Abstract
This chapter focuses on national and international financial crisis prevention and management. A stable global monetary and financial system is generally deemed to be a public good conducive to durable growth. Official multilateral institutions — such as the IMF, the World Bank Group, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) — have important roles to play in promoting global financial and economic stability. Leading member governments of these institutions are those of the major financial markets in the world. Crises have prodded governments into co-operating with respect to (i) exchanging, pooling and disseminating reliable information pertinent to the efficient functioning of global financial markets; (ii) furthering co-ordination between national and international regulatory or monitoring bodies; (iii) designing and implementing common international best standards and practices; and (iv) co-ordinating their efforts in crisis prevention and resolution.
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Notes and References
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© 2003 Zuhayr Mikdashi
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Mikdashi, Z. (2003). In Search of Financial Stability. In: Regulating the Financial Sector in the Era of Globalization. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403990112_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403990112_6
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