Collection
Conspiratorial Ideation and Psychopathology
The idea that beliefs in conspiracy theories are somewhat pathological has been recurrent in the research on this phenomenon and is present also in the public debate where, for instance, denialist theories about COVID-19 have been repeatedly labelled as ‘delusional’. But the question of whether conspiracy belief is pathological is far from settled. This Special Issue seeks to address that question, as well as to explore what implications would follow from whether or not we pathologize conspiratorial ideation. Such implications include both ones related to the nature of conspiratorial ideation, and those related to the nature and treatment of (other) pathological beliefs in clinical populations.
Editors
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Ema Sullivan-Bissett
Ema Sullivan-Bissett is a Reader in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham. Her research concerns the nature of belief and its connection to truth, as well as delusional belief formation and implicit bias. Her work has appeared in European Journal of Philosophy, Mind & Language, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophical Studies, and Synthese, among others. She also co-edited with Helen Bradley and Paul Noordhof the volume Art and Belief (Oxford University Press, 2017), and is the editor of the forthcoming Belief, Imagination, and Delusion (Oxford University Press) Email: e.l.sullivan-bissett@bham.ac.uk
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Anna Ichino
Anna Ichino is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the State University of Milan. She works primarily in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology, with a focus on the cognitive architecture of propositional attitudes like imagination and belief. Her work has appeared in Analysis, Topoi, Philosophia, Philosophical Psychology, and WIREs Cog Science, among others. She is the promoter of the Philosophy Museum project – for the creation of the first philosophy museum in the world (see https://dailynous.com/2020/01/21/philosophy-museum-guest-post-anna-ichino/). Email: anna.ichino@unimi.it
