Abstract
This chapter provides a close reading of The Federalist to show how powers, organization, and constituency are interrelated throughout the papers. This chapter begins with the ways scholars have interpreted Federalist no. 51’s arguments about the separation of powers and checks and balances, and then shows how the three variables bring greater clarity and consistency to the argument in no. 51 and the subsequent papers covering Congress, the presidency, and the judiciary.
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Notes
Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, Expanded ed. ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006 ), 4.
Gary Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist ( Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981 ).
William Kristol, “The Problem of the Separation of Powers: Federalist 47–51,” in Charles Kesler, Ed., Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding ( New York: Free Press, 1987 ), 100–130.
John Ferejohn, “Madisonian Separation of Powers,” in Samuel Kernell, Ed., James Madison: The Theory and Practice of Republican Government ( Stanford, CA: Stanford University press, 2003 ), 126–55.
David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984 ), 137.
William Lee Miller, The Business of May Next: James Madison and the Founding ( Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992 ), 167.
Edward Millican, One United People: The Federalist Papers and the National Idea ( Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1990 ), 152–53
Scott Gordon, Controlling the State: Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to Today ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999 ), 310;
Martin Diamond, “The Federalist,” in History of Political Philosophy, ed. Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963 ), 573–93.
Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1908 ), 56.
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© 2015 Daniel Wirls
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Wirls, D. (2015). The Separated Institutions Sharing Power: Powers, Organization, and Constituency in The Federalist. In: The Federalist Papers and Institutional Power in American Political Development. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137499608_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137499608_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Pivot, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-50690-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-49960-8
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