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The Missing Incentive: Corruption, Anticorruption, and Reelection

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Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition

Part of the book series: Political Evolution and Institutional Change ((PEIC))

Abstract

Anticorruption campaigns in post-communist democracies are running out of steam. There is a silent consensus that the war on corruption has failed to obtain the expected results. “Though still in the early stages of development, the experience of anticorruption programs to date has produced mixed results …. Ambitious anticorruption campaigns in several countries have floundered at the implementation stage. Key structural reforms have been blocked by powerful vested interests. In some cases, politicians have hijacked the anticorruption agenda and used it to attack their rivals,” stated a World Bank report (World Bank 2000: 15). “The political economy of anticorruption initiatives has proven complex and difficult” (31). The conclusion reached is that “a serious anticorruption program cannot be imposed from the outside, but requires committed leadership from within, ideally from the highest levels of the state. While pressure for reform can come from below, any effective program must be supported from the top” (30).

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Authors

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János Kornai Susan Rose-Ackerman

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© 2004 János Kornai and Susan Rose-Ackerman

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Krastev, I., Ganev, G. (2004). The Missing Incentive: Corruption, Anticorruption, and Reelection. In: Kornai, J., Rose-Ackerman, S. (eds) Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition. Political Evolution and Institutional Change. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403981103_9

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