Abstract
UCAS may eventually be capable of the full gamut of air missions, including ISTAR, Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR), perhaps even autonomous AAR from one UCAV to another, Strike Control and Reconnaissance, Close Air Support, SEAD, interdiction, EA and conceivably control of the air in its entirety, including Defensive Counter Air (DCA) and Offensive Counter Air (OCA) missions.1 One of the greatest advantages UCAS can have is a small Radar Cross Section (RCS), if Low Observable (LO) technology is used.2 UCAS could have long endurance, enabling persistence and availability, and with no aircrew allowing operations in a toxic environment. Mitigating the effects on aircrew may be a partial driver, but it is the potential reduction in procurement and life cycle costs, and the capability to persist on task for periods currently not capable by manned fighter aircraft, that will be the main reasons for their usage. Human endurance has historically limited fighter sortie duration to approximately 10 hours.3 A report from the US DoD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency states: ‘a UCAV weapon system has the potential to fully exploit the emerging information revolution and provide advanced airpower with increased tactical deterrence at a fraction of the total life cycle costs of current manned systems’.4
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Notes
For an excellent overview of radar system principles for the non-specialist, see Martin Streetly, Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems: 2010–2011, 22nd Edition, Coulsdon: IHS Jane’s, 2010, pp. 3–6.
Robert O. Work and Dr Thomas P. Ehrhard, The Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration Program: A New Dawn for Naval Aviation?, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2007, p. 27.
Mark Daly (ed.), Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, Coulsdon: IHS Jane’s, 2011, p. 8.
For a description of how passive detection systems can be used to cue fighters and SAM, see Arend G. Westra, ‘Radar versus Stealth: Passive Radar and the Future of U.S. Military Power’, Joint Forces Quarterly, (55), 2009, 139–141.
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds), Carl Von Clausewitz: On War, Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 85.
The US use the term Network Centric Warfare (NCW) vice the UK usage of NEC. For the origins and development of the concept of NCW, see Paul T. Mitchell, Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US Miltary Primacy, The International Institute for Strategic Studies: Adelphi Paper 385, Routledge: Abingdon, 2006, pp. 28–35. The Russians also use the term NCW. For a Russian view on the issues facing the Russian military — see Colonel A. Raskin, Colonel V. Pelyak, and Colonel S. Vyalov, ‘Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Pro and Contra’, Military Thought: A Russian Journal of Military Theory and Strategy, 21(3), 2012, 8–16.
For an overview of the importance of fighter aircraft manoeuvrability and turn performance, that is, sustained and instantaneous capability, see Robert L. Shaw, Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985, pp. 387–392.
Lesley Brown (ed.), Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th Edition, Vol. 1, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 157.
See Patrick Lin, George Bekey, and Keith Abney, Autonomous Military Robotics: Risks, Ethics, and Design, San Luis Obispo: Ethics and Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University, 2008, pp. 103–105.
Major Robert Trsek USAF, The Last Manned Fighter: Replacing Manned Fighters with UCAVs, Master’s Degree, Air University, 2007, pp. 13–14.
For a description of Patriot, see James O’Halloran and Christopher Foss (eds), Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence, 24th Edition, Coulsdon: IHS Jane’s, 2011, pp. 446–449.
For a description of AEGIS, see Commander Malcolm Fuller RN (ed.), Jane’s Naval Weapon Systems, Coulsdon: IHS Jane’s, 2011, pp. 179–186.
See Major Robert C. Nolan II USAF, The Pilotless Air Force? A Look at Replacing Human Operators with Advanced Technology, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF Air University, 1997, p. 36.
DRFM jammers are capable of emulating the coded waveform of radars, creating false information, potentially mitigating their use — see Curtis Schleher, Electronic Warfare in the Information Age, Boston: Artech House, 1999, pp. 293–294.
For example, see Craig Penrice, ‘Single Seat Fighter — The Way Ahead for the 21st Century’, Air and Space Europe, 2(1), 2000, 10.
Steve Davies, F-15C Eagles in Combat, Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2005, p. 6.
In 1991, the Military Commission issued instructions for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and all military academies to study the Gulf War — see Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Johnathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995, pp. 31–33.
Dr C. J. Edge and Dr V. M. Lee, The Long-Term Health Effects of Flying High Performance Aircraft, Farnborough: UK Ministry of Defence, 1999, p. 19.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) minimum flying-hour requirement for aircrew to remain combat-ready has for decades been 15 hours per month — see John F. Schank and others, Finding the Right Balance: Simulator and Live Training for Navy Units: Appendix D, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002, p. 133.
John A. Ausink and others, Investment Strategies for Improving Fifth-Generation Fighter Training, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011, p. xi.
RAF Air Warfare Centre, AP 3000: Air Power Doctrine, 2nd Edition, Norwich: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1993, p. 1.2.15.
See UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0–01: British Defence Doctrine, 4th Edition, Shrivenham: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2011, p. 5.
Fran P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, Abingdon: Routledge, 2007, p. 3.
Louis Morton, U.S. Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific — Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962, p. 589.
Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (eds), The Army Air Forces in World War II — The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki — June 1944 to August 1945, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950, pp. ix–x.
Andrew F. Krepinvech, ‘The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets: The Eroding Foundations of American Power’, Foreign Affairs, 88(4), 2009, 26.
Thomas P. Ehrhard and Robert O. Work, Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Net working: The Case for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air System, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2008, pp. 7–8.
Mark A. Gunzinger, Sustaining America’s Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010, p. x.
This maxim has been the modus operandi of the RAF, almost since its inception — see, for example, A. H. Narracott, Air Power in War, London: Frederick Muller Ltd, 1945, p. 160.
For the origins of Customary International Humanitarian Law, see JeanMarie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law — Volume I: Rules, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. xxv–xxvii.
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Wills, C. (2015). Overview. In: Unmanned Combat Air Systems in Future Warfare. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137498496_3
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