

# Second Preimages on $n$ -Bit Hash Functions for Much Less than $2^n$ Work

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**Abstract.** We expand a previous result of Dean [Dea99] to provide a second preimage attack on all  $n$ -bit iterated hash functions with Damgård-Merkle strengthening and  $n$ -bit intermediate states, allowing a second preimage to be found for a  $2^k$ -message-block message with about  $k \times 2^{n/2+1} + 2^{n-k+1}$  work. Using RIPEMD-160 as an example, our attack can find a second preimage for a  $2^{60}$  byte message in about  $2^{106}$  work, rather than the previously expected  $2^{160}$  work. We also provide slightly cheaper ways to find multicollisions than the method of Joux [Jou04]. Both of these results are based on *expandable messages*—patterns for producing messages of varying length, which all collide on the intermediate hash result immediately after processing the message. We provide an algorithm for finding expandable messages for any  $n$ -bit hash function built using the Damgård-Merkle construction, which requires only a small multiple of the work done to find a single collision in the hash function.

## 1 Introduction

The security goal for an  $n$ -bit hash function is that collisions require about  $2^{n/2}$  work, while preimages and second preimages require about  $2^n$  work. In [Dea99], Dean demonstrated that this goal could not be accomplished by hash functions whose compression functions allowed the easy finding of fixed points, such as MD5 [Riv92] and SHA1 [SHA02]. In this paper, we use the multicollision-finding result of [Jou04] to demonstrate that the standard way of constructing iterated hash functions (the Damgård-Merkle construction) cannot meet this goal, regardless of the compression function used. Thus, hash functions such as RIPEMD-160 [DBP96] and Whirlpool [BR00] (when used with a full 512-bit result) provide less than the previously-expected amount of resistance to second-preimage attacks, just as do hash functions like SHA1.

For a message of  $2^k$  message blocks, we provide a second preimage attack requiring about  $k \times 2^{n/2+1} + 2^{n-k+1}$  work. Like Dean's attack, ours is made possible by the notion of *expandable messages*—patterns of messages of different lengths which all yield the same intermediate hash value after processing them. These expandable messages do not directly yield collisions on the whole hash function

because of the length padding done at the end of modern hash functions, and in any event are no easier to find than collisions. However, they allow second preimages and multicollisions to be found much more cheaply than had previously been expected. This result may be compared with an earlier generic preimage attack by Merkle: the attacker is given  $2^k$  distinct  $n$ -bit hash outputs, and expects to find a preimage for one of the outputs with about  $2^{n-k}$  work, but has no ability to choose which of the outputs is to be matched. (Note that Merkle's attack is truly generic, in that it applies to any hash function with an  $n$ -bit output, even a random oracle.)

Our attack, like the earlier attack of Dean, probably has no practical impact on the security of any system currently relying upon a hash function such as SHA1, Whirlpool, or RIPEMD-160. This is true because the attack is always at least as expensive as collision search on the hash function, and because the difficulty of the attack grows quickly as the message gets shorter. For example, a 160-bit hash function like SHA1 or RIPEMD-160 requires about  $2^{128}$  work to find a second preimage for a  $2^{38}$ -byte message, and a target message of only one megabyte ( $2^{20}$  bytes) requires about  $2^{146}$  work to find a second preimage. Also, the attack only recovers second preimages—it doesn't allow an attacker to invert the hash function.

The significance of our result is in demonstrating another important way in which the behavior of the hash functions we know how to construct differs from both the commonly claimed security bounds of these functions, and from the random oracles with which we often model them. When combined with the recent results of Joux [Jou04], our results raise questions about the usefulness of the widely-used Damgård-Merkle construction for hash functions where attackers can do more than  $2^{n/2}$  work.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First, we discuss basic hash function constructions and security requirements. Next, we demonstrate a generic way to find expandable messages, and review the method of Dean. We then demonstrate how these expandable messages can be used to violate the second preimage resistance of nearly all currently specified cryptographic hash functions with less than  $2^n$  work. Finally, we demonstrate an even more efficient (albeit much less elegant) way to find multicollisions than the method of Joux, using Dean's fixed-point-based expandable messages. We end with a discussion of how this affects our understanding of iterated hash function security.

## 2 Hash Function Basics

In 1989, Merkle and Damgård [Mer89, Dam89] independently provided security proofs for the basic construction used for almost all modern cryptographic hash functions<sup>1</sup>. Here, we describe this construction<sup>2</sup>, and its normal security claims.

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<sup>1</sup> These functions date back to Rabin, and were widely used by hash function designers throughout the 1980s [Pre05, MvOV96].

