Skip to main content

Regional Conflicts as Turning Points

The Soviet and American Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua

  • Chapter
  • 173 Accesses

Part of the book series: New Visions in Security ((NVS))

Abstract

Conflicts in the Third World were an important part of the Cold War. Although Moscow and Washington were involved in many regional conflicts, three took on special importance near the end of the Cold War: (1) the civil war in Angola; (2) the anti-Somoza revolution and subsequent Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua; and (3) the coup d’etat and revolution imposed from above in Afghanistan that led to the Soviet invasion and occupation.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. James A. Baker III, with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), pp. 71–74.

    Google Scholar 

  2. On symbolic nature of regional conflicts see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospects of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 174–225,

    Google Scholar 

  3. and Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefa and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, eds. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

    Google Scholar 

  4. John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962–1976 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978).

    Google Scholar 

  5. See Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation & Collapse in the International System (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 111–21.

    Google Scholar 

  6. See Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C., 1985), pp. 887–965.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Also see Andrew Bennett, Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Interventionism, 1973–1996 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).

    Google Scholar 

  8. See Charles Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 68–125.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), pp. 426–69.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Martha Cottam, Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), p. 89–101.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Robert Pastor, Whirpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 42–64.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Anatolii Chernyaev reports that Gorbachev persuaded the Politburo to that withdrawal from Afghanistan as early as October 17, 1985. See Bennett op. cit., p. 289 citing Chernyaev, Shest’ Let s Gorbachevym, po dnevnikovym zapisyam (Moscow: Kultura, 1993), pp. 57–58.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal op. cit., pp. 201–09. Also see Riaz M. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 65–66.

    Google Scholar 

  14. See George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), pp. 1086–94.

    Google Scholar 

  15. See W. Martin James III, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974–1990 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992), p. 240.

    Google Scholar 

  16. See Margaret Joan Anstee. Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992–93. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  17. Michael McFaul, “Rethinking the Reagan Doctrine,” International Security 14 (3) (Winter 1989–90), pp. 99–135, pp. 106–07.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Human Rights Watch, Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process (New York: Humtan Rights Watch, 1999).

    Google Scholar 

  19. See Alexander M. Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984)

    Google Scholar 

  20. and Constantine C. Menges, Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988).

    Google Scholar 

  21. Ronald Reagan, “The State of the Union, Address Delivered before a Joint Session of the Congress,” February 6, 1985, Presidential Documents, 21 (February 11, 1985), p. 145.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Gary Prevost. “The FSLN in Opposition.” In Vanessa Castro and Gary Prevost (eds.), The 1990 Elections in Nicaragua and Their Aftermath. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield publishers, 1992), pp. 48–179.

    Google Scholar 

  23. $11989 increased by 262 percent compared to deliveries made between 1982 and 1985. Richard Grimmett, Trends in Conventional-Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1982–1989 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 19, 1990), p. 60. Also see Bennett, Condemned to Repetition, op. cit., pp. 285.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Between 1985 and 1989 the flow of Soviet military supply to Nicaragua increased. In 1984 it was $350 million, in 1985 $280 million, in 1986 $600 million, in 1987 $500 million, and in 1988 $525 million. Jan S. Adams, A Foreign Policy in Transition: Moscow’s Retreat from Central America and the Caribbean, 1985–1992 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), p. 111.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  25. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1990), p. 101.

    Google Scholar 

  26. John Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

    Google Scholar 

  27. See Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospects of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 174–225 and Robert Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,” in Jervis and Snyder (eds.), Dominoes and Bandwagons, pp. 20–50. and Robert Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,” in Jervis and Snyder (eds.), Dominoes and Bandwagons, pp. 20–50.

    Google Scholar 

  28. For a review of the thinking that led to the Soviet involvement in Angola, see Odd Arne Westad, “Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974–1976: A New Pattern of Intervention,” in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 8–9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 21–32.

    Google Scholar 

  29. Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984).

    Google Scholar 

  30. See President James Carter, “A Foreign Policy Based on America’s Essential Character (address made at the commencement exercises of Notre Dame University, South Bend, Ind., May 22, 1977), Department of State Bulletin (June 13, 1977), pp. 621–25. Also see Jerel Rosati, The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991).

    Google Scholar 

  31. See David Welch and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Detente, Nobel Symposium 95, September 17–20, 1995 (Oslo: The Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1996).

    Google Scholar 

  32. Also see Richard Herrmann, “The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A Strategy for Drawing Inferences About Perceptions,” International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988), pp. 175–203.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  33. See, for instance, A. Bovin, “Afghanistan: A Difficult Decade,” Izvestiya, Dec. 23, 1988, 5 (FBIS-SOV-88–247), pp. 24–26.

    Google Scholar 

  34. For a review of these developments, see Jerry Hough, The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986).

    Google Scholar 

  35. See Sarah Mendelson, Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). Also see Bennett, Condemned to Repetition? op. cit., pp. 247–94.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Richard K. Herrmann Richard Ned Lebow

Copyright information

© 2004 Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Herrmann, R.K. (2004). Regional Conflicts as Turning Points. In: Herrmann, R.K., Lebow, R.N. (eds) Ending the Cold War. New Visions in Security. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403982810_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics