Collection

The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Structure, Mechanisms and Functions

Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists have extensively studied the “sense of agency” and other aspects of the phenomenology of individual action. Joint action has been the topic of much work in these disciplines, too, but that work has focused on issues about the structure, ontogenesis and neurophysiology of joint action. The phenomenology of joint action has only recently become a topic of contemporary debate in philosophy and other cognitive sciences. It is the aim of this special issue to promote this emerging interest in the phenomenology of joint action, and to provide an interdisciplinary forum for discussing questions about the structure, mechanisms and functions of our experience of joint action.

Editors

  • Nivedita Gangopadhyay

    Nivedita Gangopadhyay (nivedita.gangopadhyay@uib.no) has a PhD in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. She is currently a senior lecturer at the Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen and is also leading a digitisation project as a senior engineer at the University of Bergen Library. At present she is developing interdisciplinary research combining cognitive science, philosophy of mind, digital humanities, artificial intelligence and text technology, She has published extensively in top-level international journals and with Oxford University Press.

  • Franz Knappik

    Franz Knappik (franz.knappik@uib.no) is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bergen (Norway). His research interests lie mainly in philosophy of mind/psychology/psychiatry, the history of philosophy (German Idealism, the Black Radical Tradition) and critical social theory. He is the author of a monograph on Hegel's theory of freedom, and of articles that have appeared in journals such as Synthese, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, European Journal of Philosophy, and Journal of the History of Philosophy.

Articles (10 in this collection)