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The Founders’ Reasons and Justifications for Presidential Emergency Power

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Abstract

The American Founders were very concerned about the power of the American Presidency. As such, they placed several limitations of presidential power via checks and balances. However, certain parts of Article II of the Constitution are very vague leaving open the mysterious question of whether or not presidents have implied powers. Such an example of implied power is presidential emergency power. In this chapter, I examine the Founders’ debate over whether or not executives should have an implied emergency power. I find that Hamilton and others agreed that executives should have unbridled, unlimited power in times of crisis; therefore, in America’s War on Terror, executive prerogative determines what powers to use and when to use them in order to combat the enemy. According to this view, the President is in no way constrained by the Constitution or Congress as he decides to wage war against the terrorists.

Keywords

  • Executive Branch
  • Executive Power
  • Emergency Power
  • Executive Authority
  • Constitutional Convention

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Notes

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© 2015 Justin DePlato

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DePlato, J. (2015). The Founders’ Reasons and Justifications for Presidential Emergency Power. In: American Presidential Power and the War on Terror: Does the Constitution Matter?. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137539625_2

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