Abstract
Addictive processes emerge from hierarchies of interacting complex adaptive processes both internal and external to an individual. These processes include and emerge from cells and cell systems, and also from psychological phenomena, as well as from higher-level emergent processes operating at both the physical and social levels. From the beginning, the world outside the individual is dynamically involved in the development of his or her physical and psychological traits and dispositions. As we saw in Chapter 4, the influence of social conceptions on one’s experience of diverse aspects of life, such as family, property, work, discomfort, and gratification, are profound and have. significant impact on whether, how, and to what extent individuals may become addicted. Patterns of activity at this level interact with personal and subpersonal patterns of action to create meaning. Meaning operates at the core of addiction for the addict and her close social circle, as well as for researchers, treatment professionals, and policy makers. When an individual becomes addicted to some substance or activity, what that thing means to her shifts fundamentally, as does her conception of herself and the rest of the world. The meaning of that substance or activity to her spouse, friends, children, or parents, although completely different from what it is for the addicted person, is. driving force in their lives.
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Notes
Paul Churchland, Neurophilosophy at Work (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 138–140.
Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought (New York: Crowell, 1975);
also Jerry Fodor, RePresentations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981) and others.
In Jerry Fodor, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), he denies the existence of innate ideas. or concepts. opting instead for innate mechanisms (142) – but this is all compatible with classical innatism, at least as put forth in the philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and arguably in that of Descartes.
Jerry Fodor, “Concepts: Potboiler,” Cognition 50 (1994): 107.
Jerry Fodor, “Semantics, Wisconsin Style,” Synthese 59 (1984): 231–250, reprinted in A Theory of Content and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).
Walter J. Freeman, How Brains Make Up Their Minds (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 25.
John Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Brain and Behavioral Science 3, no.3 (1980): 417–457.
John Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Brain and Behavioral Science 3, no.3 (1980): 417–457.
S. I. Greenspan, The Growth of the Mind and the Endangered Origins of Intelligence (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997).
Gene Heyman, Addiction: Disorder of Choice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 84–86.
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© 2016 Candice L. Shelby
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Shelby, C.L. (2016). Addiction and Meaning. In: Addiction. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137552853_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137552853_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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