Abstract
The Federalist contains a heretofore unrecognized theory of institutional power. In the papers each institution is characterized by its (1) powers, as in constitutional authority and duties, (2) organization, as in structure, size, procedures, and other internal resources, (3) constituency, as in external social support, and (4) relationship among the three elements or variables. The distribution of power among the branches is a function of the relative nature of each institution’s powers, organization, and constituency. This chapter introduces this argument and reviews the relevant literature from the scholars of the papers and American Political Development (APD).
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Notes
Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter (New York: Wiley, 1980), 26 [emphasis in the original].
Brian J. Glenn, “The Two Schools of American Political Development,” Political Studies Review 2, no. 2 (April 2004): 154.
Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908 [1961]): 56.
David Brian Robertson, The Constitution and America’s Destiny (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 22–23, is a recent example.
James S. Young, The Washington Community, 1800–1828 ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1966 ).
Nelson W. Polsby, “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives,” American Political Science Review 62, no. 1 (1968): 144–68.
Jeffrey Tulis, “The Two Constitutional Presidencies,” in The Presidency in the Political System, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000 ), 104.
Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001 ). Carpenter ascribes institutional autonomy to a combination of social ties or networks and organizational capacity.
Peter F. Nardulli, “The Constitution and American Politics: A Developmental Perspective,” in The Constitution and American Political Development: An Institutional Perspective, ed. Peter F. Nardulli ( Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992 ), 3–31.
Samuel P. Huntington, “Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century,” in The Congress and America’s Future, ed. David B. Truman ( Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973 ), 6–38.
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© 2015 Daniel Wirls
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Wirls, D. (2015). The Federalist Theory of Institutional Power. In: The Federalist Papers and Institutional Power in American Political Development. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137499608_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137499608_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Pivot, New York
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