security. Eventually, those protocols are well suited for smart card applications.

1 Introduction

An interactive identification protocol involves two persons Alice and Bob. Alice wants to prove interactively that she is really Alice. She has a public key which everybody knows, and a secret key associated to her public key. She is the only one who knows the secret key, and nobody can compute it. To prove her identity, Alice proves that she knows a secret key associated to her public key. In general, the public key is a problem, a difficult problem, and the secret key is a solution of this problem.

Recently, the zero-knowledge theory showed that we can prove the knowledge of a solution of a problem without revealing anything about this solution. The verifier learns nothing but the conviction that the prover knows a solution.

The first efficient zero-knowledge protocols were based on number theoretical problems (Fiat-Shamir [2] and its variants [8, 5, 4], Schnorr [9]). They have two major disadvantages:

- The hardness of the problems used (factorization and discrete logarithm) is not proved. Moreover, efficient algorithms and computers threaten them.
- Arithmetic operations are very expensive (modular multiplications, modular exponentiations).

Since 1989, new schemes have appeared, which rely on $\mathcal{NP}$ -complete problems, and require only operations over small numbers or even on bits: PKP (Permuted Kernels Problem) [10], SD (Syndrome Decoding) [12] or CLE (Constrained Linear Equations) [13].

This paper introduces another linear scheme based on the Perceptrons Problem, an $\mathcal{NP}$ -complete problem, which seems to be well suited for smart card applications.

2 Problems

2.1 The Perceptrons Problem

The following problem appears in physics and the study of the Ising's perceptrons, and in artificial intelligence with the learning machines. We call it *The Perceptrons Problem*.

Notation 1. We call an ε -vector (or matrix) a vector (or matrix) which components are either -1 or $+1$.

Definition 2. The Perceptrons Problem **PP**:

Input : an ε -matrix A of size $m \times n$.
 Problem : find an ε -vector Y of size n such that $AY \geq 0$.

It is easy to show that this problem is difficult to solve, even to approximate in the sense of Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [6]. Proofs can be found in [7].

2.2 The Permuted Perceptrons Problem

It is possible to design a zero-knowledge identification protocol with every $\mathcal{NP}$ -complete problem provided one-way hash functions are granted. But in order to get one quicker and easier, we will take a variant of this problem:

Definition 3. The Permuted Perceptrons Problem **PPP**

Input : an ε -matrix A of size $m \times n$,
 a multiset S of nonnegative integers, of size m .
 Problem : find an ε -vector Y of size n such that
 $\{ \{ (AV)_j | j = \{1, \dots, m\} \} \} = S$.

It is clear that a solution for **PPP** is a solution for **PP**. So the Permuted Perceptrons Problem is more difficult to solve than the original Perceptrons Problem.

3 Size of the problem

Secure values of m and n will be precised later with the efficiency of the attacks. But we will see that efficiency of the attacks will depend on the number of solutions of the instance.

So we will first evaluate the number of solutions of an average instance (A, S) of the Permuted Perceptrons Problem of size $m \times n$ when we know there exists at least one solution V .

- On one hand, we can count the solutions for the Perceptrons Problem instance associated. Let $PP(m, n)$ be the average number of solutions for the Perceptrons Problem instance A of size $m \times n$ (it is a big formula).
- On the other hand, we have to evaluate the probability to obtain a given multiset S with the components of the product of A and a given solution of **PP**: $P_{m,n,S}$

With every multiset S , this probability is less than the probability to obtain the multiset Σ which elements have a Gaussian distribution

(i.e. $|\Sigma|_j = mp_{n,j}$, where $p_{n,j}$ is the probability for two ε -vectors of size n ,

X and Y , to be such that $|X \cdot Y| = j$: $p_{n,j} = 2^{-n+1} \binom{n}{\frac{n+j}{2}} \simeq \sqrt{\frac{8}{\pi n}} e^{-\frac{j^2}{2n}}$

when $n = j \bmod 2$)

$$P_{m,n,S} \leq m! \prod_{j=1}^n \frac{p_{n,j}^{mp_{n,j}}}{(mp_{n,j})!}$$

Then the number of solutions for an average instance of **PPP** is less than $PP(m, n) \times P_{m,n,\Sigma}$.