<sup>2</sup> Damgård proposed two methods for constructing hash functions. This paper addresses only the more commonly used one, which was independently invented by Merkle.

A hash function with an  $n$ -bit output is expected to have three minimal security properties. (In practice, a number of other properties are expected, as well.)

1. Collision-resistance: An attacker should not be able to find a pair of messages  $M \neq M'$  such that  $\text{hash}(M) = \text{hash}(M')$  with less than about  $2^{n/2}$  work.
2. Preimage-resistance: An attacker given an output value  $Y$  in the range of hash should not be able to find an input  $X$  from its domain so that  $Y = \text{hash}(X)$  with less than about  $2^n$  work.
3. Second preimage-resistance: An attacker given one message  $M$  should not be able to find a second message,  $M'$  to satisfy  $\text{hash}(M) = \text{hash}(M')$  with less than about  $2^n$  work.

A collision attack on an  $n$ -bit hash function with less than  $2^{n/2}$  work, or a preimage or second preimage attack with less than  $2^n$  work, is formally a break of the hash function. Whether the break poses a practical threat to systems using the hash function depends on specifics of the attack.

Following the Damgård-Merkle construction, an iterated hash function is built from a fixed-length component called a compression function, which takes an  $n$ -bit input chaining value and an  $m$ -bit message block, and derives a new  $n$ -bit output chaining value. In this paper,  $F(H, M)$  is used to represent the application of this compression function on hash chaining variable  $H$  and message block  $M$ .

In order to hash a full message, the following steps are carried out:

1. The input string is padded to ensure that it is an integer multiple of  $m$  bits in length, and that the length of the original, unpadded message appears in the last block of the padded message.
2. The hash chaining value  $h[i]$  is started at some fixed IV,  $h[-1]$ , for the hash function, and updated for each successive message block  $M[i]$  as

$$h[i] = F(h[i-1], M[i])$$

3. The value of  $h[i]$  after processing the last block of the padded message is the hash output value.

This construction gives a reduction proof: If an attacker can find a collision in the whole hash, then he can likewise find one in the compression function. The inclusion of the length at the end of the message is important for this reduction proof, and is also important for preventing a number of attacks, including long-message attacks [MvOV96].

Besides the claimed security bounds, there are two concepts from this brief discussion that are important for the rest of this paper:

1. A message made up of many blocks,  $M[0, 1, 2, \dots, 2^k - 1]$ , has a corresponding sequence of intermediate hash values,  $h[0, 1, 2, \dots, 2^k - 1]$ .
2. The padding of the final block includes the length, and thus prevents collisions between messages of different lengths in the intermediate hash states from yielding collisions in the full hash function.

### 3 Finding Expandable Messages

An expandable message is a kind of multicollision, in which the colliding messages have different lengths, and the message hashes collide in the *input* to the last compression function computation, before the length of the message is processed. Consider a starting hash value  $h[-1]$ . Then an “expandable message” from  $h[-1]$  is a pattern for generating messages of different lengths, all of which yield the same intermediate hash value when they are processed by the hash, starting from  $h[-1]$ , without the final padding block with the message length being included. In the remainder of the paper, an expandable message that can take on any length between  $a$  and  $b$  message blocks, inclusive, will be called an  $(a, b)$ -expandable message.

#### 3.1 Dean’s Fixed-Point Expandable Messages

In [Dea99], there appears a technique for building expandable messages when fixed points can easily be found in the compression function<sup>3</sup>. For a compression function  $h[i] = F(h[i-1], M[i])$ , a fixed point is a pair  $(h[i-1], M[i])$  such that  $h[i-1] = F(h[i-1], M[i])$ . Compression functions based on the Davies-Meyer construction [MvOV96], such as the SHA family [SHA02], MD4, MD5 [Riv92], and Tiger [AB96], have easily found fixed points. Similarly, Snefru [Mer90] has easily found fixed points. Techniques for finding these fixed points for compression functions based on the Davies-Meyer construction appear in [MOI91], and are briefly discussed in an appendix to this paper, along with techniques for finding fixed points in Snefru. Note that these techniques produce a pair  $(h[i-1], M[i])$ , but allow no control over the value of  $h[i-1]$ .

We can construct an expandable message using fixed points for about twice as much work as is required to find a collision in the hash function. This is done by first finding about  $2^{n/2}$  randomly-selected fixed points for the compression function, and then trying first message blocks until one leads from the initial hash value to one of the fixed points.

