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Stability and Stagnation

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Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

Part of the book series: Executive Politics and Governance ((EXPOLGOV))

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Abstract

On the fourth of July, 1776, thirteen American colonies declared their independence from Great Britain, and formed the United States of America, thereby laying the foundations for the now oldest surviving political system with representative government. An oft-quoted passage in the Declaration of Independence is the passage that men are endowed with certain unalienable rights, which include life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and to secure them “[g]overnments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”

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Authors
  1. Anders Sundell
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Gothenburg, Sweden

    Carl Dahlström (Professor) & Lena Wängnerud (Professor) (Professor) &  (Professor)

Copyright information

© 2015 Anders Sundell

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Sundell, A. (2015). Stability and Stagnation. In: Dahlström, C., Wängnerud, L. (eds) Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government. Executive Politics and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137556288_8

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