Abstract
The development of UCAS worldwide is consistent with the evolution of UAS as a whole. Countries such as Iran see UAS as offering a significant problem to US maritime forces in the Gulf, for example. Stuart Yeh, in Comparative Strategy, argues: ‘A small force of UAVs could decimate entire divisions of soldiers … destroy all aircraft in a given theater, and put Nimitz-class carriers out of action.’1 As discussed in Chapter 1, the US DoD’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap: 2005–2030 outlines a programme for the development of UAS/UCAS. This roadmap is not policy but it does give guidance on what is possible if procurement leans towards unmanned systems. The USN has now taken over the development of the US UCAS with its UCLASS programme, detailed earlier. A number of other US companies are mirroring Northrop Grumman’s UCAS programmes, although not necessarily aligned with seaborne operations in mind. Boeing has been developing the X-45 Phantom Ray UCAS. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems is developing the Predator-C Avenger. This system is a jet-powered semi-stealthy UAS, which has the potential to be more survivable than current UAS.2 Whether Avenger-type UAS has a place in warfare is debatable, as it appears that it is not UCAS as defined by me. Other systems have been trialled, such as the Lockheed Polecat that crashed during trials in 2006 and has since been cancelled.3
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
UCAS Programme Manager Capt Rich Brasel USN, Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration: Presentation to Precision Strike Association, USN NAVAIR, Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2006, slide 9.
See Ian M. Easton and L. C. Russell Hsiao, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities’, Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2013, p. 12.
See Mark Stokes, China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability: The Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Challenge to U.S. Maritime Operations in the Western Pacific and Beyond, Washington, DC: Project 2049 Institute, 14 September 2009, pp. 14 and 18.
For an excellent explanation of what multi- and intelligent-agent systems are, see Michael Woolridge, An Introduction to Multi-Agent Systems, 2nd Edition, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2009, pp. 21–28.
Barry D. Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects, Washington, DC: Center for Budgetary Assessments, 2007, p. 290.
Hui-Min Huang and others, Specifying Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems: Interim Report, Gaithersburg: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2003, p. 43.
Robert M. Taylor, Capability, Cognition and Autonomy, Farnborough: DSTL Human Sciences Air Systems, 2003, pp. 16–17.
Ryan W. Proud and Jeremy J. Hart, FLOAAT, a Tool for Determining Levels of Autonomy and Automation, Applied to Human-Rated Space Systems, Arlington: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2005, p. 1.
Alan J. Vick and others, Aerospace Operations against Elusive Ground Targets, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001, pp. 104–105.
For a view on how China is shrinking the technology gap between itself and the West, particularly the US, see Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011, pp. 232–237.
See George W. Stimson, Introduction to Airborne Radar, El Segundo, CA: Hughes Aircraft Corporation, 1983, pp. 577–578.
Bob Preston, Dana J. Johnson, Sean J. A. Edwards, Michael Miller and Calvin Shipbaugh, Space Weapons Earth Wars, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002, p. 28.
Melvin Belcher, ‘Phased-Array Pulse-Doppler Radar’, in Airborne Pulsed Doppler Radar, Guy Morris and Linda Harkness (eds), London: Artech House, 1996, p. 136.
Ibid. The US Defense Science Board views that HPM could be utilised in UCAS — see US Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2004, Chap. 6, p. 9.
See John Haystead, ‘NGJ — Advanced Tactical Jamming for the Next-Generation Warfare’, The Journal of Electronic Defense, 35(8), 2012, 43.
For an excellent discussion on the legality of the current use of UAS, see Michael Schmitt, ‘Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems (Armed Drones) and International Humanitarian Law: Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate’, Boston University International Law Journal, 30(3), 2012, 595–619. Schmitt, Chairman, International Law Department, US Naval War College, views that there are very few legal issues unique to the employment of UCAS in the battlefield.
See P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, New York: The Penguin Press, 2009, pp. 123–124.
Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, JSP 383: The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Shrivenham: UK Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 2.
Howard M. Hensel (ed.), The Law of Armed Conflict, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007, p. 114. See also, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, p. 51.
For example, see Colm McKeogh, Innocent Civilians: The Morality of Killing in War, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001, p. 141.
For a discussion on whether such killings are justified under CIHL, see Michael Ramsden, ‘Targeted Killings and International Rights Law: The Case of Anwar Al-Awlaki’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 16(2), 2011, 385–406.
See generally, Andrew C. Orr, ‘Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: The Status of American Drone Strikes under International Law’, Cornell International Law Journal, 44, 2011, 729–752.
William H. Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 230.
For example, see Alec Banks, Jonathan Vincent, and Keith Phalp, ‘Particle Swarm Guidance System for Autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in an Air Defence Role’, The Journal of Navigation, 61(1), 2008, 9–29.
For an overview of Article 36, see International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977’, International Review of the Red Cross, 88(864), 2006, 931–956.
See R. Laurie, ‘After Top Gun: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 33(3) (Spring), 2012, 687.
Noel Sharkey, ‘Automating Warfare: Lessons Learned from the Drones’, Journal of Law, Information and Science, 21(2), 2011, 153–154.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2015 Colin Wills
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Wills, C. (2015). Unmanned Combat Air Systems: Technical and Legal Challenges. In: Unmanned Combat Air Systems in Future Warfare. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137498496_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137498496_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-69822-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-49849-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Business & Management CollectionBusiness and Management (R0)