**ALGORITHM:** MakeFixedPointExpandableMessage( $h[in]$ )

*Make an expandable message from initial hash value  $h[in]$ , using a fixed point finding algorithm.*

#### Variables:

1.  $h[in]$  = initial chaining value for the expandable messages.
2. FindRandomFixedPoint() = an algorithm returning a pair  $(h[i], M[i])$  such that  $h[i] = F(h[i], M[i])$ .
3.  $A, C$  = two lists of hash values.
4.  $B, D$  = two lists of message blocks.
5.  $i, j$  = integers.

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<sup>3</sup> We were made aware of Dean’s work by a comment from one of the anonymous referees.

6.  $M(i)$  is a function that produces a unique message block for each integer  $i$  less than  $2^n$ .
7.  $n$  = width of hash function chaining value and output.

**Steps:**

1. Construct a list of  $2^{n/2}$  fixed points:
  - For  $i = 0$  to  $2^{n/2} - 1$ :
    - $h, m = \text{FindRandomFixedPoint}()$
    - $A[i] = h$
    - $B[i] = m$
2. Construct a list of  $2^{n/2}$  hash values we can reach from  $h[-1]$ :
  - For  $i = 0$  to  $2^{n/2} - 1$ :
    - $h = F(h[in], M(i))$
    - $C[i] = h$
    - $D[i] = M(i)$
3. Find a match between lists  $A$  and  $C$ ; let  $i, j$  satisfy  $A[i] = C[j]$ .
4. Return expandable message  $(D[j], B[i])$ .

**Work:** About  $2^{n/2+1}$  compression function computations, assuming  $2^{n/2+1}$  memory.

If an  $n$ -bit hash function has a maximum of  $2^k$  blocks in its messages, then this technique takes about  $2^{n/2+1}$  work to discover  $(1, 2^k)$ -expandable messages. Producing a message of the desired length is trivial, consisting of one copy of the starting message block, and as many copies of the fixed-point message block as necessary to get a full message of the desired length.

**ALGORITHM:** ProduceMessageFP( $R, X, Y$ )

*Produce a message of desired length from the fixed-point expandable messages.*

**Variables:**

1.  $R$  = the desired length in message blocks; must be at least one and no more than the maximum number of message blocks supported by the hash.
2.  $X$  = the first message block in the expandable message.
3.  $Y$  = the second (repeatable) block in the expandable message.

**Steps:**

1.  $M = X$ .
2. For  $i = 0$  to  $R - 2$ :
  - $M = M || Y$
3. Return  $M$ .

**Work:** Negligible work, about  $R$  steps.

### 3.2 A Generic Technique: Multicollisions of Different Lengths

Finding an expandable message for any compression function with  $n$ -bit intermediate hash values takes only a little more work than finding a collision in the hash function. This technique is closely related to the technique for finding  $k$ -collisions in iterated hash functions from Joux.

In Joux's technique, a sequence of single-message-block collisions is found, and then pasted together to provide a large number of different messages of equal length that lead to the same hash value. In our technique, a sequence of collisions between messages of *different* lengths is found, and pasted together to provide a set of messages that can take on a wide range of different lengths without changing the resulting intermediate hash value—an expandable message.

**Finding a Collision on Two Messages of Different Lengths.** Finding an expandable message requires the ability to find many pairs of messages of different specified lengths that have the same resulting intermediate hash value. Finding such a pair is not fundamentally different than finding a pair of equal-length messages that collide: The attacker who wants a collision between a one-block message and an  $\alpha$ -block message constructs about  $2^{n/2}$  messages of length 1, and about the same number of length  $\alpha$ , and looks for a collision. For efficiency, the attacker chooses a set of  $\alpha$ -block messages whose hashes can be computed about as efficiently as the same number of single-block messages.

**ALGORITHM:** FindCollision( $\alpha, h_{in}$ )

*Find a collision pair with lengths 1 and blocks, starting from  $h_{in}$ .*

**Variables:**

1.  $\alpha$  = desired length of second message.
2.  $A, B$  = lists of intermediate hash values.
3.  $q$  = a fixed “dummy” message used for getting the desired length.
4.  $h_{in}$  = the input hash value for the collision.
5.  $h_{tmp}$  = intermediate hash value used in the attack.
6.  $M(i)$  = the  $i$ th distinct message block used in the attack.
7.  $n$  = width of hash function chaining value and output in bits.

