Abstract
Dayton’s second weekend was a moment of transition. It had taken ten days to clear away such issues as the Federation and Eastern Slavonia, and the parties had become comfortable with the surroundings and each other. Yet despite hours of intense negotiating and prodding by the Americans, the core issues remained largely untouched. There had been some discussion about territory—such as the status of Sarajevo—with little success. The Bosnian government had done little more than restate their previous positions, and Milosevic remained defiant. With the two-week mark approaching fast, the Americans wanted to use the weekend to jump-start things. “Saturday,” Kerrick informed Lake, “is a day of maps.”1
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Notes
Bildt interview; Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 120–126;
Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Brookings, 2000), pp. 184–187.
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© 2005 Derek Chollet
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Chollet, D. (2005). Endgame: Dayton, November 11–21. In: The Road to the Dayton Accords. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403978899_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403978899_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
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