Abstract
We argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophical perspective on Gödel’s most famous theorem is even more radical than has commonly been assumed. Wittgenstein shows in detail that there is no way that the Gödelian construct of a string of signs could be assigned a useful function within (ordinary) mathematics. — The focus is on Appendix III to Part I of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. The present reading highlights the exceptional importance of this particular set of remarks and, more specifically, emphasises its refined composition and rigorous internal structure.
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© 2016 Wolfgang Kienzler and Sebastian Sunday Grève
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Kienzler, W., Grève, S.S. (2016). Wittgenstein on Gödelian ‘Incompleteness’, Proofs and Mathematical Practice: Reading Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Part I, Appendix III, Carefully. In: Grève, S.S., Mácha, J. (eds) Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472540_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472540_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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