**Steps:**

1. Compute the starting hash for the  $\alpha$ -block message by processing  $\alpha - 1$  dummy message blocks:
  - $h_{tmp} = h_{in}$ .
  - For  $i = 0$  to  $\alpha - 2$ :
    - $h_{tmp} = F(h_{tmp}, q)$
2. Build lists  $A$  and  $B$  as follows:
  - for  $i = 0$  to  $2^{n/2} - 1$ :
    - $A[i] = F(h_{in}, M(i))$
    - $B[i] = F(h_{tmp}, M(i))$
3. Find  $i, j$  such that  $A[i] = B[j]$
4. Return colliding messages  $(M(i), q||q||\dots||q||M(j))$ , and the resulting intermediate hash  $F(h_{in}, M(i))$ .

**Work:**  $\alpha - 1 + 2^{n/2+1}$  compression function calls

**Building a Full  $(k, k + 2^k - 1)$ -expandable message.** We can use the above algorithm to construct expandable messages that cover a huge range of possible lengths, in a technique derived from the multicollision-finding technique of [Jou04]. We first find a colliding pair of messages, where one is of one block, and the other of  $2^{k-1} + 1$  blocks. Next, we find a collision pair of length either 1 or  $2^{k-2} + 1$ , then 1 or  $2^{k-3} + 1$ , and so on, until we reach a collision pair of length 1 or length 2. The result is a list of pairs of message components of different lengths, which lead to the same intermediate hash after processing them. The first such pair allows a choice of adding  $2^{k-1}$  blocks to the expanded message, the second allows a choice of adding  $2^{k-2}$  blocks, and so on. Thus, expanding the message is just writing the difference between the desired length and the number of message components in binary, and using each bit in that binary string to choose the corresponding short or long message component to include.

**ALGORITHM:** MakeExpandableMessage( $h_{in}, k$ )

*Make a  $(k, k + 2^k - 1)$ -expandable message.*

**Variables:**

1.  $h_{tmp}$  = the current intermediate hash value.
2.  $C$  = a list of pairs of messages of different lengths;  $C[i][0]$  is the first message of pair  $i$ , while  $C[i][1]$  is that pair's second message.

**Steps:**

1. Let  $h_{tmp} = h_{in}$ .
2. For  $i = 0$  to  $k - 1$ :
  - $(m_0, m_1, h_{tmp}) = \text{FindCollision}(2^i + 1, h_{tmp})$
  - $C[k - i - 1][0] = m_0$
  - $C[k - i - 1][1] = m_1$
3. Return the list of message pairs  $C$ .

**Work:**  $k \times 2^{n/2+1} + 2^k \approx k \times 2^{n/2+1}$  compression function calls.

At the end of this process, we have an  $k \times 2$  array of messages, for which we have done approximately  $2^k + k \times 2^{n/2+1}$  compression function computations, and with which we can build a message consisting of between  $k$  and  $k + 2^k - 1$  blocks, inclusive, without changing the result of hashing the message until the final padding block.

**Producing a Message of Desired Length.** Finally, there is a simple algorithm for producing a message of desired length from an expanded message. This amounts to simply including the different-length pieces based on the bit pattern of the desired length.

**ALGORITHM:** ProduceMessage( $C, k, L$ )

*Produce a message of length  $L$ , if possible, from the expandable message specified by  $(C, k)$ .*

**Variables:**

1.  $L$  = desired message length.
2.  $k$  = parameter specifying that  $C$  contains a  $(k, k + 2^k - 1)$ -expandable message.
3.  $C$  = a  $k \times 2$  array of message fragments of different lengths.
4.  $M$  = the message to be constructed.
5.  $T$  = a temporary variable holding the remaining length to be added.
6.  $S[0..k - 1]$  = a sequence of bits from  $T$ .
7.  $i$  = an integer counter.

**Steps:**

1. Start with an empty message  $M = \emptyset$ .
2. If  $L > 2^k + k - 1$  or  $L < k$ , return an error condition.
3. Let  $T = L - k$ .
4. Let  $S$  = the bit sequence of  $T$ , from low-order to high-order bits.
5. Concatenate message fragments from the expandable message together until we get the desired message length. Note that this is very similar to writing  $T$  in binary.
  - for  $i = 0$  to  $k - 1$ :
    - if  $S[i] = 0$  then  $M = M || C[i][0]$
    - else  $M = M || C[i][1]$
6. Return  $M$ .

**Work:** Negligible (about  $k$  table lookups and string copying operations).

The result of this is a message of the desired length, with the same hash result before the final padding block is processed as all the other messages that can be produced from this expandable message.

