Abstract
Whether used as. tool for control and profit,. weapon for accusation, or an excuse for inexcusable behavior, the appeal to addiction seems to be ubiquitous. And yet, as we have seen, it can be applied to virtually anyone given. particular context. Even in the most paradigmatic cases, it depends upon. network of genetic, environmental, developmental, psychological, and sociological factors. The concept “addiction” should be understood not as. defined and settled phenomenon, the scope of which is delimited by necessary and sufficient conditions, but instead as. prototype,. locus within our conceptual state space. Close to that prototype are examples like the individual who lives in an abandoned building, occupying all her time and devoting all her resources to shooting up heroin. Further away, but still within the scope of the concept, is the individual who drinks coffee most days of the week, and is grumpy when he does not, or who hasn’t had. drink in months, but continues to think of it daily. Surely some generalizations can be made across cases; otherwise, there would be no agreement that in most cases addiction is unwanted, and there would be no support groups for escaping it. But we do notice that the support groups are legion in variety, suggesting that many individuals who think of themselves as addicted do not recognize their experiences as being similar to those who are addicted to different substances or activities than they are.
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Notes
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Are Addicts Responsible?” Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience, ed. Neil Levy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 126.
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© 2016 Candice L. Shelby
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Shelby, C.L. (2016). Conclusion. In: Addiction. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137552853_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137552853_9
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