Abstract
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, government interventions in the market tend to create distortions and excess profits, which special interests try to capture. There are also incentives for various groups in the economy to join forces and try to secure favours by persuading the state to introduce distorting policy measures.
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Literature
The idea that those in power tend to maximize their own utility can be found in:
Brennan, Geoffrey and Buchanan, James M. (1983), ‘Predictive Power and the Choice of Regimes’, Economic Journal, Vol. 107.
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© 2002 Hans C. Blomqvist and Mats Lundahl
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Blomqvist, H.C., Lundahl, M. (2002). The State as an Interest Group: The Economic Logic of Wielding Power. In: The Distorted Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403914347_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403914347_12
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