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Financial Safety Nets

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Regulating the Financial Sector in the Era of Globalization

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Abstract

Public authorities’ prudential regulations concerning financial intermediaries and their effective supervision (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4) are often considered to be the foremost safety nets. Their objectives are (a) at the micro level to ensure that individual financial institutions are well capitalized and well managed; and (b) at the macro level to safeguard the soundness, efficiency and stability of the financial system. Besides the regulatory-supervisory frameworks, specific post-failure and government-supported financial safety nets — discussed hereafter — are deemed to be valuable complements to enhancing savers’ and investors’ confidence, and reinforcing financial stability.

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Notes and References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Banking and Finance, University of Lausanne, Switzerland

    Zuhayr Mikdashi (Honorary Professor and Founder)

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  1. Zuhayr Mikdashi
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© 2003 Zuhayr Mikdashi

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Mikdashi, Z. (2003). Financial Safety Nets. In: Regulating the Financial Sector in the Era of Globalization. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403990112_5

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