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Revised Fischlin’s (Blind) Signature Schemes

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3802))

Abstract

The representation problem based on factoring gives rise to alternative solutions to a lot of cryptographic protocols in the literature. Fischlin applies the problem to identification and (blind) signatures. Here we show some flaw of Fischlin’s schemes and present the revision.

Supported by President’s Foundation of Graduate School of CAS (yzjj2003010).

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Lv, K. (2005). Revised Fischlin’s (Blind) Signature Schemes. In: Hao, Y., et al. Computational Intelligence and Security. CIS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3802. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11596981_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11596981_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30819-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31598-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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