### 3.3 Variants

The expandable messages found by both of these methods can start at any given hash chaining value. As a result, we can build expandable messages with many useful properties:

1. The expandable message can start with any desired prefix.
2. The expandable message can end with any desired suffix.
3. While both algorithms given here for finding expandable messages assume complete freedom over choice of message block, a variant of the generic method can be used even if the attacker is restricted to only two possible values for each message block.
4. The fixed-point method requires about  $2^{n/2}$  possible values for each message block, but this is sufficiently flexible that for existing hash functions, it can typically be used with only ASCII text, legitimate sequences of Pentium opcodes, etc.
5. The multicollision technique from Joux allows an attacker to discover  $2^k$  messages with the same hash for an  $n$ -bit iterated hash function, using only about  $k \times 2^{n/2}$  compression functions of work. This technique can be used to make a set of  $2^k$  expandable messages which all yield the same hash output. The full power of combining these techniques remains to be investigated.

## 4 Using Expandable Messages to Find Second Preimages

An  $n$ -bit hash function is supposed to resist second preimage attacks up to about  $2^n$  work. That is, given one message  $M$ , the attacker ought to have to spend about  $2^n$  work to find another message that has the same hash value as output.

### 4.1 The Long Message Attack

Here is a general (and previously known) way to violate the second-preimage resistance of a hash function without Damgård-Merkle strengthening [MvOV96]: Start with an extremely long message of  $2^R + 1$  blocks. An attacker who wishes to find another message that hashes to the same value with a 160-bit hash function can do so by finding a message block  $M_{link}$  such that, from the IV of the hash,  $h[-1]$ ,  $h^* = F(h[-1], M_{link})$  yields a value  $h^*$  that matches one of the intermediate values of the hash function in processing the long message. Since the message has  $2^R$  such intermediate values, the attacker expects to need to try only about  $2^{160-R}$  message blocks to get a match. That is, when  $R = 64$ , the attacker has  $2^{64}$  available target values, so each message block he tries has about a  $2^{-96}$  chance of yielding the same hash output as some intermediate hash value from the target message. The result is a shorter message, which has the same hash output *up until the final block is processed*.

The length padding at the end of the Damgård-Merkle construction foils this attack. Note that in the above situation, the attacker has a message that is shorter than the  $2^{55}$ -block target message, which leads to the same intermediate hash value. But now, the last block has a different length field, and so the attack fails—the attacker can find something that's *almost* a second preimage, but the length block changes, and so the final hash output is different.

### 4.2 Long-Message Attacks with Expandable Messages

Using expandable messages, we can bypass this defense, and carry out a second-preimage attack despite the length block at the end. This attack was first discovered by Dean [Dea99]. We start with a long message as our target for a second preimage, find an expandable message which will provide messages over a wide range of lengths, and then carry out the long-message attack from the end of that expandable message. We then expand the expandable message to make up for all the message blocks that were skipped by the long message attack, yielding a new message of the same length as the target message, with the same hash value.

**ALGORITHM:** LongMessageAttack( $M_{target}$ )

*Find the second preimage for a message of  $2^k + k + 1$  blocks.*

**Variables:**

1.  $M_{target}$  = the message for which a second preimage is to be found.
2.  $M_{link}$  = a message block used to link the expandable message to some point in the target message's sequence of intermediate hash values.

3.  $A$  = a list of intermediate hash values
4.  $h_{exp}$  = intermediate chaining value from processing an expandable message.

**Steps:**

1.  $C$  = MakeExpandableMessage( $k$ )
2.  $h_{exp}$  = the intermediate hash value after processing the expandable message in  $C$ .
3. Compute the intermediate hash values for  $M_{target}$ :
  - $h[-1]$  = the IV for the hash function
  - $m[i]$  = the  $i$ th message block of  $M_{target}$ .
  - $h[i]$  =  $F(h[i-1], m[i])$ , the  $i$ th intermediate hash output block. Note that  $h$  will be organized in some searchable structure for the attack, such as a hash table, and that elements  $h[0, 1, \dots, k]$  are excluded from the hash table, since the expandable message cannot be made short enough to accommodate them in the attack.
4. Find a message block that links the expandable message to one of the intermediate hash values for the target message after the  $k$ th block.
  - Try linking messages  $M_{link}$  until  $F(h_{exp}, M_{link}) = h[j]$  for some  $k + 1 \leq j \leq 2^k + k + 1$ .
5. Use the expandable message to produce a message  $M^*$  that is  $j - 1$  blocks long.
6. Return second preimage  $M^* || M_{link} || m[j + 1] || m[j + 2] \dots m[2^k + k + 1]$  (if  $j = 2^k + k + 1$ , then no original message blocks are included in the second preimage).

