Skip to main content

U.S. and Soviet Policies in August–December 1945

  • Chapter
The Partition of Korea after World War II
  • 138 Accesses

Abstract

According to Dean Rusk, the division of Korea along the 38th parallel was proposed during a meeting of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWINK or SWNCC) on August 14, 1945. The ex-U.S. secretary of state, who was then a colonel on the staff of the elite Operations Division (OPD) of the U.S. War Department General Staff in Washington, notes in his memoirs that the state and war departments held different opinions on where and when American forces should accept the surrender of Japanese forces. While the State Department desired to accept the surrender as far north on the mainland of China as possible, including key parts of Manchuria, the army did not want to accept responsibility for areas where it had no or few forces. “In fact, the Anny did not want to go onto the mainland at all,” Rusk writes. Rusk then goes on to relate how the drawing of the 38th parallel took place:

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. George M. McCune, “Korea: The First Year of Liberation,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 20, no. 1 (3/1947), p. 5.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. David Murphy, What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa (Yale University Press, 2005)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Constantine Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War Two on the Eastern Front (Houghton Mifflin, 2005). Anastas Mikoyan, one of Stalin’s top lieutenants, left a detailed personal account of how Stalin dismissed all warning signals of the impending German attack in June 1941.

    Google Scholar 

  4. A.I. Mikoyan, Tak bylo: razmyshleniia o minuvshem (Moscow: Vagirus, 1999), pp. 378, 388.

    Google Scholar 

  5. See the citation in David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939–1956 (Yale University Press, 1994), p. 132.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Khrushchev (1990), Khrushchev Remembers p. 82.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Quoted in: Martin Kitchen, “British Policy Towards the Soviet Union, 1945–1948,” Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1991: Retrospective, Gabriel Gorodetsky (ed.) (Frank Cass, 1994), p. 114.

    Google Scholar 

  8. B. Iarovoi, “Koreia, ee proshloe i nastoiashchee,” Novoe Vrernia August 15, 1945, no. 6 (16), pp. 24–27.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Copyright information

© 2006 Jongsoo Lee

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Lee, J. (2006). U.S. and Soviet Policies in August–December 1945. In: The Partition of Korea after World War II. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983015_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983015_2

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-53150-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4039-8301-5

  • eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics