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Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government pp 69–92Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

The Political and Historical Origins of Good Government: How Social Contracts Shape Elite Behavior

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Part of the Executive Politics and Governance book series (EXPOLGOV)

Abstract

An influential scholarship holds that the behavior of political elites – that is, elected and non-elected public officials – is of key importance for achieving quality of government (Klitgaard, 1988; Goldsmith, 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, 2012; North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009; Fukuyama, 2011). The influence of political elites is assumed to travel through direct as well as indirect channels. The powerful position of elites gives them a direct influence on political, social, and economic development. At the same time, the behavior of political elites is likely to indirectly influence the behavior of ordinary citizens through what Werner (1983, p. 149) calls a “leader-follower spillover effect.” That is, the morals and actions of political elites are likely to be copied, complemented, and reinforced by actors further down the hierarchy. In line with this logic, it is often argued that “the fish rots from the head down,” whereas responsive and responsible leadership plays an important role in setting in motion a virtuous development spiral (Rothstein, 2011).

Keywords

  • Social Contract
  • Political Elite
  • Veto Player
  • Legal Origin
  • Corruption Perception Index

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Authors
  1. Anna Persson
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  2. Martin Sjöstedt
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Professor, Professor, University of Gothenburg, Sweden

    Carl Dahlström & Lena Wängnerud & 

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© 2015 Anna Persson and Martin Sjöstedt

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Persson, A., Sjöstedt, M. (2015). The Political and Historical Origins of Good Government: How Social Contracts Shape Elite Behavior. In: Dahlström, C., Wängnerud, L. (eds) Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government. Executive Politics and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137556288_5

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