Abstract
When Bill Clinton took office of the U.S. presidency in January 1993, he undoubtedly inherited a series of complex foreign policy issues— mostly issues involving conflicts that were taking place within rather than between nations, raising new and difficult questions pertaining to the definition of nation and nationhood. However, Clinton had won the presidency by promising to focus “like a laser beam” on issues haunting the domestic economy. In the face of widespread economic stagnation and a mounting federal deficit, there was a widespread feeling among the American public that their country needed to focus its energies on domestic rather than foreign policy problems. This meant that public support for U.S. foreign policy endeavors or peacekeeping missions increasingly declined. And as Clinton himself announced during his acceptance speech to the 1992 Democratic Convention:
The end of the Cold War permits us to reduce defence spending while still maintaining the strongest defence in the world, but we must plough back every dollar of defence cuts into building American jobs right here at home. I know well that the world needs a strong America, but we have learnt that strength begins at home.1
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Notes
Reinhard Wolf, “The Doubtful Mover: Germany and NATO Expansion,” in David Haglund (ed.), Will NATO Go East? The Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance, Kingston, Ont.: Queen’s University, Centre for International Relations, 1996, pp. 197–224.
Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 216–217.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Plan for Europe,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 1, 1995, pp. 26–42.
See Ronald D. Asmus, “Double Enlargement: Redefining the Atlantic Partnership after the Cold War,” in David C. Gompert and Stephen Larrabee (eds.), America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
See Volker Rühe, “Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era,” Survival, vol. 35, no. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 129–137.
See Max Otte, A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989–1999, New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 2000; see also the comments made by the then British foreign minister, Douglas Hurd, in “Hurd: keine baldige Ausdehnung der NATO,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 September 1993.
See Karl-Heinz Kamp, “NATO Entrapped: Debating the Next Enlargement Round,” Survival, vol. 40, no. 3, Autumn 1998, pp. 170–186, here p. 176.
See James Goldgeier, Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999, p. 20; also confirmed by Lake, interview.
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© 2006 Chaya Arora
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Arora, C. (2006). Debate on NATO Enlargement, 1993. In: Germany’s Civilian Power Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983343_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983343_6
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