State-Society Relations in Post-Soviet Systems: Trade Unions in Ukraine

Abstract

State-society relations in Russia have changed (as mentioned in Chapter 5), though not as dramatically as some outside observers predicted in 1991. Ukraine has experienced less change in terms of state-society relations and in terms of economics;indeed, some would argue that Ukraine has remained virtually unchanged. In part because Ukraine only began seriously debating a post-Soviet constitution in 1996, economic change has been piecemeal and unambitious, and property rights have lagged. Most importantly for the argument dis- cussed here, whereas Russia removed control of state resources from the trade unions, Ukraine has not. This key factor, control of state resources, should lead to differences in the rate of new union formation between Russia and Ukraine. As noted in Chapter 5, Russia has had significant new union formation. The model used in this research would predict that Ukraine will have little or no new union formation because of state policy. The risk of leaving the official trade unions while they fully control state resources such as social insurance is too great for most trade union leaders. While control of state resources is a key indicator for new union formation, we posit several other variables which also affect the probability that union leaders will form new unions: labor power, profitability, and union organization. These variables should have less effect in the Ukrainian case than in Russia, though, because of the overriding importance of state policy. Chapter 5 analyzed the probability of new union formation in Russia using these variables and this chapter will look at the Ukrainian case.