Conclusion

Abstract

We embarked upon this research endeavor with three key purposes in mind: first, to establish the extent of Germany’s relative influence on Washington’s leadership to accept the basic rationale for NATO’s eastward enlargement, only to then gradually support the idea on largely German terms; second, we sought to assess whether and to what extent Germany’s diplomatic approach in exercising this influence coincides with William Smyser’s 2003 study of the German negotiating style. Finally and upon this basis we aspired to evaluate whether this particular case corresponds in substance to the Habermasian notion of communicative action. Hence, the structure of the following evaluation is in accordance with these three aims. Each of the three sections consists of a set of illustrative examples, taking care to ensure that the choice of these examples is evenly spread out across the relevant period (1993–97) and not least in order to be able to verify whether it is possible to account for the criterion of consistency in the three categories of influence, approach and substance.