Why ESDP is Misguided and Dangerous for the Alliance

Abstract

Despite the impact of September 11, the EU has, since that date, continued doggedly in its attempts to equip itself with a defense policy. Whatever the outcome of these efforts, the progress made recently toward that end has been impressive. No longer can critics (the current author included) simply dismiss as mere rhetoric the stated ambitions of Europeans to do more in the military sphere. Space constraints preclude a description of the process of negotiation and bargaining that led from a northern French coastal resort to a southern one, and which has been examined in some detail elsewhere.¹ Between the Anglo-French summit at Saint-Malo in December 1998 and the European Council meeting at Nice in December 2000, a series of practical steps were taken to equip the EU with the structures and military capacities to implement a defense policy of its own. The organization now incorporates structures specifically designed to take decisions relating to defense. Uniformed officers now stroll through the corridors of the Council building, and provide military advice to decision makers occupied with the EU’s defense dimension. In addition, the member states have committed themselves to creating, by 2003, a European intervention force of at least 60,000 troops.