Abstract
By focusing on questions of decision-making in the context of war, this chapter seeks to join the broader discussion of institutional moral agency in which the other contributors to this volume are engaged. This chapter will explore both the military and the moral relationship between one particular institution, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and one of its constituents, the individual combat soldier.
We make love by telephone, we work not on matter but on machines, and we kill and are killed by proxy. We gain in cleanliness, but lose in understanding.
Albert Camus1
An earlier version of this chapter was presented by Paul Cornish at the BISA/ISA Joint Special Workshop, ‘Can Institutions Have Morals?’, held at the University of Cambridge, 18–19 November 2000.
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Notes
A. Camus, ‘Neither Victims nor Executioners’, in D. P. Barash (ed.), A Reader in Peace Studies (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 181–3 (p. 182).
In Chapter 1, p. 26, Erskine also makes the point that the recognition of institutional responsibilities does not negate (or allow the evasion of) the distinct responsibilities of individual actors.
NATO, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO, 1991), para. 10.
J. Shea, ‘The Alliance’s New-Found Popularity’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, CXLIV 1 (1999) 8–13, 32 (p. 10).
M. Albright, text of speech, Washington, 6 April 1999 (US Information Service, Official Text, 7 April 1999).
M. Albright, text of speech, Washington, 14 April 1999 (US Information Service, Official Text, 15 April 1999).
M. Albright, text of speech, Washington, 20 April 1999 (US Information Service, Official Text, 21 April 1999).
M. Albright, ‘To Win the Peace’, Wall Street Journal (14 June 1999).
J. Solana, ‘A Defining Moment for NATO: The Washington Summit Decisions and the Kosovo Crisis’, NATO Review, XLVII 2 (1999) 3–8 (p. 3).
‘General George and the EU paper tiger’, Sunday Times (30 January 2000).
‘NATO Politicians “Spiked our Guns”,’ Sunday Telegraph (5 March 2000). See also a British military view that ruling out the ground offensive was a ‘strategic mistake’ in ‘Ground War “Error”,’ The Times (24 March 2000).
House of Commons, Lessons of Kosovo (London: HMSO, Select Committee on Defence, Fourteenth Report, October 2000), para. 95.
House of Commons, Lessons of Kosovo, para. 95.
‘Why Kosovo Bombs Missed Mark’, The Times (25 October 2000).
‘Forces want Funds for “Safer” Weapons’, The Times (16 July 2001).
It has been reported anecdotally that when the 10 000-strong NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) moved across the border into Kosovo in June 1999, it was accompanied by 2500 accredited media representatives; a soldier/media ratio of 4 : 1.
See F. Harbour and P. Cornish, ‘Planning for Casualties: Insights from World War II and Kosovo’, paper presented to the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 2001.
J. McMahan, ‘War and Peace’, in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 386.
M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd edn (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p. 21.
A. J. Coates, The Ethics of War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 98.
E. Sciolino and E. Bronner, ‘The Decision to Bomb the Serbs’, New York Times (18 April 1999).
Eaker Colloquy on Aerospace Strategy, Requirements, and Forces held on 16 August 1999 in Washington, DC, titled Operation Allied Force: Strategy, Execution, Implications.
I. H. Daalder and M. E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 72–4.
B. Graham, ‘Cohen Wrestles with a Mission Far Harder than Predicted’, Washington Post (11 April 1999); B. Graham, ‘Joint Chiefs Doubted Air Strategy’, Washington Post (5 April 1999).
R. W. Apple Jr, ‘Nimble Security Juggler: Sandy Berger, The Strategist and Politician’, New York Times (25 August 1999).
Hearing of the Armed Services Committee, US Senate, 106th Congress, 1st session, 20 July 1999.
See, for example, M. Green, ‘France Says U.S. Sidestepped NATO in Kosovo’, Reuters, AOL News (11 November 1999).
P. E. Gallis, J. Kim, S. Bowman, E. F. Bruner, S. Woehrel, and S. D. Goldman, ‘Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force’, P. E. Gallis, Coordinator, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Order
Number RL30374 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 19 November 1999), p. 7.
B. Graham, ‘War without “Sacrifice” Worries Warriors’, Washington Post (29 June 1999).
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Cornish, P., Harbour, F.V. (2003). NATO and the Individual Soldier as Moral Agents with Reciprocal Duties: Imbalance in the Kosovo Campaign. In: Erskine, T. (eds) Can Institutions Have Responsibilities?. Global Issues Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403938466_8
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