Introduction

Abstract

The strategic failures in the approach to deal with the problems of the Greek economy, namely the disproportionate internal devaluation of the private sector and the tax base with respect to the milder internal devaluation of the government expenditure, has certainly taken place in the context of a country that was asked to undertake one of the most difficult adjustments made by any country and through a deal that appeared to be ignoring important warning signs (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2011, 2012; Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, 2014). Essentially, the 2010 and onward sequential deals amounted to agreeing with the political leadership and the administration of an economy that has been turned by the former into a quasi-soviet economy at the fringes of free markets that they will tear down the bureaucracy that has been established for over 30 years, while being offered the cash and support to keep operating largely in a “business as usual” environment.