Abstract
Whereas Richard Rorty restricts the power of creative self-invention to the private sphere, Michel Foucault, in L’Usage des plaisirs, Le Souci de soi, and other later texts, shows that self-creation (or the care of the self) on the contrary might have strong effects in the public sphere and that the idea of a radical private-public split is therefore untenable. How does the idea of self-creation present itself in this Franco-American conversation or theoretical dialogue? Both Rorty and Foucault were provocative self-fashioners in the field of theory. Moreover, both often felt closer to the poets than to the philosophers. As a young analytic philosopher, Rorty experienced a profound melancholy because Platonism had not kept its tempting promise. In the late 1950s and 1960s, Foucault’s writings on literature and art made it obvious how much he had been influenced by writers such as Nietzsche, Raymond Roussel, Maurice Blanchot, Georges Bataille, Pierre Klossowski, Philippe Sollers (and the Tel Quel group), and de Sade. One should also think of his baroque writing style, for instance in Les Mots et les choses. Nonetheless, the idea of self-creation plays a different role in Rorty’s and Foucault’s theoretical frameworks.
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Notes
In this context, see also Rorty’s paper “Justice as a Larger Loyalty,” Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues, ed. Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 223–37.
In the context of our discussion, one might ask what role Stanley Cavell’s understanding of morality, as he develops it in Part II of The Claim of Reason, plays for the critique of the attempt to discover atemporal foundations of moral obligation. It is in his magnum opus that his antifoundationalist conception of moral obligation, as well as his moral fallibilism and his refusal to appeal to self-evident principles, becomes particularly obvious. He writes: “Morality must leave itself open to repudiation; it provides one possibility of settling conflict, a way of encompassing conflict which allows the continuance of personal relationships against the hard and apparently inevitable fact of misunderstanding, mutually incompatible wishes, commitments, loyalties, interests and needs, a way of mending relationships and maintaining the self in opposition to itself or others. Other ways of settling or encompassing conflict are provided by politics, religion, love and forgiveness, rebellion, and withdrawal” (1999: 269). In this context, see the chapter “Ethics and Politics” (119–47) in Espen Hammer, Stanley Cavell: Skepticism, Subjectivity, and the Ordinary (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). See also Rorty’s piece, “Cavell on Skepticism,” in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982: 176–90, especially 185–87).
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© 2015 Ulf Schulenberg
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Schulenberg, U. (2015). “Redemption from Egotism”: Richard Rorty, the Private-Public Distinction, and the Novel. In: Romanticism and Pragmatism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137474193_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137474193_12
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