Security and Material Possessions in a Lockean State of Nature - Non-Co-operative Games

Abstract

States also provide protection for material possessions by enforcing rules of ownership and exchange, and this raises questions about the security of property and enforcement analogous to those in Chapter 2. This chapter makes a start on these questions. This will be done by extending the analysis of conflict in the state of nature to the case where there are no rules of possession and there are conflicts over material goods. In order to deal with this question it must be assumed that the Hobbesian problem is solved and that individuals have some level of material wealth. This is referred to as a Lockean state of nature. Without this assumption it is difficult to see how material possessions can be treated as a greater concern than domination and fear of violent death. The Hobbesian problem might be avoided by assuming that there is already an ultra-minimal state that protects life. The absence of rules of property means that individuals are involved in struggles where there are material pay-offs. For these interactions to be interesting it is also necessary to assume that strategies are costly. It turns out that the problem of studying struggles over possessions is more complicated than the analysis of struggles over domination. This is because the single dominant strategy of the Hobbesian problem is lost and the equilibrium of one-shot games may not be uniquely determined.