Against the most efficient attack, we will need the smallest number of solutions. Then we will choose m and n such that $PP(m, n) \times P_{m,n,\Sigma} \leq 1$

As a consequence, we see that for interesting sizes ($100 < m < 200$), we can approximatively take $n \approx m + 16$.

4 Making the problem practical

4.1 How to get the keys ?

For cryptographic purposes, we only use instances with a known solution. We also want all instances with at least one solution may appear. To get such an instance, we firstly choose an arbitrary ε -vector V , of size n , which will be the solution of the future instance, and an ε -matrix A of size $m \times n$. We next modify it in the following way:

- If $(AV)_i < 0$, we replace the i^{th} row of A by its opposite value.
- If $(AV)_i \geq 0$, then we don't change this row.

Then, we compute $S = \{(AV)_i | i = 1, \dots, m\}$. Consequently, (A, S) is an instance of the Permuted Perceptrons Problem, with V as a solution. In addition, with this method, all the “good instances” may appear, with a probability which is proportional to the number of solutions of the **PP** instance.

4.2 Finite field

Also for cryptographic use, we need to bound the size of the numbers used in order to store them on a constant number of bits. So we will work in the finite field with p elements. If we bound the components of the product by a nonnegative odd integer t (i.e. if $T \in \{1, 3, \dots, t\}^m$), we can prove that if n , p and t are such that $2p > n + t$ we have:

$$AV = T \iff AV = T \bmod p$$

5 Possible attacks

We tried several attacks against **PP** and **PPP** in order to evaluate the security of a possible protocol. But since there is no algebraic structure in those problems, no manipulation of the matrix will leave the problem unchanged (manipulation like Gaussian elimination, used in the past against PKP, CLE or any problem based on error correcting codes will not help here). So, it seems that only (more or less intelligent) exhaustive search or probabilistic attacks would succeed.

5.1 The majority vector

The first attack against **PPP** which comes to mind is the *majority vector* M :
for all j , $\begin{cases} M_j = +1 & \text{if } \#\{i | A_{i,j} = +1\} > \frac{n}{2} \\ M_j = -1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Theorem 4. *For an $m \times n$ -instance constructed as shown below, with solution V and $m \leq n$, the average Hamming distance between V and M , is roughly $n \cdot (\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{\pi} \sqrt{\frac{m}{n}}) \approx 0.2n$.*

Firstly, we can change 20% of the components of M , and trying the products, but there are $\binom{n}{0.20n}$ such possibilities.

We can already fix a bound for n (and m) to overtake the usual work factor of 2^{64} : $n \geq 95$.

To improve this attack, we could arrange these changes beginning with components of M which values are litigious (i.e. $\#\{i | A_{i,j} = +1\}$ near $\frac{n}{2}$). But surprisingly enough, some components which seem to be very good are false: on average, 80% of the components will have to be handled. So, this improvement doesn't modify the bound on n .

5.2 Simulated annealing

Because of the inefficiency of the previous attack, we tried the well-known probabilistic algorithm that comes from artificial intelligence, known as *simulated annealing* [11]. This attack tries to minimize a function, *Energy*, defined on a finite metric space, in a probabilistic way. Simulated annealing algorithms are an improvement of gradient descent algorithms. Whereas gradient descent algorithms can converge to a local minimum and stay there, simulated annealing algorithms try to go away with some small random perturbations. These perturbations which may be important at the beginning have to decrease to zero.

