Post-Crimean Political Order

  • Boris Makarenko


The anti-modernization trend will become the main feature of the country’s political regime for the immediate future – this trend dooms the regime to stagnation, making any attempts at technocratic renewal futile. In order to keep the situation under control, the regime will inevitably resort to greater, most likely pre-emptive, and therefore disproportionate, repressions, which will further exacerbate political conflict. The main question that will determine the predictions of the political regime’s future is how stable it will be under the new conditions and what hypothetical solutions for overcoming stagnation it will have at its disposal.


Political Regime Party System Economist Intelligence Unit Regime Party Legislative Election 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. V. Barinov (2014) ‘Judges Are Sent Notices Not to Leave the Country’, Kommersant, 28 May 2014Google Scholar
  2. S. Belanovskiy, M. Dmitriyev, et al. (2011) The Driving Forces and Prospects for Russia’s Political Transformation, Analytical Report (Moscow. Center for Strategic Research).Google Scholar
  3. Center for Political Technologies (2013) ‘Russian Politics–Chance for Reformers’, Report for the Committee for Civil Initiatives,
  4. S. Goryashko (2014) ‘Vladimir Putin Is Recognized as Irreplaceable’, Kommersant, 15 May 2014.Google Scholar
  5. V. Gurvich (2014) ‘The Future Dictated by the Past’, Nezavsimaya Gazeta, 21 May 2014.Google Scholar
  6. V. Khamraev, E. Yeremenko (2014) ‘Municipal Reform Runs Ahead of Law ’, Kommersant, 82 (5355).Google Scholar
  7. V. Klyuchevsky (1993) Russian History. Full Course of Lectures, Lecture LXXXV: The Nicholas I Reign (Moscow).Google Scholar
  8. A. Levinson (2013) ‘Russian Society Before and After 2012’, Vestnik Obshchestvennogo Mneniya: Dannye, Analyz, Diskussiya, 1 (114), January–March 2013, 30–34.Google Scholar
  9. J. Linz, A. Stepan (1996) Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).Google Scholar
  10. B. Magaloni, R. Kricheli (2010) ‘Political Order and One-Party Rule’, Annual Review of Political Science, 2010, 13 (1), 123–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. B. Makarenko (2013) ‘Frameworks of Political System Development’ in M. Lipman, N. Petrov (eds) Russia 2025: Scenarios for the Russian Future (London: Palgrave Macmillan), 161–80.Google Scholar
  12. B. Makarenko, A. Melville (2015) ‘How Do Transitions to Democracy Get Stuck, and Where?’ in A. Przeworski (ed.) Democracy in a Russian Mirror, Cambridge 268–97.Google Scholar
  13. B. Makarenko (2011) ‘The Post-Soviet Regime Party: The United Russia in the Comparative Context’, Polis, 121(1), 42–65.Google Scholar
  14. G. A. O’Donnell (1973) Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. (Berkeley: University of California Press).Google Scholar
  15. President of Russia (2013) ‘Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly’, 12 December 2013,
  16. A. Przeworski (1991) Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Public Opinion Foundation (2014) Political Indicators: Electoral Rankings. Public Opinion Poll on 9–10 August 2014,
  18. The Committee for Civil Initiatives (2014) Analytical Report No 3 on the Long-term Monitoring of the September 2014 Elections,
  19. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2012) Democracy Index 2012. Democracy at a Standstill, gnid=DemocracyIndex12
  20. I. Yurgens (ed.) (2011) Attaining the Future. Agenda 2012 (Moscow: Econ-Inform).Google Scholar
  21. D. Yevstifeev, K. Baranova (2014) ‘Force Structure Employees Now Vacation in Russia’, shtml

Copyright information

© Boris Makarenko 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Boris Makarenko

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations