The Intensive Pricing Surface



If price is written, and if this writing concerns not the communication of meaning but the transmission of intensity, a very particular registry or surface is required as the locus of its recording. There is no doubt that, without such a concept it is impossible to formulate an adequate theory of the market. In its absence we are left with the Scylla of an anthropomorphized specular market-subject (‘what the market wants’) and the Charybdis of a deflationary sociology.1


Option Price Implied Volatility Price Process Infinite Regress Phenomenal Experience 
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  1. 2.
    Karen Knorr Cetina and Urs Bruegger, ‘Global Microstructures: The Virtual Socieites of Financial Markets,’ The American Journal of Sociology 107:4 (2002): 908Google Scholar
  2. 5.
    Several texts have addressed this concept in Deleuze and in the history of thought that proceeds his treatment, including Simon Duffy, The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), esp. Chapters 4 and 5. The work of Mary-Beth Mader, however, is perhaps the locus of the most important developments on this front. See in particular her Sleights of Reason: Norm, Bisexuality, Development (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011), 13–41.Google Scholar
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    Carl Boyer’s comparison of Oresme’s diagram with Cartesian geometry is symptomatic in precisely this way. See Boyer, The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development (New York: Dover, 1959), 82; on this point, c.f. Mary-Beth Mader, ‘The Difference of Intensity: Deleuze and Nicolas Oresme,’ (unpublished paper presented at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Annual Meeting 2008), 7–8. Châtelet also notes a later development, which he dubs ‘Romantic’, that ‘no longer allows the separation horizontal/vertical or right/left to be self-evident’ (Figuring Space, 99n4). Clearly, this development is not conceived, from the point of view of the contemporary (analytic) philosophy of mathematics, to have been a point on the line that leads to the present. For a very important corrective to the contemporary analytic-foundational view (one that the Romantic moment certainly attacks),Google Scholar
  6. see Fernando Zalamea, Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics, trans. Zachary Luke Fraser (London: Urbanomic, 2012).Google Scholar
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    For an excellent example of the divergence in different social contexts of the meaning and nature of calculation, see Helen Verran, Science and an African Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).Google Scholar
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  9. or the more phenomenologically indebted text by George Lakoff and Rafael E. Nafiez, Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being (New York: Basic Books, 2000) — we have no grounds to assert that it remains bound by its social context, neurobiology or anything else. This particular case of the genetic fallacy is a partner to another that will be discussed later in this book, regarding the socio-histor-ical genesis of the market in relation to its subsequent role as a foundation for the unfolding of the history of the social.Google Scholar
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    Mandelbrot’s characteristic approach is already to be found in Benoit Mandelbrot, ‘On the Distribution of Stock Price Differences,’ Operations Research 15 (1967): 1057–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. For a fuller account, see Fractals and Scaling in Finance: Discontinuity, Concentration, Risk (New York: Springer, 1997), and more recently, the seemingly prophetic text with Richard L. Hudson, The Misbehaviour of Markets: A Fractal View of Financial Turbulence (New York: Basic Books, 2004).Google Scholar
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    Colonna, ‘L’homme ruyerien’, Les études philosophiques 80(1), 2007: 63–84; 84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 210.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Jon Roffe 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of New South WalesAustralia

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