Abstract
Beijing continues to adhere to a “no first use” (NFU) policy and China is not racing to parity with the United States and Russia, but China is enhancing its nuclear capabilities by increasing the size and sophistication of its strategic missile force. After relying on a small and relatively outdated nuclear missile force for several decades, China is currently modernizing its nuclear deterrent to respond to what it sees as threats to its credibility. Specifically, Beijing is modernizing its nuclear force to enhance its survivability, increase its striking power, and counter missile defense developments. In addition, China is enhancing its nuclear command and control.1
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Notes
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2013), p. 30. According to the Department of Defense, “The PLA has deployed new command, control, and communications capabilities to its nuclear forces. These capabilities improve the Second Artillery’s ability to command and control multiple units in the field.”
Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense in 2010 (Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, March 31, 2011).
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Pamela Pun, “Experts: DF-41 Could Force US to Adjust its Strategy,” Hong Kong Standard, October 15, 1999, p. 6.
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Chase, M.S. (2015). Assessing China’s Evolving Nuclear Capabilities. In: Chung, J.H. (eds) Assessing China’s Power. Asan-Palgrave Macmillan Series. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137534613_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137534613_5
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