Conclusion: Beyond 8%: Resituating Emissions Trading

Abstract

The case studies of emissions trading schemes in the preceding chapters have all been remarkably resistant to the kinds of civilizing processes proposed by Callon. Scheme after scheme has seen caps on carbon undermined by weak targets or overly generous offset provisions. The Australian federal government’s baseline-and-credit ‘Direct Action’ policy passed in October 2014 is the latest example of this tendency. This policy seems to have unlearned the last two decades of climate policy, reverting to an effectively voluntary scheme similar to the predecessor of the NSW scheme discussed in Chapter 3. The policy sets sectoral baselines at the highest historic point of emissions, rather than using best-available technology standards. This decision will create windfall gains for business-as-usual fluctuations in emissions and improvements in technology, whilst the limited financial consequences for non-participation will allow the biggest polluters in a field to continue polluting (Green, 2014). Furthermore, the EU appears firmly mired in the ambition paradox discussed in Chapter 6. The latest target designed to stimulate demand for the EU emissions trading is likely to be a cakewalk, according to the European civil society organization Sandbag’s October 2014 analysis.¹