**Work:** The total work done is the work to find the expandable message plus the work to find the linking message.

1. For the generic expandable message-finding algorithm, this is  $k \times 2^{n/2+1} + 2^{n-k+1}$  compression function calls.
2. For the fixed-point expandable message-finding algorithm, this is  $3 \times 2^{n/2+1} + 2^{n-k+1}$

The longer the target message, the more efficient the attack relative to a brute-force preimage search, until the search for the expandable message becomes more expensive than the long-message attack. For SHA1 and SHA256, the maximum allowed message length is  $2^{64} - 1$  bits, which translates to about  $2^{55}$  512-bit blocks of message. For SHA384 and SHA512, the maximum allowed message length is  $2^{128} - 1$  bits, which translates to about  $2^{118}$  1024-bit blocks of message. Let  $2^R$  be the maximum number of message blocks allowed by the hash function. The total work of the generic expandable-message form of the attack is then  $R \times 2^{n/2+1} + 2^{n-R+1}$  compression function calls.

**An Illustration.** To illustrate this, consider a second preimage attack on the RIPEMD-160 hash function [DBP96]. The longest possible message for RIPEMD-160 is  $2^{64} - 1$  bits, which translates into just under  $2^{55}$  blocks. For simplicity, we will assume the target message is  $2^{54} + 54 + 1$  message blocks (about  $2^{60}$  bytes) long.

1. Receive the target message and compute and store all the intermediate hash values.
2. Produce a  $(1, 54 + 2^{54})$ -expandable message. This requires about  $54 \times 2^{81}$  compression function computations.
3. Starting from the end of the expandable message, we try about  $2^{106}$  different message blocks, until we find one whose hash output is the same as one of the last  $54 + 2^{54}$  intermediate hash values of the target message. This requires computing about  $2^{106}$  compression functions on average.
4. Expand the expandable message to compensate for the message blocks of the target message skipped over, and thus produce a second preimage. This takes very little time.

**Summary of the Attack.** The long-message attack can be summarized as follows: For a target message substantially less than  $2^{n/2}$  blocks in length, the work is dominated by the long message attack. Thus, a second preimage attack on a  $2^k$ -block message takes about  $2^{n-k+1}$  compression function computations, assuming abundant memory.

### 4.3 Variations on the Attack

Some straightforward variations of this attack are also possible, drawing from the variations available to the expandable messages. For example, the algorithms for producing an expandable message work from any starting hash value, and are not affected by the message blocks that come after the expanded message. Thus, this attack can be used to “splice together” two very long messages, with an expandable part in the middle. Similarly, if it is important that the second preimage message start with the same first few hundred or thousand message blocks as the target message, or end with the same last few hundred or thousand blocks, this can easily be accommodated in the attack. Another variation is available by using Joux’s multicollision-finding trick, or the related ones described below: By setting up the expandable message to be a  $2^u$ -multicollision, we can find  $2^u$  distinct second preimages for a given long message, without adding substantial cost to the attack. Additionally, keyed constructions that leave the attacker with offline collision search abilities are vulnerable to the attack; for example, the “suffix mac” construction [MvOV96],  $\text{MAC}_K(X) = \text{Hash}(X||K)$  is vulnerable to a second preimage attack, as well as the much more practical, previously-known collision attack.

**Low-Memory and Parallel Versions of the Attack.** These methods for finding expandable messages assume unlimited memory. In the real world, memory is limited, and bandwidth between processing units and memory units is likewise limited. This doesn’t raise a difficulty to the attack. For  $n$ -bit hash functions whose maximum input size in message blocks is substantially less than  $2^{n/2}$ , the parallel collision search techniques of [vOW96, vOW99] allow both our generic attack and the fixed-point attack of Dean to go forward at approximately the stated cost; the search for a linking message (the long message attack) dominates the work.

#### 4.4 The Attack in Perspective

Our attack allows the finding of a second preimage on a  $2^k$  block long target message with a certainty of success. A previously known attack originally noted by Merkle is somewhat similar in spirit [MvOV96, Pre05]: an attacker is given  $2^k$  candidate target messages, and finds one preimage with  $2^{n-k}$  work. While that attack wasn't able to find a second preimage for a specific desired message, it makes our result and the earlier result of Dean somewhat less surprising. It is worth noting that Merkle's result applies to *any*  $n$ -bit hash function, even one constructed from random oracles.

Our attack differs from that of Dean only in its universality—Dean's attack applies only to hash functions whose compression functions allow easy finding of second preimages, whereas ours apply to any iterated hash function with an  $n$ -bit intermediate hash value.