Such an algorithm can be efficient only if the *Energy* function is roughly “continuous” (the difference between the images of two neighbors is bounded by a small number). For this reason, simulated annealing doesn’t seem to be well suited for **PPP** because of the multiset, but it should be perfect for **PP** with

$$E(V) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^m (|(AV)_i| - (AV)_i)$$

This algorithm turned out to be the most efficient. We have carried out many tests on square matrices ($m = n$), and on some other sizes, and during a day, we can find a solution for any instance of **PP** which size is less than about 200.

Those attacks have been running for a few months and we never find a solution for **PPP** for sizes greater than 71.

If we suppose that each of those solutions can appear with the same probability, we have to repeat this attack about $0.7 \times \#\{\text{solutions of } \mathbf{PP}\}$ rounds, in order to find the good solution with probability 0.5.

Then, we can evaluate the work factor of such an attack with probability of success equal to 0.5:

size	number of solutions PP	time for a solution (seconds)	time Solution Pr = 1/2 (seconds)	Work factor* 2^n elementary operations
101 × 117	$4.7 \cdot 10^9$	85	$399 \cdot 10^9$	64
121 × 137	$8.7 \cdot 10^{10}$	130	$11 \cdot 10^{12}$	68
151 × 167	$3.7 \cdot 10^{12}$	180	$666 \cdot 10^{12}$	74

* work factor estimated using a 60-70 MIPS processor speed

Then, we can say that even small sizes are secure enough. In addition, whatever the probabilistic attack, it will not be able to differentiate the good solution of **PPP** from any solution of **PP**. So, even if we supposed a quick attack for **PP** (an $\mathcal{NP}$ -complete problem) which would need only 1 second to find a solution for a 141×157 -sized instance, the work factor would remain above 2^{64} .

6 Practical values

With those results, we can suggest $m = 101$ and $n = 117$ as a secure size of the problem. So, in the average instance, $|S|_1 = 15$, $|S|_3 = 14$, etc.

$$\Pr_{\text{Instances}} [\text{Max } S > 33] < .3$$

Then we can suppose that there is no greater number than 33, (i.e. $t = 33$). We must take $p > 75$, and then we take $p = 127$ (it will optimize the probability from a cheater to be rejected).

7 Protocols

Common data: some integers p, n, t such that $2p > t + n$ and a collision-free, random hash function H .

Let A be a matrix of size $m \times n$, a Perceptrons Problem instance, with V as a solution. Let S be the multiset of the components of AV .

Public key : (A, S)

Secret key : V

The prover selects

- a random permutation P over $\{0, \dots, m-1\}$ (to mix the rows of A .)
- a random signed permutation Q over $\{0, \dots, n-1\}$
(to mix the columns of A , and to multiply them randomly by $+1$ or -1 .)
- a random vector W of $\mathbb{F}_p^n$

7.1 Three pass identification protocol (3p zk)

1. The prover computes $A' = PAQ$, $V' = Q^{-1}V$, $R = W + V'$
and $h_0 = H(P|Q)$, $h_1 = H(W)$, $h_2 = H(R)$, $h_3 = H(A'W)$, $h_4 = H(A'R)$
and sends $(h_0, h_1, h_2, h_3, h_4)$ to the verifier.
2. The verifier randomly selects c in $\{0, \dots, 3\}$ and sends c to the prover.
3. The prover sends: 4. The verifier checks:

if $c = 0 : (P, Q, W)$	$h_0 = H(P Q)$, $h_1 = H(W)$ and $h_3 = H(PAQW)$.
if $c = 1 : (P, Q, R)$	$h_0 = H(P Q)$, $h_2 = H(R)$ and $h_4 = H(PAQR)$.
if $c = 2 : (A'W, A'V')$	$h_3 = H(A'W)$, $h_4 = H(A'W + A'V')$ and $\{\{(A'V')_i\}\} = S$.
if $c = 3 : (W, V')$	$h_1 = H(W)$, $h_2 = H(W + V')$ and $V' \in \{-1, +1\}^n$.

