Abstract
The active involvement of the OAS in the successful resolution of the 2000 political crisis in Peru highlights its evolution from club to networked multilateralism. In spite of the signs of progress toward a democratic solidarity paradigm, up to the Peru crisis it was the organizational limitations of the OAS, rather than its strengths, that continued to dominate attention. Mirroring the contested nature of foreign policy principles found more generally in the region, tension has remained extant between the advocates of pro-democracy collective interventions and defenders of the foundations concerning non-intervention.1 Therefore, in operational terms, OAS actions to defend and strengthen democracy remained reactive and incomplete. The walls of state sovereignty remained tough to penetrate.
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Notes
Richard J. Bloomfield, “Making the Western Hemisphere Safe for Democracy? The OAS Defense-of Democracy Regime,” in Collective Responses to Regional Problems: The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean, ed. Carl Kaysen, Robert A. Pastor, and Laura W. Reed (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1994), 15–28.
Organization of American States Electoral Observation Mission (MOE/OEA), Informe Final del Jefe de Misión. Misión de Obsrvación Electoral, Elecciones Generales de la República del Perú, Año 2000 (Lima, Peru: June 2, 2000).
CNN, “OAS rejects U.S. Call For Action Against Peru Over Election,” May 31, 2000.
CNN, “Toledo Raises Idea of Sanctions: U.S. Softens Stance on Peru Elections,” May 30, 2000.
Embassy of the United States of America in Lima, Peru, Statement on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions (March 28, 2000): S Res 43. See also the Joint Resolution of the U.S. Congress warning that “if the April 9, 2000 elections are not deemed by the international community to have been free and fair, the United States will modify its political and economic relations with Peru, including its support for international financial institution loans to Peru.”
Andrew F. Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon, 1997).
For more detail about Vincent’s role in this episode see James Bartleman, On Six Continents (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2004); “The Canadian at the centre of Peru’s hostage taking,” CBC-National, December 19, 1996.
See César Gaviria, A New Vision for the OAS. Working Document presented to the Permanent Council, April 6, 1995 (URL: http://www.oas.org/EN/PINFO/nvindexe.htm).
OAS General Assembly, Resolution on Peru, Released at the 30th OAS G A, June, 2000, Windsor: Canada, www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/00605_oasgares_peru.html.
Permanent Secretariat of the Organization of American States High-Level Mission to Peru, Informe Final de la Secretaría Permanente de la Misión de Alto Nivel de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA) en el Perú (Lima, Peru: February 26, 2001).
Joaquín Tacsán, “Searching for OAS/UN Task-Sharing Opportunities in Central America and Haiti,” Third World Quarterly 18 (1997): 489–507; and Cooper and Legler, “The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm.”
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© 2006 Andrew F. Cooper and Thomas Legler
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Cooper, A.F., Legler, T. (2006). Networked Multilateralism in Action: The OAS and the 2000 Crisis in Peru. In: Intervention Without Intervening?. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983442_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983442_4
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