Abstract
The UN’s engagement of African regional organizations in conflict management constitutes one of the dominant trends in the post-Cold War era. Captured in the dual conceptual lenses of multilateralism and regionalism, this engagement is often couched in the functionalist terms of partnership where regional organizations become the fulcrums for conflict prevention, peace building, and peacekeeping while the UN assumes the essential role of mobilization of global resources and leverage. Partnership proceeds from the assumption of African ownership of local problems as major players in the UN Security Council reduce their roles in these conflicts.1
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Notes
For analyses of changing roles between regional organizations and the UN see Gareth Evans, “Preventive Action and Conflict Resolution,” in Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp. 61–87; Ismat Kittani, “Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking: The UN Experience,” in Otunnu and Doyle, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century, pp. 89–107; Salim Ahmed Salim, “The OAU Role in Conflict Management,” in Otunnu and Doyle, pp. 89–107;
Thomas G. Weiss, Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs (London: Macmillan, 1998);
Tobias Debiel, “Strengthening the UN as an Effective World Authority: Cooperative Security Versus Hegemonic Crisis Management,” Global Governance, vol. 6, no. 1 (January–March 2000), pp. 25–42.
For historical background on Burundi see, Rene Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994);
Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (London: Pall Mall, 1970);
and Robert Schrire and Warren Weinstein, Political Conflict and Ethnic Strategies: A Case Study of Burundi (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1976).
Filip Reyntjens, “The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating: The June 1993 Elections in Burundi,” Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 31, no. 4 (1993), pp. 563–83;
and Leonce Ndikumana, “Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi,” African Studies Review, vol. 41, no. 1 (April 1998), pp. 35–36.
John Sedlins, “Envoy Urges Support for OAU-U.N. Action in Burundi,” United States Information Agency, October 29, 1993; Judy Aita, “U.N. General Assembly Condemns Burundi Coup: OAU Urged to Help Restore Order,” United States Information Agency, November 4, 1993. For critical analysis of the initial phase of intervention see Stephen R. Weissman, “Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International Diplomacy,” Peaceworks, no. 22 (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), p. 6
and Rene Lemarchand, “Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?” African Studies Review, vol. 41, no. 1 (April 1998), p. 5.
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Burundi on the Brink, 1993–1995 (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, Perspectives Series, 2000), pp. 37–40.
Agostinho Zacarias, “Time to Stop a Genocide Culture,” World Today, vol. 52, November 1996, p. 286. For analysis of the process and outcomes of internal negotiations see “Attempted Coup by Army Collapsed,” FBIS-Afr-94–079, April 25, 1994, p. 1; “Security Situation Deteriorating in Bujumbura,” FBIS-Afr-94–082, April 28, 1994, p. 1;
Michael Lund and others, “Learning from Burundi’s Failed Democratic Transition, 1993–1996: Did the International Initiatives Match the Problem,” in Barnett R. Rubin, ed., Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), pp. 63–65; and Ould-Abdallah, Burundi on the Brink, pp. 73–91.
Glynne Evans, Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes, Adelphi Paper, no. 311 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), p. 31. On the broader issue of coordination of roles during Ould-Abdallahs tenure, Evans notes, “In 1994 and 1995, UN and OAU efforts were made in parallel, supported above all by telephone communications between the secretaries-general. Although these links worked well at the highest level, they were less effective at lower levels.” Evans, Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes, p. 34.
The Carter Center, “Cairo Declaration on the Great Lakes Region,” News & Info, Atlanta: The Carter Center, November 29, 1995;
and The Carter Center, “Great Lakes Heads of State Issue Declaration in Tunis,” News & Info, Atlanta: The Carter Center, March 18, 1996.
For a review of recent literature on sanctions see the contributions in Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (New York: Macmillan, 1999); Robert A. Pape, “Why International Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 2 (1997); and Richard Farmer, “Costs of Economic Sanctions to the Sender,” World Economy, vol. 23, no. 1, 2000.
For a summary of these campaigns see, e.g., The International Crisis Group, “Lifting Embargo on Burundi is Key to Maintaining Peace Process Momentum,” IGC Report, July 17, 1998 and United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, DHA Report on Regional Sanctions Against Burundi (New York: United Nations, December 1997).
For a balanced analysis see Eric Hoskins and Samantha Hunt, The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions on Burundi (Providence: The Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper No. 29, 1997).
Sam Kiley, “Amnesty Accuses Burundi Army of Massacring Hutus,” The Times, November 22, 1996; “Burundi Tutsis Battle Hutus,” Associated Press, November 29, 1996; UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, “UN Humanitarian Situation Report: Burundi,” December 13, 1996.
Jakaya M. Kikwete, “Tanzania and the Great Lakes Region,” Public Lecture, Center for International and Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, January 15, 1998.
“Relief Agencies Say Sanctions Hurt Burundi,” Reuters, January 13, 1997. See also UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, “Sanctions Hamper Burundi Relief Effort,” January 14, 1997 and Moyiga Nduru, “Kenyan Politician Calls for Lifting of Embargo,” Inter Press Service, November 15, 1996.
UN, DHA Report on Regional Sanctions Against Burundi (New York: UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, December 1997), pp. 10–11; Farhan Haq, “Politics: Regional Sanctions on Burundi Have Failed, UN Says,” Inter Press Service, December 14, 1997; Lisa Schlein, “UN-Burundi,” Voice of America, Correspondent Report 2–224428, December 22, 1997; Clive Mutiso, “Carrot-and-Stick Deal on Burundi Peace Talks,” The East African, December 23, 1997.
“Report of the Special Envoy on the First Session of the Burundi Peace Negotiations, Arusha, June 15–21, 1998,” EU office, Arusha, September 9, 1998. For similar criticisms see the International Crisis Group, “Burundi’s Peace Process: The Road From Arusha,” IGC Report, July 20, 1998;
and Jan Van Eck, “Burundi Report: External ‘Signals’ Needed to Further Stimulate Internal and External Negotiation Processes,” Arusha, August 3, 1998.
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© 2003 Jane Boulden
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Khadiagala, G.M. (2003). Burundi. In: Boulden, J. (eds) Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403982209_9
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