7.2 Properties

Theorem 5. *The 3p zk protocol is an Interactive Proof System for PPP.*

Lemma 6. Assume that some probabilistic polynomial-time adversary is accepted with probability greater than $\left(\frac{3}{4}\right)^r + \epsilon$ after r rounds, then there exists a polynomial-time probabilistic machine which extracts the secret key S from the public data or outputs collisions for the commitment function, with overwhelming probability.

Proof. Consider the tree $T(\omega)$ of all 4^k executions corresponding to all possible questions of the verifier over k rounds when the adversary has a fixed random tape ω .

$$\alpha = \Pr_{\omega}[T(\omega) \text{ has a vertex with 4 sons}]$$

It is clear that $\alpha \geq \epsilon$, and by resetting the adversary $\frac{1}{\epsilon}$ times, one finds, with constant probability, an execution tree with a vertex having 4 sons. Repeating again, this probability can be made very close to one.

A vertex with 4 sons corresponds to a situation where 5 commitments h_0, h_1, h_2, h_3 and h_4 have been made and where the adversary can provide answers to the 4 possible queries of the verifier.

Consider answers :

$$\begin{array}{ll} H(P_0|Q_0) = h_0 = H(P_1|Q_1) & H(P_0AQ_0W_0) = h_3 = H(Y_2) \\ H(W_0) = h_1 = H(W_3) & H(P_1AQ_1R_1) = h_4 = H(Y_2 + Z_2) \\ H(R_1) = h_2 = H(W_3 + V'_3) & \end{array}$$

Unless we have found a collision for the hash function H , we can consider

$$\begin{array}{lll} P = P_0 = P_1 & R = R_1 = W_3 + V'_3 = W + V' & \\ Q = Q_0 = Q_1 & Y = Y_2 = P_0AQ_0W_0 = PAQW & \\ W = W_0 = W_3 & Y + Z = Y_2 + Z_2 = P_1AQ_1R_1 = PAQR & \end{array}$$

such that $V' \in \{-1, +1\}^n$ and $\{\{Z_i\}\} = S$.

so $Y + Z = PAQR = PAQW + Z = PAQW + PAQV'$, then $Z = PAQV'$.

Let $V = QV'$ ($V \in \{-1, +1\}^n$), then $Z = PAV$, Consequently $\{\{(AV)_i\}\} = S$.

7.3 Five pass identification protocol (5p zk)

1. The prover computes $A' = PAQ$, $V' = Q^{-1}V$
and $h_0 = H(P|Q)$, $h_1 = H(W|V')$, $h_2 = H(A'W|A'V')$
and sends (h_0, h_1, h_2) to the verifier.
2. The verifier randomly selects k in $\mathbb{F}_p^*$ and sends k to the prover.
3. The prover computes $R = kW + V'$ and $h_3 = H(R)$, $h_4 = H(A'R)$
and sends (h_3, h_4) to the verifier.
4. The verifier randomly selects c in $\{0, 1, 2\}$ and sends c to the prover.
5. The prover sends: 6. The verifier checks:

if $c = 0 : (P, Q, R)$	$h_0 = H(P Q)$, $h_3 = H(R)$ and $h_4 = H(PAQ R)$
if $c = 1 : (A'W, A'V')$	$h_2 = H(A'W A'V')$, $h_4 = H(kA'W + A'V')$ and $\{\{(A'V')_i\}\} = S$.
if $c = 2 : (W, V')$	$h_1 = H(W V')$, $h_3 = H(kW + V')$ and $V' \in \{-1, +1\}^n$

7.4 Properties

Theorem 7. *The **5p zk** protocol is an Interactive Proof System for PPP.*

Lemma 8. *Assume that some probabilistic polynomial-time adversary is accepted with probability greater than $\left(\frac{2p-1}{3(p-1)}\right)^r + \epsilon$ after r rounds, then there exists a polynomial-time probabilistic machine which extracts the secret key S from the public data or outputs collisions for the commitment function, with overwhelming probability.*

Using the idea of resettable simulation [3], in the random oracle model [1], it can be shown that both protocols are zero-knowledge. Alternatively, one has to assume specific statistical independence properties for the hash function.

