Counterproliferation Versus Nonproliferation in the Middle East After Saddam: Lessons From Iraq and Libya

Abstract

While the formal treaty-based nonproliferation regime has been in effect in the Middle East since its inception—Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, for example, all signed the NPT in 1968—efforts to deal with the growing threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East were considerably intensified after the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988 and the Gulf War of 1991. Only a few years later, however, frustrations with the limitations inherent in multilateral and diplomatic approaches to the problem led the William Clinton administration to develop the set of policies and programs dubbed “counterproliferation.” Both nonproliferation and counterproliferation techniques have been tested recently, most obviously in Iraq. However, the lessons of Iraq should not be analyzed in isolation. Muammar Qadhafi’s extraordinary and welcome decision to end Libya’s WMD programs voluntarily and the alarming revelations about undeclared Iranian nuclear activities require that this extraordinarily complex set of developments be examined comparatively. Are Iraq and Libya two entirely different cases? What can they tell us about the relative utility of counterproliferation measures and the classic nonproliferation regime?¹ How can they assist us in dealing with the challenge posed by the alarming progress of the Iranian nuclear program and the potential Syrian WMD threat?