### 5 Expandable Messages and Multicollisions

In [Jou04], Joux demonstrates a beautiful way to produce a large number of messages that collide for an iterated hash function, with only a little more work than is needed to find a single pair of messages that collide. Here, we demonstrate ways to use expandable messages to find multicollisions, and ways to combine the Joux technique with expandable messages to add flexibility to the structure of the multicollisions.

We construct a multicollision by concatenating two or more expandable messages, and then varying the length of each so that the sum of their lengths stays the same. For example, if we concatenate a (1,1024)-expandable message with another (1,1024)-expandable message, we get a 1024-collision of 1025 block long messages. By concatenating a large number of such messages, we can get a much larger multicollision.

#### 5.1 Multicollisions Using Fixed Points

Using fixed-point expandable messages, multicollisions which are much cheaper than those found by Joux are available. Recall that for an  $n$ -bit hash function, finding a fixed-point expandable message which is expandable up to the maximum message length of the hash function costs about  $2^{n/2+1}$  compression function computations.

Consider a 160-bit hash function with a maximum of  $2^{55}$  message blocks. Now, a very simple  $2^{55}$ -collision is available for about  $2^{82} = 4 \times 2^{80}$  work, as opposed to  $55 \times 2^{80}$  work—this is constructed by concatenating two fixed-point expandable messages, and always making the sum of their lengths  $2^{55}$  blocks. Concatenating three such expandable messages produces a  $2^{107}$ -collision, and so on, following the rule that a multicollision consisting of  $K$  expandable messages in a hash function with a maximum length of  $R$  blocks produces  $\binom{R}{K-1}$ -multicollisions with about  $K \times 2^{81}$  work.

These multicollisions are of unreasonable length, but they're generally cheaper than Joux' multicollisions. At more reasonable lengths, they're still interesting, but they become more expensive than Joux' multicollisions. For example, concatenating ten expandable messages together and limiting message length to 1034 blocks total, we get about a  $2^{80}$ -multicollision using this technique; for the same cost, Joux' technique would give a  $2^{1024}$ -multicollision.

## 5.2 Using Generic Expandable Messages

The cost of finding a single fixed-point expandable message is within a factor of two of the cost of finding a single collision in Joux' scheme. The cost of finding a generic  $(1, K)$ -expandable message is about  $\lg(K) \times 2^{n/2}$ . This means that in general, generic expandable messages cannot be used to make multicollisions cheaper than those of Joux.

## 5.3 Combining with Joux

Finally, it is possible to combine Joux multicollisions with expandable-message multicollisions. This allows multicollisions to be constructed that look quite different from the Joux multicollisions, and are somewhat more flexible in structure. This may allow Joux attacks to go forward even on cascaded constructions that attempt to foil his attack.

As an example, a multicollision may be formed by alternating  $(1, 2)$ -expandable messages and individual collisions as sought by Joux' method, with a final  $(10, 1024)$ -expandable message at the end. This permits the individual colliding message blocks to appear at different positions in different messages, without altering the final hash value.

## 6 Conclusions and Open Questions

In this paper, we have described a generic way to carry out long-message second preimage attacks, despite the Damgård-Merkle strengthening done on all modern hash functions.

These attacks are theoretical because 1) they require more work than is necessary to find collisions on the underlying hash functions, and 2) the messages for which second preimages may be found are generally impractically long. However, they demonstrate some new lessons about hash function design:

1. An  $n$ -bit iterated hash function provides fundamentally different security properties than a random oracle with an  $n$ -bit output. This was demonstrated in one way by Joux in [Jou04], and by another here.
2. An  $n$ -bit iterated hash function begins to show some surprising properties as soon as an attacker can do the work necessary to find collisions in the underlying compression function.
3. An  $n$ -bit iterated hash function cannot support second-preimage resistance at the  $n$ -bit security level, as previously expected, for long messages.

4. Easily found fixed points in compression functions (such as those based on the Davies-Meyer construction) allow an even more powerful second-preimage attack described in [Dea99].

The important lesson here is that the standard construction of iterated hashes from Merkle and Damgård does not provide all the protection we might expect against attackers that can do more than  $2^{n/2}$  compression function computations. In some sense, the hash function is “brittle,” and begins to lose its claimed security properties very quickly once the attacker can violate its collision resistance by brute force.