7.5 Light versions

A light version (**3p light** and **5p light**) of those protocols, which reduces the number of required rounds, can be designed.

Five pass identification protocol (5p light)

The initialization is the same as in the previous schemes.

1. The prover computes $A' = PAQ$, $V' = Q^{-1}V$
and $h_0 = H(P|Q)$, $h_1 = H(W|A'W|V'|A'V')$
and sends (h_0, h_1) to the verifier.
 2. The verifier randomly selects k in $\mathbb{F}_p^*$ and sends k to the prover.
 3. The prover computes $R = kW + V'$ and $h_2 = H(R|A'R)$
and sends h_2 to the verifier.
 4. The verifier randomly selects c in $\{0, 1\}$ and sends c to the prover.
 5. The prover sends:
 6. The verifier checks:
if $c = 0$: (P, Q, R)	$h_0 = H(P Q)$, $h_2 = H(R PAQR)$
if $c = 1$: $(W, V', A'W, A'V')$	$\{\{(A'V')_i\}\} = S,$
$V' \in \{-1, +1\}^n$
$h_2 = H(X Y)$ with
$X = kW + V'$
$Y = kA'W + 2T + U$

These light protocols are no longer zero-knowledge. However, the information released appears quite small. In fact, in the case $c = 1$, the verifier learns two vectors and their images by A' , then he can deduce something about A' , and then about P and Q . As he knows V' , he theoretically learns a fraction of bit of V . Since the permutations P and Q are different at each round, the given information seems unusable.

8 Performances

The performances of this scheme are similar to those of the already existing linear ones:

	SD Stern	CLE Stern	PKP Shamir	PPP 3p ZK	PPP 5p ZK
matrix size	256×512	24×24	37×64	101×117	
over the field	$\mathbb{F}_2$	$\mathbb{F}_{16}$	$\mathbb{F}_{251}$	$\mathbb{F}_2$	
best known attack complexity	2^{68}	2^{52}	$> 2^{100}$	2^{64}	
Number of rounds	35	20	20	48	35
public key (bits)	256	80	296	144	
secret key (bits)	512	80	384	117	
bits sent by round	954	824	832	896	1040
global transmission rate (kbytes)	4.08	2.01	2.03	5.25	4.44

- As we can see in the figure, with a secret key more secure than in some other schemes (work factor of the attack greater than 2^{64}), and with a probability of 10^{-6} for a cheater to be accepted, an identification requires less than 4.5 kbytes of communication between the prover and the verifier (to be compared with the 2 kbytes for PKP and CLE, and the 4 kbytes for SD). And we can improve them by the use of hash trees.
- Moreover, all the operations are no more than additions and subtractions between small integers (less than one byte) even modulo 2. They are well suited to a very minimal environment of 8-bit processors.
- If we use a common matrix M , stored in the seed of a pseudo-random generator, and if the keys are:
 - secret key : a random ε -vector V of size n (less than 15 bytes)
 - public key : the ε -vector L such that $L_i(MV)_i \geq 0$ and the multiset $S = \{\{L_i(MV)_i\}\}$ (18 bytes)
 It is very few bytes if we compare them with PKP or SD. But we should not forget that as for PKP, SD and CLE, this scheme is not *identity based*. It means that public keys have to be certified by an authority.
- They require only simple operations so the program is very small. Moreover, the size of the data (common data and keys) are tiny. As a consequence, little EEPROM is needed.
- Very few temporary computations have to be stored so they require very little RAM.

9 Conclusion

We have defined a new identification scheme which is very easy to implement on every kind of smart card because of its very simple operations and the small size of the data. We welcome attacks from readers.

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