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Globalization, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe

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Europe and Globalization

Abstract

The landscape of globalization presents a remarkably rugged appearance.1 This is true if one adopts a genuinely global view. Differences in the extent of global market integration are, however, also discernible if one adopts a narrower (Western) European perspective.2 The European Union was set up half a century ago with the express purpose of achieving deep economic integration. Despite the remaining differences in integration among member states, the initiative has proved to be remarkably successful.3 The European countries have attained a level of economic integration that provides substantial static gains from trade and significant dynamic gains from increased market competition.4

The authors thank Arye Hillman for helpful comments.

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Authors
  1. Albert Breton
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  2. Heinrich Ursprung
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland

    Henryk Kierzkowski (Professor of Economics) (Professor of Economics)

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© 2002 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Breton, A., Ursprung, H. (2002). Globalization, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe. In: Kierzkowski, H. (eds) Europe and Globalization. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403937674_14

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