Abstract
The third chapter explains how the Eurozone crisis has put the historically grounded connection between “Eu government” and “independence” into crisis. In a context where the triptych of the Court, the Commission and the Central Bank have been granted unprecedented oversight and controlling powers over national governments’ political economy and social policies (budgetary supervision of the European Commission, the “conditionality policy” of the European Central Bank, etc.), the exteriority of the “independent branch” from the circuit of representative democracy as well as its relative invisibility in Europe’s public sphere are more and more problematic.
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Notes
Anu Bradford, “The Brussels’ Effect,” Northwestern University Law Review, 107 (1), 2012.
Olivier Baisnée and Andy Smith, “Pour une sociologie de ‘l’a-politique’. Acteurs, interactions et représentations au cœur du gouvernement de l’Union européenne,” in Antonin Cohen et alii (eds.), Les Formes de l’activité politique. Éléments d’analyse sociologique, Paris, PUF, 2006, pp. 335–354.
European Central Bank, “The ECB’s relations with European Union Institutions and Bodies—Trends and Prospects” ECB, Monthly Bulletin, January 2010, p. 73.
Hubert Legal, “Au sein de l’institution, l’unité du droit s’impose,” Europe. Actualité du droit de l’Union européenne, no. 4, April 2007.
Clément Fontan, Une institution politique à l’épreuve de la crise: la Banque centrale européenne dans l’Union économique et monétaire (août 2007-janvier 2012), Ph.D in political science, Sciences Po Grenoble, 2012.
Irene Bellier, “The European Union, Identity Politics and the Logic of Interests’ Representation” in Irene Bellier et Thomas Wilson (eds.), An Anthropology of the European Union: Building, Imagining, Experiencing Europe, Oxford, Berg, 2000, pp. 53–73.
See Frédéric Lebaron, “ECB Leaders: A New European Monetary Elite?,” in Didier Georgakakis and Jay Rowell (eds.), The Field of Eurocracy: Mapping EU Actors and Professionals, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 87–104.
See the scathing criticism by Alain Supiot, “Le sommeil dogmatique européen,” Revue française des affaires sociales, no. 1, 2012, pp. 185–198.
Fritz Scharpf, “The Asymmetry of European Integration, or Why the EU Cannot be a ‘Social Market Economy’,” Socio-Economic Review, 8, 2010, pp. 211–250. More recently, Fritz Scharpf forcefully showed that the EMU further extended and systematized this lock-in effect, thereby “jeopardizing democratic self-governement in Europe”; Fritz Scharpf, No Exit from the Euro-Rescuing Trap, Max Planck Institute, MPIfG Discussion Paper 14 /4, 2014.
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© 2016 Antoine Vauchez
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Vauchez, A. (2016). The Crisis of Europe’s Independent Branch. In: Democratizing Europe. Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137540911_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137540911_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Pivot, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-71237-3
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