We believe these results, when combined with those of Dean and Joux, require a rethinking of what security properties are expected of an iterative hash function with an  $n$ -bit intermediate state. We see three sensible directions for this rethinking to take:

1. A widespread consensus that an  $n$ -bit iterated hash function should never be expected to resist attacks requiring more than  $2^{n/2}$  operations. This would invalidate current uses of hash functions in cryptographic random-number generation, as in [KSF99, DHL02, Bal98], key derivation functions as described in [AKMZ04, NIST03, X963], and many other applications, and seems the least palatable outcome.
2. A clear theoretical treatment of the limits that exist for  $n$ -bit hash functions, and precisely what attacks more demanding than collision search they may be expected to resist. (For example, none of these recent results appear to be applicable when the attacker cannot do offline collision search. Similarly, these attacks do not apply when only a single message block is being processed. Perhaps these observations can be formalized.)
3. New constructions for hash-function round functions. For example, XORing in a monotonic counter as part of the round function would resist the attacks in this paper.
4. New constructions for hash functions in the vein of [Luc04], which maintain much more than  $n$  bits of intermediate state in order to make collision attacks on intermediate states harder (require  $2^n$  work).

We believe that the region between  $2^{n/2}$  and  $2^n$  is a rich area for the cryptanalysis of iterated hash functions, and expect to see other research results in the future. Absent a solid theoretical treatment of the security properties of  $n$ -bit iterative hashes along the lines of [PGV93] and [BRS02], expanded to deal thoroughly with the full hash construction, at this point it is difficult to justify using them in applications requiring more than  $n/2$  bits of security for messages longer than one block with any confidence.

We hope this work spurs such a treatment, as well as further cryptanalysis.

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## A Finding Fixed Points Efficiently in Many Compression Functions

Finding fixed points in many hash compression functions is simple.

### A.1 Davies-Meyer

Most widely used hash functions have compression functions designed around very large block-cipher-like constructions, following the general Davies-Meyer model. For the SHA and MD4/MD5 families, as well as Tiger, if  $E(K, X)$  is a very wide block cipher, with  $K$  the key and  $X$  the value being encrypted, then the compression function is:

$$F(H, M) = E(M, H) + H$$

for some group operation “+”. For these compression functions, it is possible to compute the inverse of this block-cipher-like construction, which we can denote as  $E^{-1}(K, X)$ . This makes it possible to find fixed points in a simple way, as discussed in [MOI91] and [PGV93]:

1. Select a message  $M$ .
2. Compute  $H = E^{-1}(M, 0)$ .
3. The result gives a fixed point:  $F(H, M) = H$ .

A property of this method for finding fixed points is that the attacker is able to choose the message, but he has no control whatsoever over the hash value that is a fixed point for a given message. Also note that for these hash functions, each message block has exactly one fixed point.

## A.2 Snefru

Snefru is derived from a block-cipher-like operation that operates on a much larger block than the hash output, and which effectively has a fixed “key.” Let  $E(X)$  be this fixed “encryption” of a block. Further, let  $n$  be the hash block size,  $m$  be the message block size,  $\text{lsb}_n(X)$  be the least significant  $n$  bits of  $X$ , and  $\text{msb}_n(X)$  be the most significant  $n$  bits of  $X$ . Note that  $E(X)$  operates on  $n + m$ -bit blocks.

The compression function is derived from  $E(X)$ :

$$F(H, M) = \text{lsb}_n(E(H||M)) + H$$

where the hash input and output are each  $n$  bits wide, and where  $\text{lsb}_x(Y)$  represents the least significant  $x$  bits of the value  $Y$ . We can find fixed points for Snefru-like compression functions as follows, letting  $E^{-1}(X)$  be the inverse of  $E(X)$  once again:

1. Choose any  $X$  whose least significant  $n$  bits are 0.
2. Compute  $Y = E^{-1}(X)$ .
3. Let  $H = \text{msb}_n(Y)$  and  $M = \text{lsb}_m(Y)$ .
4. The result gives a fixed point:  $F(H, M) = H$ .

This method gives the attacker no control over the message block. Unlike the Davies-Meyer construction, there is no guarantee that a given message block has even one fixed point; we would expect for some message blocks to have many, and for others to have none.

Note that the Snefru construction could easily be altered to make fixed points very hard to find, when the size of the message and hash blocks are equal, by the compression function as:

$$F(H, M) = \text{lsb}_n(E(H||M)) + H + M$$

or

$$F(H, M) = \text{lsb}_n(E(H||M)) + H + M + \text{msb}_m(E(H||M))$$

Also note that many other compression function constructions, such as the Miyaguchi-Preneel construction used by Whirlpool and N-Hash and the construction used by RIPEMD and RIPEMD-160, do not appear to permit a generic method for finding fixed points.