Abstract
This chapter asks the question: ‘what, for the clinician, is disease?’ Of all the tasks philosophers undertake, I consider the conceptual analysis of disease to be of particular importance — and for obvious reasons. For one, one’s disease status can have significant consequences. In the following sections I outline three prominent conceptions of disease, looking for that best suited to clinical medicine: those proposed by Rachel Cooper (2002), Peter Schwartz (2007), and Jerome Wakefield (1992, 1999). I dismiss Cooper’s view based on clear cut counterexamples, but show that significant parts of both Wakefield and Schwartz’s views are compelling. I conclude with a fourth proposal (which draws on both Wakefield and Schwartz), providing an etiological theory of disease in clinical medicine.
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© 2016 Benjamin Smart
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Smart, B. (2016). The Concept of Disease in Clinical Medicine. In: Concepts and Causes in the Philosophy of Disease. Palgrave Pivot, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137552921_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137552921_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Pivot, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-71621-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-55292-1
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