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Intuitive Knowing as Spiritual Experience pp 21–57Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Spirits

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Abstract

The spiritual realities that seem to some to be implicated in experiences of “intuitive knowing” have been widely and vigorously relegated to the periphery by the Academy and the educated elite in Western civilization. In an essay published shortly before his death, well-known professor of philosophy and humanities, Richard Rorty (1931–2007), wrote that “empirical evidence is irrelevant to talk about God,” remarking that this viewpoint, advanced by both David Hume (1711–76) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), applies equally to theism and atheism.1

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Notes

  1. Richard Rorty, and Gianni Vattimo (2004) The Future of Religion (ed. Santiago Zabala) (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 33.

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© 2015 Phillip H. Wiebe

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Wiebe, P.H. (2015). Spirits. In: Intuitive Knowing as Spiritual Experience. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137543585_2

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